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ABSTRACT
LABOUR LEGISLATION AND POLICY IN A POST-COLONIAL STATE s 
ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE TRADE UNIONS IN ZAMBIA 
1971 - 86
Evance Kalula
This is a study of some of the major aspects of the development of 
post-colonial labour policy in Zambia. It examines the Zambian 
Government's attempts to 'incorporate' trade unions into its 
strategy of national development. Except for such later references 
as it was possible to include, it covers the period from 1971 to 
1986.
The purpose of the study is to examine the role played by law in 
the Zambian Government's attempts to incorporate trade unions and 
the rank and file sufficiently in the plans for national 
development. Zambian trade unions at independence were quite 
autonomous. Given the power and autonomy of trade unions, their 
attitude and approach have been viewed by the Government as crucial 
elements of national development. The Government has, therefore, 
progressively adopted measures aimed at the closer control and 
regulation of the trade union movement and its membership. In 
spite of such attempts, however, the approach in Zambia has been 
less coercive than in some other African countries. The Government 
has tended to rely on "pressure rather than force".
In this context government reforms are examined in four key areas: 
the regulation of trade union activity, the restructuring of 
collective bargaining (including incomes policy), industrial 
conflict and dispute settlement procedures, and workers' 
participation. It is concluded that the Government has not 
achieved its stated major objectives. Although trade unions and 
their members have generally accepted the Government's overall 
authority to set the agenda of national development, they have 
resisted attempts to curtail their autonomy. It is on account of 
this failure that the Government now intends to integrate trade 
unions into the State completely.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This study is primarily concerned with an examination of some of 
the key aspects of post-colonial labour policy in Zambia in 
pursuance of the thesis that attempts to •incorporate' trade unions 
into the government strategy of national development have been the 
major pre-occupation of the State and, consequently, labour 
relations law since independence. Research was conducted at 
various intervals during the period between January 1981 and 
December 1986. The purpose was to examine both primary and 
secondary materials in various libraries and archives in Zambia and 
the United Kingdom. Further research was also conducted at the 
International Labour Office (the ILO) in Geneva between July 1984 
and July 1986 in the course of the author's fellowship there.
Field work consisted of interviews with Zambian government 
officials, trade unionists, officers of employers' associations and 
ILO officials (see Appendix I at P. 264). Additional material was 
also drawn from the Zambia Labour Relations Project which the 
author initiated at the University of Zambia at Lusaka with the aim 
of collecting and collating teaching and research materials.
The main justification for the study lies in the need to broaden 
research into Zambian labour issues. The 'labour question' in 
Zambia has attracted considerable scholarly interest since the 
development of the mining industry on the Copperbelt. As a result 
we have had notable contributions by a number of historians, 
anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists. Legal 
scholars however, have not followed suit. No attempt has been made 
to analyse the role of the law in the development of labour 
relations and policy within the economic and socio-political 
context.
2This study is, therefore, an attempt to fill part of the gap in 
that respect. The evolving Zambian industrial relations system 
continues to be of interest to students of post-colonial 
developments. It presents the researcher with a viable system 
where in spite of attempts at 'trade union incorporation' and the 
advent of the one-party state, certain fundamental principles 
adopted from the British industrial relations system, including the 
"tripartite” structure have been maintained in varying degrees.
The trade union movement continues to be one of the strongest and 
best organised in Africa, including Nigeria, South Africa and North 
Africa. Thus the system inherited at independence has been adapted 
to post-colonial political, social and economic developments 
without totally destroying trade union autonomy in spite of the 
ever increasing state intervention in industrial relations.
In this introductory chapter we briefly outline the analytical 
framework of the study. In particular we briefly describe the 
basic approach which emphasises the economic and socio-political 
context of the policy we have characterised as 'trade union 
incorporation'. This can be defined briefly as an attempt to 
persuade trade unions through legislation and other means to assume 
a non-conflictual role in line with the Government's defined 
objectives for national development. We explore this concept of 
incorporation in greater detail in Chapter Two. In this thesis we 
are examining the law within the context of other factors so it is 
necessary to highlight relevant economic, constitutional and legal 
developments that have formed the background to the Government's 
labour policy since independence. We also describe the sources and 
methods of research used in the study. We conclude with a summary 
of the major themes discussed in the following chapters. Before 
looking more closely at these points, let us consider how we view 
the study of law and our basic analytical approach.
l.A. Analytical Framework
As we have noted, the main justification for embarking on this 
study is the need to broaden the study of labour issues in Zambia, 
to take into account economic and other critical factors that have 
been instrumental in shaping labour policy. The significance of 
the relationship between law on the one hand and economic and other 
factors on the other, although still problematic, is now widely 
recognised by many legal scholars.4 The relationship between law 
and other factors is crucial in the study of labour law policy. 
Extra-legal factors, particularly economic ones, are of paramount 
importance in this field as they determine the shape and role of 
the law to a large extent.
Our analytical approach in this study has benefited from two 
broadly similar traditions of legal scholarship that recognise the 
importance of the economic, social and political context in the 
study of law. These are the "Law in Context" and "Law and 
Development" approaches. Although the two approaches are not in 
themselves schools of thought along the traditional lines of 
jurisprudence, they do, however, have distinctive analytical 
features that merit consideration. They can be summarised as 
follows:
(a) Law in Context
The Law in Context approach, as set out in the book series of that 
name published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, seeks to put the study 
of law in context by examining issues "beyond the exposition of 
legal doctrine, to consider critically the law in its social and 
economic context." Thus the approach calls for the treatment of 
legal issues from a broader base than has been traditional among 
legal scholars. Materials from other social sciences are used to 
explain the effect of law. In this way it has been suggested that 
the study of law is both "stimulating and more realistic than the 
bare
exposition of legal rules".6 Although the Law in Context approach 
was devised with the United Kingdom, a developed country, mainly in 
mind, its relevance to the study of law in developing countries is 
obvious. Developing countries have relatively few stable 
institutions of the modern state and extra-legal factors have a 
more direct influence on the administration of law. It can, 
therefore, be argued that because the operation of policy is 'more 
volatile' and the law 'less autonomous', the Law in Context 
approach that takes account of these factors is more suitable in 
analysing the role of the law.
(b) Law and Development
The study of law and development was largely a response to attempts 
to use law in support of development objectives in the Third 
World.7 There are a number of interpretations of the function of 
law in development. There are at least three: conflict 
amelioration, law and society studies and problem solving.8 The 
function of law in conflict amelioration is "to create a milieu in 
which social and cultural diversities are harmonised, values 
essential to societal and governmental purposes are unified (and 
others left alone), and tensions resolved .... to maintain a
gclimate of desired, necessary and inevitable change." This 
approach approximates the use of law in the Third World to that of 
developed countries in spite of different underlying economic and 
other factors. Law and society studies on the other hand emphasise 
"the general connections between law, culture and development".10 
According to Trubek "the basic goal is to understand 'law' as a 
social phenomenon".11 Law and society studies similarly proceed 
from assumptions derived from studies of law and society in the 
developed countries. This in itself, as we have suggested above,
is not necessarily a short-coming. The approach, however, assumes
12"universalistic rules" or "the autonomous legal system". The 
third approach.
what Seidman has called problem solving,13 basically regards the 
function of law as being to induce the desired change in terms of 
development objectives. The task of the state in development and 
the use of law in this case becomes one of determining change. The 
law, therefore, is essentially an instrument for channelling 
change. The law seeks to change behaviour and creates institutions 
that bring about change.14
In our analysis of the relevant issues in this study, we have not 
adopted any one of the two approaches in preference to the other.
We have, rather, been influenced implicitly by various elements in 
the two broad traditions of legal scholarship. This approach has 
been reinforced by the primary concern of this study which is the 
nature and product of the interaction between labour legislation as 
part of government policy of development and trade unions. We do 
not regard law as an exclusive determining factor in the 
interaction. We regard the law as subject to pressures within 
society and, naturally, from without. This perception does not 
deny the importance of law. On the contrary, it recognises that 
law provides a framework that accounts for social order, direction 
and cohesion. The law's effect is, however, affected by 
extra-legal factors. There is, therefore, a need to broaden the 
study of the role of law to appreciate issues more fully. We 
submit that this approach is more relevant to the study of the role 
of law in labour policy in Zambia. Like other emergent polities, 
the operation of policy imperatives in Zambia cam be said to be 
more 'volatile' and the law less 'autonomous' as a result.
It is evident that in the development of labour policy, law, in 
particular labour legislation, has been used in an instrumental 
way. The use of law as an instrument of policy is a stimulating 
and controversial subject that a number of eminent scholars have 
dealt with.1** Wherever we think it is useful to our analysis of 
developments in Zambia, we have taken account of some views in the 
debate. We have, however, refrained from any critical analysis
of the questions concerning the debate. We do not think it would 
usefully add to our concern in this study which is the effect of 
the strategy of trade union incorporation for development as we 
have defined it. What we think is more useful is our attempt to 
highlight the effect of law on the relationship between the state 
and trade unions in a post-colonial society. We explore some 
elements of the relationship in Chapter Two.
A number of background factors have been relevant to the 
development of labour policy in Zambia. In Appendix II (P. 266)we 
outline some of the basic social and economic indicators which 
constitute Zambia's national profile and, therefore, form the 
background to all developments in the country. There are, 
moreover, four elements in context that are more important and need 
to be mentioned here. These are the economic, constitutional, 
geo-political and the African experience. The most important of 
these have been economic factors since they have shaped labour 
policy more decisively.
Constitutional factors have also been instrumental in shaping 
labour policy, particularly as they have provided a basis for the 
necessary labour legislation. The African experience has generally 
influenced the development of the relationship between the state 
and organised labour. In the next chapter we discuss the 
significance of the general African experience to the development 
of labour policy in Zambia. In the following pages we briefly 
consider (i) economic imperatives, (ii) constitutional development 
and (iii) geo-political factors.
l.A.l Economic Imperatives
The primacy of economic considerations in the strategy of 
incorporation cannot be over-emphasised. It is clearly apparent 
from both the Livingstone Tripartite Conference Report, 1967, which 
was one of the major sources of impetus to the 1971 legislation.
Various studies thatand successive national development plans.16 
have dealt with the question of labour and development in Zambia 
have also recognised that economic development has been central to 
labour policy, the wider elements of political, social and cultural 
development notwithstanding.17 Thus economic development can be 
assumed to be the sine qua non to development in other areas. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that the policy to restructure 
collective bargaining, contain industrial conflict and formulate an 
effective incomes policy has been central to the incorporation 
strategy. Taken together, the introduction of legally binding 
collective bargaining procedures and agreements, restrictive strike 
policy, incomes and prices policy, and to a lesser extent, workers' 
participation represent the economic aspects of post-colonial 
labour policy in Zambia.
In the following chapters we shall deal with the issues concerning 
these areas of policy. For our present purposes it is useful to 
give a brief account of the main economic objectives and 
developments in support of which the law, in particular, the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, was formulated.
The importance of economic considerations which were later to 
become the main basis of the trade union incorporation strategy was 
evident as early as 1964, soon after Zambia became independent. In 
December 1964 a United Nations Mission, sent to make a survey of 
the prospects for the country's economic development, observed in 
relation to wages:
"There is really a choice for Zambia: in the next five years 
it can have big increases in wages or big increases in 
employment, not both" (emphasis given)
It is economic considerations such as this that came to shape 
post-independence labour policy as much as any other factors. 
Increasingly, the government became pre-occupied with the need to 
balance what were seen as wage labour's aspirations with the rest
8of society's claims. Society's claims with which trade union's 
claims were to be reconciled were set out in a series of National 
Development plans which set out ambitious targets for the country's 
development. The First one was embarked upon for the period 
1966-70, followed by the Second (1972-76) , the Third (1979-83) and 
the current Interim National Development Plan devised in 1985.20
The goals were to raise the general welfare and education, to 
achieve sectional and regional balance in the economy, and to 
prevent the development of wide gaps in the levels of incomes. As 
will be apparent in the following chapters, wage labour as led by 
trade unions has been a central focus of these goals.21
The development plans were progressively followed by major changes 
in the economic structure and control of the economy. Thus in 
1968, for instance, the government invited 26 major companies to 
accept a 51 per cent shareholding by the State, a move said to have 
been prompted by the national philosophy of 'Humanism' which we 
briefly discuss below (Chapter Two). In August 1969, therefore, 
the mining industry was nationalised. In 1970 similar measures 
concerning the banks and other financial institutions were 
announced, but later abandoned in 1971. The result of the 
nationalisation measures were the creation of the Zambia Industrial 
and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) group, the holding company of most 
parastatal companies. In the mining sector, the Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (the ZCCM) created in 1982 is a result of 
those measures. The Company is owned 60.3 per cent by ZIMCO, 17.3 
per cent by the Zambia Copper Investments (part of South Africa's 
Anglo-American Corporation Group) , 6.9 per cent by ITM 
International, 4.2 per cent by US private interests and 1.3 per 
cent by British private interests.22
The rest of the ZIMCO group has interests in virtually every sector 
of the economy from insurance, banking, transport, hotel and 
catering, wholesale and retail trades, to railways, airways.
19
telecommunications and energy. It has assets of well over K2,000m, 
making it the largest company in independent black Africa.23
The above changes were followed by other institutional changes from 
1975 onwards that included the intensification of rural development 
and changes in land tenure.
These changes provided the economic impetus with which to 
incorporate trade unions. They were so pervasive that the 
inclusion of labour became a matter of course, its autonomy 
notwithstanding. Thus the major argument was that there was need 
for labour to bring its attitudes in line with what had become 
national aspirations covering every sector of the country's 
economic and social life.
For the first decade of independence the changes were aided by a 
relatively prosperous economy. Largely owing to copper, the 
Zambian economy was one of the richest and fastest-growing 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. From 1964-69, for instance, the 
country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an estimated 13 per 
cent per annum, real output grew by 5.5 per cent and trade terms 
improved 7 per cent annually due to higher copper prices.
1.A.1(a) Effects of Economic Decline
In contrast to the more favourable economic prospects during the 
initial years, worsening economic decline of recent years has had 
adverse effects on state/union relations and, consequently, 
government efforts concerning trade union incorporation.
The Zambian economy has been on a steady decline since the 
beginning of the 1970's. In 1985 a sudden worsening of the 
country's foreign exchange shortage pushed the economy further into 
recession and led to difficult negotiations with external creditors
10
demanding more austerity. In domestic terms the austerity 
programme embarked upon as a result heightened political tension 
and called into question the Government's ability to impose the 
policies without resort to measures like anti-union legislation and 
detentions which have increasingly been a disturbing feature of 
recent years.25
The current economic problems which are straining the country's 
political cohesion and state/union relations have their origins in 
the country's dependency on the copper mining industry, which 
continues to provide over 90 per cent of the country's export 
earnings. The decade after independence was followed by high 
copper prices and, as a result, Zambian income per capita bore 
favourable comparison to a number of other African countries,
(Table 1, P 11 below) . By 1985 the overall picture of key economic 
indicators was markedly different (Table 2, P 12 below), while 
Zambia's position may not have worsened in relation to other 
countries, it has definitely not improved. The high metal prices 
enabled the government to borrow heavily abroad and invest 
extensively in industrial and infrastructural development. Since 
1979 however, copper prices have been mostly on the decline 
resulting in a downward spiral of foreign exchange earnings. 
Productivity has also been adversely affected as industry has 
tended to economise on vital spare parts.
The decline in foreign exchange precipitated a debt, and balance of 
payments crisis, and since 1981, the government has resorted to the 
International Monetary Fund (the IMF) standby facilities and the 
"Paris Club" reschedulings.26
11
GDP comparisons: Zambia and five other African countries in 1970
Country GDP per capita Percentage of GDP
represented by:
(US$) Imports Exports
Zambia 421 37 54
Ivory Coast 347 28 33
Nigeria 145 16 17
Tanzania 97 28 24
Malawi 74 35 22
South Africa 784 25 22
Source: Based on Daniel's calculations from International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (Washington: IMF, 
monthly). Voi. xxix. No 9, September 1976 - Daniel P, 
Africanisation, Nationalisation and Inequality: Mining Labour and 
the Copperbelt in Zambian Development (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge), 1979, p 9.
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TABLE 2
GDP Comparisons: Zambia and five other African countries in 1985:
Country GDP per capita Percentage of GDP 
represented by:
(USS) Imports Exports
Zambia 460 27 26
Ivory Coast 691 41 34
Nigeria 739 25 32
Tanzania 237 27 14
Malawi 210(a) 28 22
South Africa 2654 31 29
Notes: (a) 1983
Source: Calculated from African Review, 1986
(Saffron Walden, Essex 1986 and 1987) 
Africa South of the Sahara, 15th edition
(European Publications, London, 1986)
13
Consequently, the population has had to put up with a sharp drop in 
living standards. In 1985 the real per capita GNP was already over 
25 per cent below the 1977 level. Since then, IMF - prescribed 
measures to boost export earnings and agricultural output, and cut 
budget and balance of payments deficits (including the devaluation 
of the national currency (the Kwacha) and its subsequent auctioning, 
subsidy removal, credit restraint and higher agricultural producer 
prices) have adversely affected the cost of living.27
Moreover, the measures combined with the shortage of goods caused 
by import cuts (up to 40 per cent of industry's requirements are 
imported) and falling productivity have constantly pushed up 
consumer inflation. It is currently estimated that inflation is 
running at 60-65 per cent, up from 12 per cent in 1982. Wage 
settlements for 1986, on the other hand, were averaging between 40 
and 45 per cent.28 Successive price increases have produced 
constant union demands for wage increases which the government and 
employers have been unable to meet in full. The response has been 
a succession of walkouts and strikes culminating in food riots in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt late in 1986 and early 1987.29
Relations between the trade union movement as represented by the 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (the ZCTU) and the government were 
always uneasy. In 1983 they became acrimonious when the government 
tried to introduce a 10 per cent ceiling on wage increases to 
comply with IMF conditions for a standby facility. It was not 
until April 1984 that the dispute was resolved when the ZCTU 
accepted government policy in return for a resumption of free-wage 
bargaining. The compromise was short-lived. By the end of 1984 
ZCTU criticism had shifted to the Government's handling of the 
economy, inefficiency and bad management of government operations 
and corruption in the Civil Service, the ruling party and 
parastatals. Because of the ZCTU's strong organisation and power 
base (relatively superior to that of the ruling party) the 
government has increasingly felt threatened, perceiving criticism 
by the ZCTU and its member unions as a direct political challenge 
to its authority.
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The government has responded in its traditional way, by a mixture 
of confrontation and conciliation. In January 1985, for instance, 
the President resorted to the rarely used Public Security 
Regulations and banned all strikes in the Health Service.31 That 
was in response to walkouts and "go-slows" by doctors, nurses and 
other health employees in pursuit of a monthly wage increase of 50 
kwacha. The next month, February, the government partially revoked 
price increases imposed earlier and announced a monthly wage 
increase of 30 kwacha for low-paid categories in the public 
service. The response was that labour unrest spread to the local 
government and the insurance sectors.
In further response, the government invoked powers under Section 20 
of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The provision gives the 
Minister the power to instruct an employer to terminate 
arrangements for the deduction of trade union dues from union 
members' wages where a particular trade union or some of its 
members are engaged in illegal industrial action. For the purposes 
of the section, it does not matter whether a particular strike is 
approved by the union concerned (that is to say an official 
dispute) or not approved (that is to say unofficial dispute). It 
suffices that the strike in question, for instance, is in 
contravention of the procedures laid down under the Act. The 
measure was a deliberate threat to union finances, calculated to 
weaken the ability of unions to organise industrial action.
Further industrial action resulted in the extension of the already 
too broad essential services category in which strikes are illegal. 
Thus, the banking and communication sectors were included in the 
category, among other sectors. On Labour Day 1986, the President 
chose to resurrect the issue of 'total incorporation' of the ZCTU 
as a wing of the ruling party, by announcing a new coimnittee to 
study ways of integration. Although the proposal had been put 
forward as early as 1982, the government had until then resisted 
party attempts to push it further.
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In late 1987 and early 1988 the continuing decline in the economy 
has resulted in massive redundancies which tended to curb union 
power. Food riots and growing dissension from the left wing of the 
ruling party compelled the government to re-assess its austerity 
programme. As a result, the President abruptly broke off 
negotiations with the IMF, decided on fixed foreign exchange rates 
and re-introduced price controls.34 Whether state-union relations 
will improve as a result remains to be seen. Much will depend on 
how the economy performs. What is significant for the purposes of 
this study is that government efforts to incorporate trade unions 
were greatly affected by the decline of the economy. We shall 
return to this theme in the concluding chapter.
1.A.2 The Legal System and Constitutional Developments
Zambia at independence inherited a constitution and a legal system. 
As in the case of the received industrial relations system these 
too have been modified over the years. A brief outline of the 
major elements of the legal system and constitutional developments 
is useful to appreciate the overall framework within which the 
policy of trade union incorporation was formulated.
In tracing Zambia's legal history, the country must be treated as 
comprising three territories - Barotseland, North-Western Rhodesia 
and North-Eastern Rhodesia.35 In 1891 Paramount Chief Lewanika of 
the Lozi people is said to have requested British protection for 
Barotseland. Lewanika claimed hegemony over surrounding 
territories comprising most of what turned out to be present 
Zambia. As a result the whole country was brought within the 
Charter of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (the BSA) 
with powers of government and protection. In 1900 a concession 
with Lewanika was signed by representatives of the British Crown.36 
The concession was regarded as a treaty between Britain and the 
Barotse nation. It granted the BSA trading and mineral rights in 
exchange for undertakings to protect the country under a British 
Resident. Two separate Orders-in-Council made provision for the
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BSA Company's administration, the Barotseland - North-Western 
Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899 and the North-Eastern Rhodesia 
Order-in-Council, 1900.37
The Protectorate's38 government was taken over in 1924 by the 
Crown. In 1953 the Country became part of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland.39 Each constituent country of the 
Federation retained its constitutional status, that is to say. 
Southern Rhodesia remained a self-governing colony, whilst Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were still protectorates. Each country also 
retained its own judicial system although there was a Federal 
Supreme Court with original and appellate jurisdictions. The 
Federation was brought about in the face of strong opposition from 
the indigenous African population in all the three countries. As a
result of continuing opposition, the Federation was dissolved in 
401963. The country was granted full independence as a Republic on 
24 October 1964.41
At independence Zambia inherited a Westminster style multi-party 
system under an executive President. The multi-party system, and 
the First Republic that came with it, lasted until 1972.
The country became a "One-party participatory democracy" on 13
42December 1972 when the Second Republic was proclaimed. It has a 
centralised government under an executive president. There are 
separate party and government structures both headed by the 
President. The Central Committee of the ruling party, the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), in principle makes policies 
that the Cabinet implements. In practice however, the Cabinet has 
policy-making powers as well. Parliament consists of a President 
and an unicameral National Assembly which includes both elected 
(the greatest majority) members by universal suffrage and a few 
nominated by the President. The President also appoints the ruling 
party's Secretary-General, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet over 
which he presides. He is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces.
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Other notable constitutional aspects include entrenched fundamental 
rights and the House of Chiefs with an advisory capacity.
Basic law consists of legislation by Parliament, the common law, 
doctrines of equity and the statutes which were in force in England 
on 17 August 1911, and later British statutes specifically applied 
by parliament.43 Effect is given to customary law by all courts in 
appropriate cases subject to written laws.
The judicature consists of the Supreme Court, the High Court and 
Subordinate Courts divided into four classes. The Subordinate 
Courts have limited civil and criminal jurisdiction.
The status, within the legal system of the Industrial Relations 
Court which forms part of this Study (Chapter Six) , is a matter of 
some debate. Some commentators have concluded that the court is 
unconstitutional and amounts to a usurpation of judicial power by 
the legislature.44 Its constitutional status and powers have been 
challenged before the High Court.45 In spite of such challenges, 
however, neither the government nor the National Assembly has felt 
it necessary to clarify its place in the constitutional and legal 
system.
1.A.3 The Geo-Political Situation
Since the beginning of the quest for independence through armed 
force in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola in 
the early 1960's, and the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in 1965, the geo-political situation in Southern 
Africa has been a significant factor in Zambian domestic and 
foreign policy, including labour policy. Zambia has been embroiled 
in the costly turmoil arising out of the conflicts in the 
neighbouring countries.46 The attainment of independence by 
Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe brought little relief as armed
conflict continues in the region. The continuing deadlock in 
Namibia and the deterioration of the political climate in South 
Africa has not diminished the problems the country faces as 
land-locked, especially the disruption of transport links.
The government has from time to time readily cited the problems 
arising out of the geo-political situation in support of the need 
for trade union incorporation. The trade union movement for its 
part has in the past broadly supported the government, including 
its stance on sanctions first against Rhodesia and now South 
Africa. However, there are indications that trade union support is 
now less forthcoming as the economic situation continues to worsen. 
A number of trade union leaders such as the ZCTU Chairman,
Frederick Chiluba, have spoken of the need to be "more realistic 
about the Southern African situation and the country's vital 
interests."47
President Kaunda recently talked of the inability of frontline 
states to impose sanctions against South Africa at once because of 
the vulnerability of their economies.48 In spite of Zambia's 
support for economic sanctions against South Africa, therefore, it 
has yet to impose them. Zambia has apparently taken note of 
President Botha's threats to impose retaliatory sanctions on South 
Africa's neighbours. That would hit copper exports. Some 70 per 
cent of copper and other mineral exports are still shipped through 
South Africa because of problems on the alternative Tazara railway 
route to the Tanzanian Coast.
The presence of the African National Congress headquarters (the 
ANC) in Lusaka also makes Zambia vulnerable to military operations 
by South Africa. In fact, there were several such operations 
against Zambian territory in 1987 and numerous others before then. 
Apparently, as a response to such pressure. President Kaunda has 
indirectly continued to encourage contacts between the ANC and 
South African interests, such as business leaders, which he
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initiated in September, 1985.49 With the escalation of the Civil 
War in Mozambique and the continuing deadlock in Angola, the 
geo-political situation is bound to continue being significant in 
domestic policy. Anxieties also continue in relations with Zaire 
which have been strained for years, culminating in major expulsions 
of each other's expatriate communities in 1984. Strains in 
relations with Zaire tend to have a more direct effect on the 
Copperbelt, the centre of the trade union movement.50
It is apparent from the above brief summary that the geo-political 
situation constitutes a potent background factor in state/union 
relations and, therefore, labour policy.
l.B. Sources and Research Methodology
As indicated above, both primary and secondary sources were 
utilised in this study. Documentary materials used included 
official Labour Department reports, newspaper accounts, materials 
in various archives and libraries, including the National Archives 
of Zambia, the Copper Industry Service Bureau (the CISB) and the 
ILO records on Zambia. Other documents included various 
Commissions of Enquiry Reports on labour matters, trade unions' and 
employers' associations' documents and data collected in the course 
of the Zambian Labour Relations project. We also made use of a 
number of surveys and experts' reports.
For field work we relied mainly on unstructured interviews, data 
collected in the course of our occasional work with various 
government agencies and trade unions, and the Zambia Labour 
Relations project, which as indicated in the acknowledgements 
section, was initiated with the aim of collecting and collating 
research and teaching materials at the University of Zambia. 
Research on labour matters in Africa, as several researchers before 
have testified, can present the researcher with a multitude of
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problems.51 It is, therefore, important to give a brief account of 
the problems, limitations and the choice of particular methods of 
inquiry. One of the major problems with research based on 
documents in Africa, including Zambia, is the inadequacy of 
facilities for the collection of information and data. More than 
twenty years after independence the collection of information and 
data in government departments still has a very low priority in 
government operations. Few resources and little manpower are 
allocated to the task. Elsewhere we identified the inability to 
gather data as one of the major problems that adversely affects the 
Zambian Labour Department’s capacity to play its proper role in the 
development of effective labour policy.5^
Even when documentary material is available it is often in a 
disorderly state due to unsatisfactory filing and cataloguing. In 
some cases, as we discovered at the Zambian High Commission Library 
in London, lack of manpower means that no attempt is made to sort 
out the material. The researcher has to find his own way through 
such material.
Materials also tend to be dated. Up-to-date material is difficult 
to find for various reasons. Government departments take years to 
bring out annual reports, at certain times there has been a backlog 
of three years or more.53 Lack of current materials is also a 
result of government sensitivity and tendency to treat routine 
documents as confidential for as long as possible. We found 
instances where Zambian documents on open shelves in foreign 
libraries were still treated as confidential at heme. In spite of 
these problems however, we endeavoured to utilise as many primary 
documentary materials as possible for the study.
We relied on oral evidence a great deal in our field work. Apart 
from commonly recognised problems concerning oral evidence which 
arise from possible bias and memory distortion, other limitations 
had to be confronted« identification of respondents and the
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problem of interviewing techniques. Labour has always been a 
highly sensitive subject in Africa. It tends to generate adverse 
reactions ranging from cold indifference to white heat. The 
problem of the political sensitivity to labour matters is probably 
greater in Zambia than in most other African countries on account 
of the labour movement's relatively greater capacity and potential 
for political involvement. Preventive detention of labour figures 
has been quite frequent since independence. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many people we interviewed preferred to remain 
anonymous except where their views were a matter of public record. 
We naturally gave assurances not to identify them in such cases.
In some cases, however, we have used identifiable views in 
preference to anonymous ones. We have, therefore, not completely 
taken Foltz's reported view that
".... because of the conditions .... and even more in 
consideration of the use to which such information might be 
put, we have as a general rule, not identified our 
respondents... we are certain that anyone who has done 
recent political research in Africa will appreciate the need 
for such reticence."
Except for the data drawn from the Zambia Labour Relations project 
and two other surveys, we utilised the 'free-answer' ('open-ended') 
technique in our interviews. We did not use a formal questionnaire 
for several reasons. Some of our respondents, especially workers, 
were either barely literate or completely illiterate. Formal 
questionnaires also tend to 'direct' responses and generate fear 
and suspicion where a sensitive subject such as labour is 
concerned. Another reason why we did not use a formal 
questionnaire was that in some instances views were solicited in 
situations where we were participating. Such instances included 
situations where we were part of delegations, participating in 
seminars or consulted for advice. We did, however, make copious 
notes either during interviews where possible or soon after each 
interview. We also used a basic 'interrogatory paradigm' which 
sketched out our talking points for interview purposes
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(Appendix I at P.262).
Our choice of the unstructured interview method was also influenced 
by its use by several prominent researchers in this field.55 in 
1971 a study group convened by the ILO - associated International 
Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) also preferred "the informal 
interview, rather than structured survey". In their view it would 
produce better results, given the nature of the subject and the 
type of respondents. The group also argued that "the interviews 
will not lead to a table of quantified responses, but are 
considered as checks on the more abstract findings developed by 
other methods".56 It can also be argued that the 'contextual' 
approach such as we have endeavoured to adopt in this study - in 
particular the analysis of basic material like statutes, existing 
literature and seme collective agreements - does not easily depend 
on the quantification of data.
l.C Thematic Summary of Contents
Apart from Chapters Two and Three, the following chapters are 
organised around themes in the four areas that we have identified 
as crucial to the Government's strategy of trade union 
incorporation: trade union activity, collective bargaining 
(including incomes policy), industrial conflict and dispute 
settlement and workers' participation. Some of the major issues 
that form the subjects of the chapters are summarised in Chapter 
Two. It is, however, useful to briefly outline the themes dealt 
with in various chapters from the outset.
Efforts to incorporate trade unions in Zambia in part reflect the 
general African post-colonial trends in labour policy. It has, 
however, specific elements that mark it out as a distinct 
experience. In Chapter Two an attempt is made to examine the
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conceptual framework of trade union incorporation in the light of 
general African experience. Specific developments, including 
ideological claims that shaped government policy are analysed. The 
nature of labour's response and indications of the overall impact 
of the policy are addressed from the outset.
Contemporary policy in many ways owed its existence to developments 
during the colonial era, especially those after the Second World 
War. It can be argued that in a number of areas there has been a 
continuity of policy trends embarked upon during the colonial 
period. In Chapter Three some of the main developments under the 
Colonial State are examined. The main focus in the Chapter is the 
development of African trade unions. Demands for changes in 
government policy and trends towards a more restrictive regime of 
labour relations law are also mentioned. The basic framework of 
colonial industrial relations policy is implicitly defined.
Government attempts to incorporate trade unions have been focused 
on a number of key areas. The following five chapters, that is to 
say. Chapters, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight examine each of the 
key areas in turn. Chapter Four analyses attempts to restructure 
trade union organisation and activity. In Chapter Five the 
institutions of collective bargaining are examined. Dispute 
settlement procedures and levels of industrial conflict probably 
provide the best yardstick with which to measure government policy. 
Measures to regulate industrial conflict form the subject of 
Chapter Six. The rural-urban imbalance and its consequences 
especially in terms of income distribution has been one of the 
taxing problems of national development policy. Attempts to 
control prices and wages have been an important part of the 
Government's aim to close the gap between the urban formal 
employment sector and the rural, mainly subsistent sector. Chapter 
Seven examines the issues that have been addressed as part of the 
Government's prices and incomes policy and the effect to date. In 
Chapter Eight workers' participation, the most radical
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element of government policy is examined. Workers' participation 
is a completely new element in current labour policy. Unlike other 
elements of policy mentioned earlier which existed during the 
colonial period, albeit in different forms, workers' participation 
can be seen as a radical attempt to change attitudes in labour 
relations.
There have been two critical periods in the development of 
post-colonial policy in Zambia. The first period, mainly 
transitional in character, existed between the attainment of 
independence in 1964 until the implementation of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971, in 1974. The second period, the main focus of 
this study, is signified by the changes brought about by the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The above Chapters, which examine 
issues in the key areas identified, take account of the two crucial 
periods.
Finally, in Chapter Nine we review the main themes which have been 
presented and appropriate conclusions are drawn. An attempt is 
also made to examine future prospects of labour policy, especially 
in the light of apparent government intention to review the current 
system of industrial relations in Zambia.
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CHAPTER TWO
TRADE UNION INCORPORATION IN ZAMBIA: POLICY FRAMEWORK
2.A Incorporation for Development
The role of trade unions in the national economy has been the main 
pre-occupation of the Zambian Government's labour policy since 
independence. The government at independence viewed trades unions 
as a sectional interest to be subordinated to the national 
interest. The State's concern with the role of organised labour 
was heightened by the major characteristic of Zambia's economy, one 
which was based upon the production of a single major commodity, 
copper; and the strategic position unions, especially the 
Mineworkers' Union1 , occupied in it. A considerable proportion of 
the labour force at independence, led by miners, was already stable 
and unionised. The labour movement was, therefore, relatively 
autonomous. Government labour policy consequently came to be 
pre-occupied with attempts to constrain the labour movements' and 
the rank and file's post-independence aspirations and expectations 
in line with its development objectives. The state brought 
pressure to bear upon trade unions through reforms in four main 
areas of labour legislation. It sought to, (1) regulate trade 
union activities more closely, (2) restructure collective 
bargaining (including attempts to introduce an effective incomes 
policy), (3) reform dispute settlement procedures and the law of 
industrial action, and (4) introduce workers' participation. In 
these ways, the law became central to the Government's overall 
strategy of incorporation. Accompanying these legislative 
initiatives were two other extra-legal government policies; 
attempts to socialise the trade unions' rank-and-file through the 
ideology of "Zambian Humanism" and to incorporate individual trade 
union leaders into government from time to time.
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It is suggested in this thesis, that the array of specific measures 
have been part of the overall strategy adopted in Zambia for labour 
policy: this can be characterised as one of "labour incorporation 
for development". In spite of the use of law as an instrument of 
union control and regulation, government strategy in Zambia has, 
however, been less coercive than in many other African states.2 
Thus, there has been no radical restructuring of the trade union 
movement itself such as has occurred in Tanzania, for example.3 
Rather, the government has relied on what Gertzel has termed 
"pressure rather than force" - a form of incorporation to achieve 
the objectives of its strategy.
The term "incorporation for development" has overtones of the 
recent European debate about corporatism in that it implies an 
attempt by the State to convince unions and their members to accept 
that their autonomous interests should be pursued in a way that is 
not incompatible with the greater "public interest" in development, 
particularly economic development.
Until recently in Europe, corporatism was mainly equated with the 
political and economic system which prevailed in Italy for instance 
during the period of fascist rule. Simply described, it was a 
system in which industry remained in private ownership, but was 
controlled by the State and used in pursuance of some overriding 
national interest.5 In recent years, however, attempts have been 
made to apply the corporatist model to contemporary developments 
elsewhere in Europe. Sociologists such as Leon Panitch and Colin 
Crouch have characterised the Donovan recommendations to reform the 
British Industrial Relations System and attempts at incomes policy 
for instance, as a 'corporatist' strategy.6 Definitions of 
corporatism vary, but they essentially focus attention on the 
reciprocal relationship between the State and organised interests 
in society in respect of the formation and execution of public 
policy. In the case of trade unions, the term conveys the attempt 
to integrate trade union leaders in order to control and restrain 
their activities.^ Cawson has defined it thus:
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"Corporatism is a politico-economic system in which the 
state directs activities of predominantly privately-owned 
industry in partnership with the representatives of a limited 
number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
interest groups."
It has been said that whether corporatism in its more recent form 
provides a more accurate model of the political process depends on 
what degree of integration, taking factors identified into account, 
between various interests and the state is felt to be required to 
justify the label. It is also said to depend on whether economic 
policy is accepted as the central concern of the state.9
Drawing any simplistic parallels between Zambian developments and 
those in Europe would be misleading, not least because of the 
absence of the Western-type pluralism as a key factor in 
post-colonial labour policy in most African countries.
Consequently it would not be useful to engage in a lengthy 
comparison. As we shall see presently, the Zambian experience is 
firmly rooted in the general African experience in which 
governments have uniformly sought to control trade unions in the 
cause of development. The debate on European corporatism does, 
however, offer a useful indicator to help us understand the 
relationship between labour and the state in post-colonial Zambia. 
It can be argued, for instance, that there is a common thread in 
the quest for the integration of economic interests into the 
policy-making process and efforts to persuade labour to take 
account of national objectives as articulated by the state.
At least two other scholars of Zambian development have recognised 
the usefulness of the term "incorporation" to describe the state's 
attempt to persuade workers to align themselves with its designs 
for national development. Similarly, a number of other writers on 
African labour and development have used or implied incorporation 
to describe various attempts by African governments to control 
trade unions. We summarise the major trends in that respect in the 
following pages of this Chapter. We can, however, immediately
mention Jackson's analysis of developments in Tanzania up to 1979 
as a notable point of comparison. What Jackson saw as a form of 
successful incorporation of labour in Tanzania, "a two-fold policy 
proceeding in parallel steps of imposing obligations on organised 
labour while at the same time creating new rights for workers", is 
what we refer to below as the "controlled unions" model. The model 
is basically exemplified by attempts to integrate trade unions at 
both the political and administrative levels. Thus the Tanzanian 
Government sought to exercise full managerial and policy control 
over trade unions. Gupta's analysis of trade unionism and politics 
on the Zambian Copperbelt is comparable to that of Jackson. In 
that respect, Gupta's perception is markedly different, at least in 
degree, from our own which we have presented in this study. The 
Zambian model of incorporation as we have stated above (P 31) , is 
distinct from that of many African countries in that it has been 
less coercive and has relied "on pressure rather than force", to 
use Gertzel's words again. We, therefore, perceive attempts to 
incorporate Zambian trade unions, as will be more apparent later in 
this Chapter, more in terms of Bates analysis rather than that of 
Jackson or Gupta.10
This thesis will examine the nature of the Government's attempts to 
use legislation in a number of specific spheres of labour policy to 
incorporate trade unions. The effectiveness of such attempts will 
also be assessed. In the present Chapter we sketch the framework 
of the incorporation strategy on which our analysis of issues in 
subsequent chapters will be based. The Zambian experience has to 
be viewed within the African historical context. It has been part 
of similar trends elsewhere on the African continent. It is, 
therefore, important to understand the main features of the general 
African experience. We therefore first begin by examining some of 
the main features of post-colonial labour policies in Africa. We 
then proceed to summarise the Zambian strategy of incorporation and 
relate it to the general African experience, drawing attention to 
its distinctiveness of approach.
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Before examining post-colonial labour policies in Africa, however, 
the use of the terms "government" and "state"10® needs an 
explanation from the outset. It will be apparent in some places of 
the thesis that the terms have been used interchangeably. We think 
this can be justified because of the dramatic change in the 
relationship between the ruling party on the one hand and 
government and other institutions in the state on the other, 
following the advent of the one-party state in 1973. In spite of 
the fact that the distinction in constitutional law between the 
state and institutions within it still exist, the usurption of many 
functions of state by the party has blurred that distinction in 
practice. After the one-party state was declared the government 
came under increasing attack over its conduct of affairs 
culminating in a political crisis in 1980 in which the trade unions 
played a big part. As a result the ruling party "asserted the 
principle of party supremacy, extended party control over 
government and in the process moved Zambia closer to a 
party-state". Thus there was a further concentration of power in 
the party through the presidency and the state. Attempts to 
incorporate trade unions have similarly been affected in terms of 
the actual sources of power directing them.
2.B Post-Colonial Labour Policies in Africa
Labour policies in African countries after independence as 
elsewhere in the Third World have had certain broad similarities. 
This is not to say that there has been any single pattern of labour 
policy in these countries. It has been suggested that the kinds of 
labour policies adopted in the Third World have corresponded to the 
types of elites governing various countries. To that extent it has 
been asserted that "each of these elite groups (had) a strategy by 
which it (sought) to order the surrounding society in a consistent 
fashion." Nevertheless, the different policies pursued have had 
a common central strategy - the desire to defend national 
sovereignty and attain rapid progress through industrialisation and 
modernisation.12
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The current pattern of labour policies in Africa started with the 
decolonisation process which produced a crisis. The crisis 
primarily centred on a common belief among African nationalists, 
who came to wield power at independence, that the colonially 
inherited laws and institutions were based on cultural, political 
and economic imperatives which, while appropriate as a means of 
serving the ends of colonialism, were distinct from, or even 
antagonistic to, the kinds of imperatives 'properly* operative in 
the context of independent Africa. Consequently, new African 
governments claimed that there was a need to rediscover 
pre-colonial traditional African values which could be adapted to 
modern development needs. It was further claimed that such 
imperatives were discernible in indigenous African culture.
It was, therefore, asserted that there was a need for organised 
labour to relate itself to the problems of creating new societies 
on the continent. The assumption was that national governments 
would determine the form that state/trade union relations should 
take. It was further assumed, and this could be said to be the 
basis of the post-colonial crisis in state/trade union relations, 
as mentioned above, that effective union participation in the 
development process required a more clearly prescribed role for 
organised labour. It also required closer ties between labour and 
the political leadership than was the case during the struggle for 
independence against colonial governments. This marked the 
beginning of a trend, that has continued ever since in various 
forms, characterised by attempts on the part of African governments 
to institutionalise firm controls over trade unions.14
Attempts to subordinate trade unions to state control after 
independence have been in marked contrast to the relationship that 
existed between African labour movements and nationalist parties 
during the colonial period. By the time of independence, many 
African trade unions had attained varying degrees of autonomy from 
both the colonial state and the nationalist political parties. The 
attainment of autonomy by the unions from nationalist parties prior
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to independence was possible because "African nationalism did not 
demand that unions define their relationship to politics in a 
precise way."15 That was due to the fact that, at least in part, 
African nationalism as an ideology was a highly diffuse one. 
Although there had been many instances of broad collaboration 
between trade unions and nationalist parties in the articulation of 
anti-colonial values, many unions were never integral parts of 
nationalism.16 In fact a number of unions asserted their 
independence from nationalist leaderships in a number of ways. To 
that end, some unions, like the Miners under Katilunga in Zambia, 
emphasised a relatively non-political industrial approach which 
manifested only a limited interest in the politics of 
independence.17 Even in instances where trade union organisations 
were highly politicised, it has been observed that their awareness 
was not necessarily accompanied by close co-operation and agreement 
between unions and nationalist parties.
In spite of the broad identity of interest that colonial rule 
helped to forge between unions and nationalist parties, colonialism 
was in fact an important factor in the development of union 
autonomy. Colonial governments encouraged union separatism and 
their non-political role and status. Colonial administrations 
sought to transfer metropolitan values and attitudes to colonial 
territories during what was by and large a paternalistic
19development of African trade unions after the Second World War.
The most important of those values was social pluralism, the 
Western concept that viewed trade unions as one of the many private 
interest groups whose appropriate role was to maximise social and 
economic advantages for their members. In that view, unions were, 
therefore, seen simply as a segment of a heterogeneous assortment 
of voluntary associations competing against one another for the 
attainment of primarily economic rather them political goals. To 
that end many colonial governments made it clear to African trade 
unionists that they could only operate in an atmosphere relatively 
free of restrictions and repression if they avoided sensitive 
political issues. Where necessary direct legislative and
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administrative techniques were used to prevent ties between unions 
and nationalist parties.
European labour movements also played a part in the development of 
African trade unions' autonomy with their efforts to foster a 
tradition of "free" trade unionism on the Continent.21 In spite of 
the tendency in some European countries towards close co-operation 
of trade unions and political parties and institutions, 
organisations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) , the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) , and the 
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU) 
emphasised the need for union autonomy in their provision of 
organisational and financial assistance to African Unions during 
the formative stages.22 At independence unions sought to maintain 
that autonomy from the political process.
The desire manifested by African trade unions to maintain their 
autonomy could, however, be said to be more than simply an 
indication of the continuation of institutional patterns 
established during the colonial period. The position taken by many 
African unions was rather a response to post-independence 
conditions and problems arising out of them.
In the face of union tendencies towards autonomy, African 
governments sought and continue to seek to control unions.
Attempts to redefine state-union relations have been primarily 
motivated by three imperatives. First, the search for development; 
second, the desire to consolidate and stabilise political authority 
and third, the perceived need for a new trade union role.2"* We 
proceed to examine each of these in turn briefly before looking 
more closely at the different forms of control attempted by 
governments in pursuit of these aims.
2.B.1 The Search for Development
African governments at independence were, without exception.
pre-occupied with the search for development.24 In spite of its 
elusiveness since then, development is still viewed as the primary 
objective of government. The State's pre-occupation with 
development was not merely dictated by ideological considerations, 
but practical ones as well. In the absence of a we 11-developed 
private entrepreneurial class like that in Western industrial 
societies, the African State at independence was inevitably the 
core focus of national development efforts. In the words of one 
development specialist, "there (was) virtually no internal agency 
apart from the government, to undertake the vital tasks (of 
development)".25 It meant, therefore, that the State had to assume 
leadership and the initiative. As a result there has been a 
tendency for development plans to follow a highly centralised and 
bureaucratic pattern.
Alongside central planning there has been a tendency for State 
control over major sectors of the economy and institutions. High 
wages and industrial conflict were inevitably seen as a threat that 
could jeopardise chances of success and, therefore, could deunage 
the national interest. Besides, a critical lack of necessary 
resources - material, economic and infrastructural prerequisites 
for development - made the mobilisation of human and organisational 
resources by the State indispenseible. It was, therefore, felt 
necessary from the start by governments, which assumed the role of 
custodians of the public interest, to resort to administrative and 
legal regulation of trade unions.
For a fuller understanding of the African State's pre-occupation 
with development strategy we have to take account of a second major 
difference between the historic process of development in the West 
and the position at independence in Africa. It has been said of 
Britain as the pioneering industrial country and other Western 
countries generally, that industrialisation was more or less 
completed before the advent of trade unionism. Unions as 
campaigners for better wages and conditions were, therefore, 
preceded by the industrial process. Africa at indepedence 
possessed a relatively well organised labour movement in comparison
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to other groups in its societies, not least due to paternalistic 
efforts on the part of colonial powers in the development of trade 
26unions. In contrast, economic development was at its earliest 
phase and in many ways continues to be so after a generation. 
Significantly, trade unions were in a position to make demands upon 
the new state order comparable to those made by their European 
counterparts whose societies were at a more advanced stage of 
industrialisation. In an implicit reaction to that difference as a 
major factor in development strategy, African governments insisted 
that labour had to accept a measure of austerity, not anything like 
as harsh as that which their European counterparts had to endure at 
a comparable stage, but nevertheless, adequate sacrifices in the 
public interest to facilitate rapid development. After all, as was 
suggested by some students of the industrial revolution, the 
success of the initial stage of capital accumulation probably 
depended on the system's ability to impose regimented and harsh 
conditions upon the working people of Europe at the time.
The public interest was consequently defined in terms of the 
absolute necessity for development. That in turn made the resort 
to administrative and legal regulation of trade unions a necessity. 
It is similarly significant that unlike the "Public Interest" in 
the classical liberal European tradition where it was viewed in 
competitive pluralistic terms of different interest groups, "each 
seeking to maximise its own advantage, .... limiting the role of 
government to the protection of the individual's life and 
property", the definition of the public interest in post-colonial 
Africa has tended to deny such private groups any comparable 
legitimacy. The public interest has been articulated in 
centralised terms.
It is true that the concept of the public interest in the West has 
changed considerably since the classical liberal definition. In 
recent times the term has attained a more positive and activist 
role resulting in more government regulation of labour, business 
and other groups in many sectors of the economy. The contemporary 
notion of the public interest in the West, therefore, emphasises
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government supervision of private interests in the light of a 
collective common interest of the public at large. In this respect 
it offers some parallels to the post-colonial African State’s 
emphasis on economic development. Nevertheless, the difference in 
terms of intensity and scope is remarkable. African Governments 
since independence have given the impression, as is evident from 
the regulation of various activities, that the definition of the 
public interest is more than merely the limiting of scope of group 
conduct to make it compatible with the public good. In African 
terms, therefore, the public interest is regarded as more 
fundamental to the social order.
2.B.2 Political Authority and Stability
The desire to consolidate political authority and stability was 
another compelling motive behind attempts to redefine the 
relationship between the State and labour in African States at 
independence. Almost everywhere on the African continent, 
governments faced serious organisational weakness, limited 
integration of societies and fragile formal institutions. Such 
problems prompted the new States to seek new ways of maintaining 
and increasing the viability of their political systems in order to 
ensure social control.
Besides, the new ruling elites felt vulnerable partly owing to a 
striking cultural gap between them and the mass of the population. 
Even where the level of education of the new leaders was relatively 
low, as in the case of Zambia, they were, in comparison to the rest 
of the population, strongly orientated towards Western attitudes,
29norms and ideological inclinations. The vast majority of the 
population remained traditional. The cultural gap coupled with 
visible differences in incomes and life-styles tended to alienate 
the new leadership from the electorate. It is notable that in many 
countries the gap, especially in economic differentiation, has 
increased rather than decreased over the years since 
30decolonisation.
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As in the case of development strategy, unions were viewed as 
crucial not only in bridging the gap between the deprived majority 
and the affluent few, but also in the quest for legitimacy as 
rulers by governments. At independence trade unions were capable 
of functioning as the middle group between the ruling elites and 
the governed. They also had the potential to pose a threat to the 
political elites. Although the political potential of many African 
unions later declined, particularly with the rise of the one-party 
state and firmer controls associated with it, their profile at 
independence was more visible and stronger.31 They tended to be 
strong in the large cities and sectors of the economy vital to 
modernisation efforts - mining as in Zambia, and almost everywhere 
else in transport, commercial, agricultural and social services. 
Moreover, with their organisational framework, in most cases 
superior to the ruling parties, trade unions had the capacity to 
influence the mass of the populations socio-economically. They 
could, therefore, help shape a strong consensus or exploit any 
possibility of the alienation of the masses from the elite.
2.B.3 New Role for Trade Unions
The search for a distinct African ideology coupled with the 
tendency of leaders to project images of the 'philosopher - King' 
as exemplified in the varying forms of "African Socialism" was 
another crucial factor bearing on attempts to control unions.33 
African leaders of varying ideological inclinations shared a 
widespread belief that independence demanded a substantially 
different and more varied role of trade unions than that of the 
unions in Western economies. Western unions were viewed as 
performing an exclusively "consumptionist" function seeking higher 
wages and better working conditions for their members. African 
trade unions, if they were to be effectively involved in 
development, needed to play a "productionist" role.34 The latter 
role would involve bearing a major responsibility by the unions for 
increasing overall economic output while accepting conditions of 
austerity for the benefit of the entire community.
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It also meant that African unions had to perform a variety of new 
functions stemming from the 'transitional' state of the 
post-colonial societies. To that extent "the first responsibility 
of the unions (was) to develop a disciplined, skilled and 
responsible labour force .... become involved in economic 
activities such as co-operatives, housing schemes and training."35
In some socialist-inclined countries trade unions were even 
conceived as a mechanism in the efforts of capital accumulation 
through investment projects.36 With the benefit of hindsight it is 
now clear that the trade unions were either unable or disinclined 
to assume a multifunctional role. Nevertheless, at independence 
there were widespread concerted efforts to persuade African unions 
to assume a multifunctional role with emphasis on them as agencies 
of socialisation introducing other groups to the rhythms and 
patterns of new industrial behaviour. Specifically, unions were 
expected to be educational institutions for workers in the 
acquiring of managerial and technical skills socially necessary for 
development.
There is little need to emphasise that the socialising and 
educative responsibilities were inherently political in nature. 
Beyond this it could be said that efforts required of unions in 
conveying a sense of national citizenship to the detriment of 
regional and other parochial loyalties have been integral features 
of many African governments' strategies for national development 
and integration. In their institutional form, however, they have 
amounted to attempts to control unions and deny them autonomy. It 
is to forms of control that we must now turn and which we must 
briefly examine.
2.B.4 Forms of Trade Union Control
The trend towards the control of trade unions by governments has 
been a universal phenomenon in post-colonial Africa. The emergence
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of the one-party state and the military government has enhanced the 
trend rather than checked it. There has been, however, a wide 
variation in actual experience. At one extreme, there are those 
countries where attempts have been made to fully integrate unions 
into the political systems. On the other, is the now rare 
situation where unions have retained a large measure of freedom 
without much political interference. Between the two are instances 
where elements from both extremes are manifested in varying 
degrees. Three main categories have, therefore, been identified.37
The first of the categories has been referred to as "relative 
autonomy". The category describes the relationship between the 
state and organised labour where a fairly high degree of freedom of 
association has been or was at least initially maintained. Where 
this was the position, as in Nigeria at various times in spite of 
various military governments, trade union activities and 
orientation roughly corresponds to the classical pluralistic model 
of the Anglo-American tradition. Two chief characteristics of this 
model are the right to strike and the freedom to choose union 
leaders. It also implies union freedom from managerial and 
organisational interference by the state.
The second model has been termed "semi-controlled". It refers to 
situations where a certain amount of state supervision and control 
over unions has been established by the State, but has fallen short 
of full integration of trade unions into the political process.
Zambia and Kenya soon after independence were said to be typical of 
38this model, the major characteristics of the model being in the 
manifestation of several forms of government regulations tending to 
limit trade union autonomy. Such controls have included the 
appointment of trade union leaders by government, the need for 
official union recognition and specific approval by the State for 
any international affiliation.
The third model advanced has been that of "controlled unions".
This model has consisted of instances where efforts have been made 
to bring about political domination of trade unions with the aim of
fully integrating them into either government or the administration 
of the ruling party. Tanzania continues to be typical of this 
39model. In this model administrative integration has enabled the 
national political leadership to exercise full managerial and 
policy control over unions. Managerial and policy controls have 
been further supplemented by a range of legislation affecting such 
labour activities as industrial action and the internal conduct of 
union affairs.
2.B.5 Recent Developments
It is now more than twenty-five years since the decolonisation 
process generally got under way in Africa. Indications are that 
structural tension still exists in state-union relations. The 
tension originated in the factors identified above, in particular 
the desire on the part of African Governments to establish firm 
administrative and policy controls over unions in what were claimed 
to be in the interest of national development and integration, and
the need for a complex multi-functional role for labour. These 
40factors, by and large, still exist.
Many governments continue to exercise political power and bring 
legislative and other coercive means to bear on the unions. 
Governments have used such techniques as the prohibition of 
strikes, the regulation of collective bargaining, administrative 
scrutiny of internal union affairs and the requirement of fiscal 
accountability. In many jurisdictions, international affiliation 
is closely regulated and financial assistance from abroad 
restricted if not prohibited. Many governments have also resorted 
to the direct suppression of union leaders through detention and 
imprisonment. Alternatively, governments have tried to devise 
rewards to influence unions positively. Check-off rights have been 
conferred and recognition given to some unions in preference to 
others. In some instances, union leaders' access to power has been 
formalised by reserving government and Parliamentary seats and 
co-opting individual union leaders into government.
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Trade union resporse where institutionally possible, continues to 
be in search of autonomy. Where there are no institutional means 
to seek autonomy the rank and file continue to pursue it illicitly 
through industrial action regardless of the legal position.
Although few unions if any have realised the full potential they 
possessed at independence, they have not completely lost it in a 
number of cases. Many unions still possess their organisation and 
voluntary membership, significant potential sources of power in any 
political context. Besides, unions still operate in large cities 
and in the modern sector of African economies.
It is probably the drastic decline in many African economies that 
has had the most adverse effect upon union capability. With 
continually rising unemployment the State has found it relatively 
easy to bring its power of supervision, control and restriction to 
bear upon the trade unions and workers they represent.
2.C. Labour and the State in Zambia
In this thesis it will be apparent that the development of 
government policy towards trade unions in Zambia has, to some 
extent, followed the general pattern of developments elsewhere in 
Africa. As we have seen, the major concern of African states, in 
common with other emergent states elsewhere, has been development, 
in particular economic development. Governments' perceptions of 
labour and its role have been determined by development objectives. 
In that perception organised labour has without exception been 
regarded as a sectional interest to be subordinated to development 
objectives as defined by the state in the national interest. As a 
result, universal attempts have been made across the continent to 
control trade unions regardless of the co-operation that existed 
between organised labour and nationalist parties that later came to 
assume political power at independence. The nature and extent of 
control, as we have seen, have varied a great deal, but the general 
pattern has been the same. The justification for various attempts 
to control unions has also been the same. It has been in terms of 
the imperatives of economic development, seeking to cultivate
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'productionist' rather than 'consumptionist' attitudes associated 
with the promotion of members' interests. In spite of other 
underlying fundamental factors, political issues, for instance, it 
is the economic imperatives that have been most important.42
The governments' unwillingness to allow autonomous centres of power 
free rein to resort to industrial action and the tendency towards 
the centralisation of power have, therefore, not been ends in 
themselves. In objective terms, they represent a broad range of 
efforts in search of development.43
The Zambian experience of relations between trade unions and the 
state have followed this general pattern, albeit as a distinct 
variation that we have termed incorporation. Labour legislation in 
turn has been influenced by that relationship between labour and 
the state. That relationship and the government strategy behind it 
has relied on pressure rather than force. This approach is 
apparent in the policy that has sought wage restraint, less 
industrial action and increased productivity, among others, that we 
shall presently examine in the following chapters.
Like Gertzel before us, two contrasting works on the Zambian labour 
question have significantly contributed to our understanding of the 
relationship between labour and state, empirical studies by Bates 
and Burawoy.45 The studies were concerned with mineworkers, a 
fitting choice. For as we have seen, the Zambian State has mainly 
been pre-occupied with the mining industry for obvious economic 
reasons we highlighted in Chapter One. The miners have been a 
focal point of labour policy initiatives and continue to be so in 
spite of the fact that they are no longer the largest union, (see 
Table 3 P 129). The founding of the miners' union was rooted in 
economic and other grievances. They have had a significant 
influence on the growth of Zambian trade unionism, in particular 
its autonomy both before and after independence.
Bates took the view, which we have embraced and logically extended 
to apply to the role of law, that post-independence labour policy
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was motivated by the objective of economic development and social 
justice. Hence the state demands for increased productivity, wage 
restraint and less frequent resort to industrial action.46 In our 
view that strategy of trade union control has amounted to 
incorporation efforts with labour legislation as an important 
instrument. Bates' conclusion was that the government's strategy 
up to 1970 generally failed to achieve its objectives. He cited 
the decline in productivity, increased strikes and wages as 
indications of failure.
Burawoy on the other hand argued that relations between labour and 
the state were determined less by economic than political issues.
To that end he argued that government strategy was governed 
first by a strong sense of identity (originating from the 
nationalist struggle during the colonial period) and the strength 
of the miners as an autonomous power centre.
In Burawoy'8 view, the "pressure rather than force" strategy could 
very well change in future if the political situation so required. 
He also sought to explain the apparent failure of government policy 
in terms of class signified by the growing gap between the 
government officials and union leadership on the one hand, and the 
rank and file on the others
"Workers are very conscious of the way the Union has been 
bureaucratised, with the leadership becoming increasingly 
remote. To many, in fact, the leadership appears as a 
privileged class which is given political support from the 
Government and Management while deriving its wealth from the 
workers' subscriptions ....
The workers see a grand alliangfj between the Union, the 
Government and the Companies."
Both Bates and Burawoy have given us invaluable insights into the 
relationship between labour and the state, and by logical 
extension, the role of law in labour policy. As we shall see in 
the following chapters, the strategy of incorporation has been 
attempted in similar ways to Bates' analysis. Burawoy's 
understanding of the underlying currents for possible future
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changes in state strategy has, however, been borne out by 
prospective changes of policy which we discuss in Chapter Nine. In 
spite of his preference for political rather than economic factors 
as being central to the labour - state's relationship, the 
underlying issues which Burawoy saw as class determinants were, in 
the final analysis, also economic. This perception has influenced 
our analysis of the policy issues throughout this study, above all 
the use of law as an instrument of development policy which we 
discuss below.
2.C.1 Origins and Evolution of Incorporation Strategy
There were two distinctive elements in Zambian labour policy at 
independence. Both were ultimately based on economic 
considerations. One was a development policy and the other a 
policy of social justice. Labour, especially trade unions, was 
perceived as crucial to both elements.
The first element was based, as in most emergent nations of the 
Third World, on the new nation's aspirations for rapid development. 
Government policy, including such cardinal features as the desire 
to consolidate political authority to the exclusion of competing 
interests, was in the final analysis based on its primary 
commitment to development, in particular economic development.
That commitment was clearly demonstrated in terms of the economic 
growth aims in the first development plan and subsequent ones.
As with many other underdeveloped countries, Zambia's development 
efforts were dictated by its reliance on a single major commodity, 
copper. As we noted earlier, the copper industry as a result of 
that reliance was the centre of organised labour whose support the 
government courted from the start. In that respect the government 
viewed workers as economic "patriots" whose discipline was 
necessary to increase production and maximise revenues to fuel 
52"rapid progress". The government, therefore, sought to enlist 
workers' co-operation in controlling excessive wages and industrial 
conflict.
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The second element of government policy of labour incorporation for 
development was that of social justice, its emphasis on a fairer 
distribution of income within society as part of its development 
strategy. The government, therefore, warned against inequities in 
incomes not only between expatriate and local labour (a situation 
viewed as transitional and bound to disappear as more local labour 
was trained and replaced expatriates) , but more crucial, between 
the urban and rural sectors of the country's economy. In other 
words, the government was concerned about the ever-increasing gap 
between urban labour, especially those who were in wage-paid 
employment, and rural labour who were subsistence farmers eking out 
a living from the land.
Government attempts to subordinate labour and incorporate it into 
its strategy for development have occurred, in two main phases.
The first was essentially a 'transitional' phase. It consisted of 
different forms of regulations in response to a series of problems 
in industrial relations and within the trade union movement that 
affected state-union relations. In its wider context transitional 
labour policy consisted mainly of protective labour legislation 
intended to enhance individual employment rights and to remove 
discriminatory laws and practices inherited from the colonial 
period. Hence a new Apprenticeship Ordinance in 1964 ended racial 
restrictions, and a new Employment Act in 1965 replaced the 
notorious 1929 Employment of Natives Ordinance. The 1965 Act 
provided minimum conditions of employment, abolished contracts on 
the ticket system, abolished recruitment and its attendant abuses. 
It also ended discriminatory provisions which were a key feature of 
the 1929 Ordinance. In addition, the government passed a new 
Factories Act in 1966 and the Employment of Women, Young Persons 
and Childrens Ordinance was amended. Also amended and retained was 
the Minimum Wages, Wages Council, and Conditions of Employment 
legislation.
State intervention in union affairs during this phase was in part 
and at least initially largely prompted by bitter divisions within 
the labour movement along personal, ideological and to a certain
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extent, ethnic lines soon after independence. Such struggles in 
due course came to pose threats of prolonged strikes that might 
cripple the economy, especially on the Copperbelt.
It was against this background that the government embarked on the 
incorporation of individual union leaders, particularly those 
perceived as militant and potentially disruptive, by offering them 
lucrative, but powerless posts. It also passed legislation 
designed to regulate trade union activity more closely. The Trade 
Union and Trade Disputes Act, 1965, created one Central Trade Union 
body, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (the ZCTU) and compelled 
all unions to affiliate to it. The government also took advantage 
of the situation to set the course of the new Congress by 
appointing its first executive, a measure claimed to be an interim 
measure to deal with what was regarded as an explosive situation 
quickly. The ZCTU was also restricted in some of its operations. 
It could not, for instance, affiliate to international 
organisations or accept financial and material assistance from 
abroad without government approval. The most significant 
restriction, however, was that concerning industrial action. No 
union could bring out its members on a strike without the ZCTU's 
. 55consent.
It is apparent that trade union regulations during this phase 
consisted mainly of elements identical to those of the 
semi-controlled model, hence the inclusion of Zambia in the model 
by some scholars.^ What is most significant about this stage of 
government policy, however, is that there is little to suggest the 
existence of any deliberate strategy beyond attempts to curb 
militant trade union activity. Even with the controls instituted 
at that stage the government showed a remarkable degree of 
restraint and maintained many of the fundamental principles of 
"British voluntarism". It is evident that the phase was essentially 
transitional in the development of government strategy.
The enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 197157, brought in 
the second phase which is the focus of our study. The legislation
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which came into effect in 1974 marked a watershed in the 
development of labour policy. It was clearly an attempt to shift 
the balance away from the voluntary model to that of active 
incorporation of labour for development. The Industrial Relations 
Act as an instrument of labour policy was directed at three areas 
which we have already referred to above and which were perceived as 
crucial to the industrial relations system and to trade union 
behaviour. These areas were, trade union activity, collective 
bargaining, (including incomes policy), and dispute settlement. A 
new institution, that of works councils, was also introduced. The 
legislation made radical changes in these areas.
As we have seen above, the changes in the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Act, 1965, sought to curtail trade union autonomy by 
closer regulation through the ZCTU. The 1971 Act which repealed 
that of 1965 sought to curtail trade union autonomy further through 
greater control over union activity. Not only were unions required 
to affiliate to the ZCTU as in the 1965 Act, the ZCTU was given 
greater powers over member unions. The Act also substantially 
increased the Registrar of Trade Unions' powers of supervision over 
both the ZCTU and member unions, particularly in relation to 
finances. It also legalised the Government's policy of one union 
in each industry, requiring unions to be formed on the basis of 
classes or categories of employees. Overall, it is apparent from 
the provisions of the Act that the aim of the government was to 
incorporate labour through structural changes and the use of union 
leaders as agents of labour incorporation.
Prior to the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, 
collective bargaining could be said to be largely autonomous except 
for the usual superintendence by the State of economic affairs.
That was mainly carried out through ad hoc incomes policies and 
such policies were, as we shall later see in Chapter Seven, largely 
ineffective. The Act substantially modified the position by the 
introduction of legally-binding procedures in which the parties had 
no ultimate control over the content of collective agreements, 
especially wage clauses. Collective bargaining was formalised at
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two basic levels: bargaining units at the undertaking level and 
joint councils at the industry-wide level.
Another important innovation in respect of collective bargaining 
was the introduction of new government institutions, or new roles 
to existing government institutions. Initially, the Industrial 
Relations Court was given the power to approve collective
agreements and subsequently the power was transferred to the Prices
58and Incomes Commission. In addition, unlike under the previous 
legal regime, the 1971 Act made collective agreements legally 
binding.
Similarly, the law brought about radical changes in dispute 
settlement procedures. Compulsory arbitration was introduced under 
the auspices of a new agency, the Industrial Relations Court. In 
contrast to the 1965 regime where both conciliation and arbitration 
were voluntary and the role of the government limited to that of 
mediator or conciliator, the Industrial Relations Act gave the new 
Court the power to give legally binding decisions in addition to 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures. It is significant that 
up to 1984, under this new legal regime and with the further 
extension of the category of essential services, only two strikes
59had qualified as legal.
The introduction of workers' participation through Works Councils 
at places of work was an even more radical departure from the 
previous system of industrial relations. At the time the 
legislation was passed, the provisions relating to Works Councils 
were considered to be so radical that their implementation was 
delayed until 1976.60
The provisions on Works Councils did not only attempt to modify 
traditional managerial prerogatives, but also tried to by-pass 
trade unions by giving workers on the shop floor, through their 
elected representatives on the Councils, a say in the running of 
their firms. It was by no accident that some of the areas over 
which Councils were given jurisdiction overlapped with traditional
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collective bargaining areas. Thus, not only were Councils to be 
composed of employees* representatives and those of management to 
the exclusion of trade union representatives, but workers' 
representatives were given a majority of two-thirds. The Works 
Councils' functions include "participation in all health and 
welfare schemes operated by the undertaking; must be consulted on 
all schemes concerned with medical, housing, recreational and 
pension arrangements". Above all. Councils must be informed of 
decisions in some areas and have to approve management decisions in 
others.
2.C.2 The Role of Ideology
Whereas government strategy has increasingly relied on the use of 
law to restructure industrial relations' institutions to bring 
about incorporation, political ideology in the form of "Zambian 
Humanism" has provided the philosophical basis of that strategy.
The use of political ideology as an important factor in the shaping 
of industrial relations systems in Africa has been common and the 
Zambian experience in this respect is not an isolated one. As 
Cambridge has recently observed, the adoption of socialism in some 
African countries as the vehicle for economic development has 
resulted in appropriate changes in industrial relations from 
'tripartite' to 'unilateral' systems. Similarly, the adoption of 
the one-party state has influenced state-trade union relations.61 
This development underlines the importance of socio-economic and 
political contexts of labour relations, law and policy.
In Zambia, ideology has been a potent if ill-defined factor in the 
Government's development policy and consequently in labour 
incorporation. Ever since Zambian Humanism was launched by 
President Kaunda in 1967, after a request to him by the ruling 
party's Central Committee to formulate an official ideology for the
party and nation, it has provided the state with a philosophical
62basis for its incorporation efforts.
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In practical terms. Humanism has been said to be a definition of 
national goals. It has, therefore, been represented as a set of 
philosophical guidelines rooted in traditional Zambian culture 
intended to unite the country in the common task of development.
An important element of the philosophy in terms of labour 
incorporation has been its primary function of trying to dispel 
sectional conflict at individual, group and institutional levels, 
identified as contrary to the national interest.
The effect of Humanism on labour incorporation and other policies 
is probably more indirect than direct. It has been asserted that 
the ability of Humanism to provide an ideological basis for action, 
a cohesive and coherent direction has been inhibited by its own 
inherent weaknesses as a political philosophy, in particular its 
ambiguity. Despite subsequent attempts to elaborate and clarify 
its content. Humanism has remained "a set of ambiguous statements, 
many mutually contradictory, and depending on voluntaristic and 
volutional rather them structural solutions to social problems"63 
While the philosophy has been described as an alternative to 
Communism and Capitalism, no adequate explanation of its 
relationship with other ideologies has ever been given. Similarly, 
while the prevention of "exploitation of man by man" was given a 
central tenet, no definition of that term has ever been provided. 
Moreover, its prescriptions for development were based upon a 
utopian notion of Zambian traditional society based on rural life 
and not really applicable to the realities of urban life and 
organised labour. Consequently, Humanism has lacked conviction as 
a guiding force for development, let alone as a basis on which to 
restructure state-trade union relations. Nevertheless, the
government has continued to advance Humanism as fundamental to its 
64labour policy. This emphasis is most apparent in one key area of 
government attempts to incorporate labour, participation through 
works councils. In spite of its obvious European origins. Works
Councils have been presented as the embodiment of Humanism in 
65industrial relations.
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The above shortcomings notwithstanding, the significance of 
Humanism in the conceptual framework of this study, therefore, lies 
in its probable influence on the character of the strategy of 
incorporation. As we have observed above, the Zambian Government's 
strategy in seeking the twin objectives of rapid development and 
social justice has mainly relied on "pressure rather than force". 
This in effect is what distinguishes the Zambian approach from many 
other strategies of trade union control in Africa. It places more 
emphasis on the search for consensus rather than forced
integration. It is apparent that this approach is also basic to 
66Humanism as a political ideology.
2.C.3 Labour's Response to Incorporation
Labour's response to government policy has obviously been crucial 
to the success or failure of the incorporation strategy. The 
labour movement's response is best understood by appreciating from 
the outset that trade unionism in Zambia grew, in part at least, 
from the demands for a measure of autonomy at places of work.67 By 
independence, trade unions' autonomy had emerged as an integral 
part of the country's industrial relations system. The pattern of 
work place relations was based on what we have referred to above as 
British voluntarism. That notion in Zambia enshrined basic trade 
union rights albeit within certain legislative and administrative 
restrictions. In spite of more visible state intervention, 
however, in contrast to the metropolitan British situation, minimum 
interference remained the basic philosophy of government policy and 
no radical attempts were made to restructure the system of 
industrial relations. The metropolitan system was, therefore, 
still the ideal despite the fact it was not fully realised. The 
colonial atmosphere especially in the period just before 
independence, did, however, provide ample opportunity for the 
attainment of a certain measure of autonomy. By independence a
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number of unions, led by the Mineworkers' Union, had in fact 
attained a large measure of functional autonomy.
The emergence of African nationalism of course resulted in the 
development of a broad identity of interests between unions and 
nationalist political parties. There was, however, no "class
alliance against colonialism" on the lines claimed elsewhere in 
68Africa. Indeed there was occasional conflict between labour and 
nationalist tactics especially in the early 1950's with trade 
unionists insisting that the industrial sphere was their domaine 
reserve. Such conflict was, on the part of trade unions, primarily 
motivated by a desire to retain their freedom of action in the 
industrial sphere, a quest for autonomy.
It is the insistence on autonomy on the part of the trade unions, 
that the new Zambian State resisted from the start. Instead, 
attempts were progressively made to design a strategy that would 
persuade organised labour to align itself with the State’s 
conception of national development and integration. The labour 
movement's continued pre-occupation with its members' interests, at 
the national leadership level, may, therefore, be construed as the 
clearest response to the Government's strategy of incorporation.
In that respect it can be seen as a re-assertion of the received 
traditional Western trade union autonomy. In other respects, 
however, trade union response has not been uniform. It is evident 
for instance, that incorporation has successfully been 
institutionalised at the level of individual leadership, recent 
attitudes within the current ZCTU leadership notwithstanding. As 
for the rank and file, indications are that while yielding to the 
Government's political authority and broadly supporting it, they 
continue to resist incorporation in many respects. The extent of 
that resistance is dealt with in the following chapters as we 
examine the effect of post-colonial government policy and 
legislation up to the end of 1986.
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2.D. Conclusioni
In this brief analysis we have attempted to define the conceptual 
framework of post-colonial government policy in Zambia towards 
trade unions in particular, and industrial relations in general. 
This policy has been characterised not only by the desire of the 
state to control trade unions and regulate industrial relations but 
also by attempts to incorporate organised labour and workers at 
large into the government's strategy of national development and 
integration. In pursuit of this objective, the government has to a 
large extent relied on the use of law to regulate trade union 
activity, restructure such institutions as collective bargaining 
and dispute settlement, and to introduce workers' participation.
In spite of the Government's increasingly interventionist and 
regulatory role, however, its strategy has been based more on 
pressure than force.
The strategy contrasts sharply with what would be the position if
proposed changes in government policy currently under consideration 
69were implemented. The proposed changes and their likely 
implications will be considered in greater detail at the end of 
this study. It will suffice for the moment to say that they would
entail a change from what is essentially a "tripartite" system of
70industrial relations to a "unitary" one. They would amount to an 
attempt to fully integrate organised labour into the political 
process, a trend currently discernible elsewhere in Africa, in 
Tanzania for example.71
In the following chapters we analyse some of the main policy 
measures and their effect. Before this, however, we shall look at 
one of the major foundations of the current policy period, post-war 
colonial labour policy, since certain aspects of pre-independence
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labour policy are important to our understanding of contemporary 
events. As will become apparent in some of the following chapters, 
there has been some continuity in some important respects between 
colonial and post-colonial labour policy.
59
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1 The name 'Mineworkers' Union' refers to the African Miners' 
Union formed in 1949 which has had different names throughout 
its history, among others, the Northern Rhodesian African 
Mineworkers' Trade Union, the Northern Rhodesian African 
Mineworkers' Union, the Zambian Mineworkers' Union, and its 
current designation, the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia.
2 Gertzel, C, "Labour and the States The Case of Zambia's 
Mineworkers' Union", (1975), 13, in Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics, P 291.
3 For an account of the Tanzanian's experience in this respect 
see for instance, Mihyo, P B, "Industrial Relations in 
Tanzania", in Damachi U G, et al (eds), Industrial Relations 
in Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1979), Chapter 7,
P 224.
4 Gertzel, 1975, op cit.
5 Ponton, G, and Gill, P, Introduction to Politics (Oxfords 
Martin Robertson, 1982), P 41.
6 Panitch L, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy, 
(Cambridge: 1976)» Crouch C, Class Conflict and the 
Industrial Relations Crisiss Compromise and Corporation in 
the Policies of the British State, (London: Heinemann,
1977) . Quoted by Lewis, R, "Method and Ideology in the 
Labour Law Writings of Otto Kahn-Freund", in Wedderburn K W, 
et al (eds), Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building 
on Kahn-Freund, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), P 120. See 
also Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978, op cit, P 197. 78
7 See, inter alia. Panitch L, "Recent Theorisations of 
Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry" (1980), 31 
British Journal of Sociology, P 159» Winkler J T, "Law,
State and Economy: The Industrial Relations Act, 1971 in 
Context", (1975), 2 British Journal of Law and Society P 103» 
Winkler J T, "The Corporate Economy: Theory and 
Administration", in Scase R (ed), Industrial Society: Class, 
Cleavage and Control, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977)» 
Schmitter P C and Lehmbruch E, Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation, (London: Sage, 1979).
8 Quoted by Ponton and Gill, 1982, op cit, P 43.
Ibid.
60
10 On the use of Incorporation in the Zambian context see, inter 
alia, Fincham R and Zulu G, "Labour and Participation in 
Zambia", in Turok B (ed), Development in Zambia, (London:
Zed Books, 1979) , P 216» approach also evident in Bates, 
1971, op cit; cf Gupta A, "Trade Unionism and Politics on 
the Copperbelt", in Tordoff W (ed), Politics in Zambia. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), P 289j 
Jackson D, "The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania:
Incomes Policy and Industrial Democracy", (1979), 17, 2, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 219 at P 250: for details 
of Tanzania's trade union integration policy see Mihyo P B, 
in Damachi et al, 1979, op cit, P 24.
10a Although the term state is commonly used, it is "the most 
opaque in the whole of political vocabulary". It is best 
defined negatively - the state is, for instance, opposed to 
mere governments. Governments come and go in the Western 
democracies. This negative definition is, however, 
inadequate in a one-party state like Zambia where the 
government is assumed to have a 'permanent status' as an 
instrument of the ruling party. It is significant that in 
Zambia the term the "party and its government" is usually 
used to describe what would be a combination of state and 
government roles in western democracies. For a definition of 
the term state, see inter alia, Robertson D, A Dictionary of 
Modern Politics, (London: Europa, 1985), P 307.
10b Gertzel C, et al, 1984, op cit, P 79.
11 Kerr C, et al. Industrialism and the Industrial Man 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), P 32.
12 Bates, 1971, op cit.
13 Legum C, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, (London: 
Pall Mall, 1962), P 125.
14 Lofchie M F and Rosberg C G, "The Political Status of African 
Trade Unionism" in Belling W A (ed) , The Role of Labour in 
African Nation-Building, (New York: Praegar, 1965), P 1.
15 Berg E and Butler J, "Trade Unions" in Coleman, J and 
Rosberg, C, (eds) , Political Parties and National Integration 
in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1964), P 340.
16 Fincham and Zulu, in Turok, 1979, op cit, P 214. See also 
Lofchie and Rosberg in Belling, 1965, citing the example of 
Ghana, op cit, P 4.
17 Lofchie and Rosberg cite the example of the French Cameroons 
in this connection, 1965, op cit, P 17.
61
18 For an elaborate account of British, French and Belgian 
Colonial labour policies in Africa, see Davies I, African 
Trade Unions, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966)
PP 31 - 50.
19 Ibid.
20 For example, the Zambian experience in this respect is 
recounted by Berger, 1979, op cit, PP 73 - 76.
21 Lofchie and Rosberg, in Belling, 1964, op cit, P 5
22 Ibid.
23 These are recurring themes in most of the literature 
concerning African labour and development. See, inter alia 
Belling W A (ed), 1965, op cit» Coleman and Rosberg, 1964, 
op cit» Damachi U G, The Role of Trade Unions in the 
Development Process, (New York: Praegar, 1974); Damachi et 
al (eds), 1979, op cit.
24 Although the term "development" is strictly speaking a wider 
concept, not limited to a nation's Gross National Product and 
Gross Domestic Product, including social and political 
modernisation as defined by Harbison and Myers in their 
Education, Manpower and Economic Development, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), PP 1 - 3, it is usually taken to mean 
economic development. We recognise the wider meaning, but 
intend to emphasise economic development in accordance with 
the more popular usage.
25 Bern 0, "Trade Union Attitudes and Development" in The Role 
of Trade Unions in Developing Countries, (Industrial Seminar, 
Brussels: OECD, 1967), P 23.
26 Colonial Paternalism was an important factor in the 
development of African trade unions after the Second World 
War, especially in British territories. See Roberts B C, 
Labour in the Tropical Territories of the Commonwealth, 
(London: Bell & Son, 1964).
27 Lofchie and Rosberg in Belling, 1965, op cit, P 6.
28 Ibid P 7.
29 Zambia at Independence had probably the worst educational 
record of all British Colonial territories in Africa. Less 
than 0.5 per cent of the population of about 3} million at 
the time had full primary education, only 1,200 had secondary 
education and less than 50 were college graduates. Manpower 
Report: a report and statistical handbook on manpower, 
education, training and Zambianlsation, 1965-66, (Lusaka: 
Government Printer, 1966), P 1.
62
31 This is the case for Kenya and Zambia, thought to be typical 
of the trend. In Zambia's case see ILO/JASPA, Basic Needs in 
an Economy Under Pressure, (Addis Ababa: ILO, 1981), 
introduction.
32 In Zambia'8 case, trade unions continue to occupy a somewhat 
strategic position, at least residually. For a recent view, 
see Gertzel, C, et al, 1984, op cit, especially chapters 1 
and 4.
32 Bates, 1971, op cit.
33 Friedland W and Rosberg C (eds) African Socialism, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1964), give accounts of early 
African socialist trends.
34 The distinction in union functions between "consumptionist" 
and "productionist" is based on Deutscher I, "Russia" in 
Galenson W (ed), Comparative Labour Movements,
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), P 502. The term was 
popularised in relation to Africa by Friedland W in various 
works, including "Labour in Emerging African Socialist 
States" in Belling W A (ed) , 1965, op cit, P 20.
35 Kenyatta J, (first President of Kenya and a proponent of that 
country's form of African Socialism), "African Socialism and 
African Unity", (Summer, 1965), 1, 1, African Forum, P 1.
36 Friedland, in Belling, 1965, op cit, refers to Tanzanian 
efforts in this respect.
37 Belling, 1965, op cit, PP 10 - 13.
38 For accounts of Zambian developments in this respect see 
Central African Examiner (London: December 1964 and May 
1965). We have referred to such developments as the 
'transitional' stage of post-colonial labour policy in this 
study.
39 Mihyo, in Damachi, 1979, op cit.
40 For recent trends in trade union and wider industrial 
relations policy in some African countries, see, inter alia, 
Damachi et al (eds) , 1979, op cit, and Cambridge C, "Emerging 
Trends in the Industrial Relations Systems of Former British 
Colonies: The Ratification of International Labour 
Conventions", (Fall, 1984), Journal of African Studies,
P 129.
41 See, for instance, Mihyo in Damachi, 1979, op cit; Fincham 
and Zulu, in Turok, 1979, op cit.
42 Cf Gertzel, 1975, op cit.
63
43 Cf Friedland in Belling, 1965, op cit.
44 Gertzel, 1975, op cit.
45 Bates, 1971, op cit» Burawoy, M, "The Colour of 
Coppermines" (1972), 7, Zambian Papers.
Class on the
46 Bates, 1971, op cit, PP 44 - 51.
47 Ibid.
48 Burawoy, 1972, op cit, P 50.
49 Ibid, P 79
50 For an elaborate and perceptive account of these twin 
objectives of Zambian Government policy, see Bates, 1971, 
op cit, PP 27 - 51.
51 Transitional, First, Second and Third National Development 
plans, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965, 1966, 1972, 1978).
52 Bates, 1971, op cit, and Burawoy, 1972, op cit.
53 Fincham and Zulu in Turok, 1979, op cit.
54 Personal interview with Wilson Chakulya who was Minister 
responsible at the time, 19 October 1982.
55 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act, 1965, discussed in 
Chapter Four, below.
56 Lofchie and Rosberg in Belling, 1965, op cit, P 11.
57 No 36 of 1971, Chapter 517 of the Laws of Zambia.
58 The Industrial Relations Court still retains the power of 
approval in relation to agreements made before 30 April,
1983. Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1983, See Chapter 
Six, below.
59 President Kaunda's statement, quoted in The Times of Zambia, 
21 December, 1984.
60 Quemby A, "Works Councils and Industrial Relations in Zambia" 
(1975) , 1, Some Aspects of Zambian Labour Relations.
P 85» discussed in Chapter Eight, below.
61 Cambridge, 1984, op cit, P 130.
62 Zulu J  B, Zambian Humanism: Some Major Spiritual and 
Economic Challenges, (Lusaka: Neczam, 1970)» Kandeke T F, 
Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism. (Lusaka: Neczam, 1977)
64
63 Gertzel, et al, 1984, op clt, P 9.
64 Kaunda K D, Humanism In Zambia and a Guide to its 
Implementation, Part II, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1974) 
P 103.
65 Gertzel C, "Industrial Relations in Zambia to 1975" in 
Damachi, et al, 1979, op cit, P 323> Quemby, 1975, op cit,
P 85.
66 Kandeke, 1977 op cit. Kaunda, 1974, op cit, P 97.
67 Fincham and Zulu in Turok, 1979, op cit, P 214» Henderson I 
1972, op cit» Berger, 1974, op cit. Chapter IX.
68 Fincham and Zulu in Turok, 1979, op cit.
69 "Industrial Relations Bill", Government discussion document 
of proposed changes to the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, 
(Lusaka, 1984), discussed in Chapter Nine, below.
70 For a reference to these systems of industrial relations and 
their development in Africa in recent years, see Cambridge, 
1984, op cit.
71 Mihyo in Damachi, 1979, op cit.
65
CHAPTER THREE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LABOUR POLICY
In the next five chapters we examine key areas of the Government's 
incorporation strategy as formulated under the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971. The foundations of modern labour policy were, however, 
laid down well before independence. Many signficant developments 
took place during the period following the Second World War.1 
Although this study is basically concerned with developments during 
the post-colonial period from 1971, developments during the 
colonial period, in particular those after the Second World War, 
formed an important basis for contemporary policy. It will be 
apparent in the following chapters that there has been some 
continuity in certain areas of the policy towards trade unions.
Some aspects of colonial policy are, therefore, important to our 
understanding of current developments. In this Chapter we examine 
some of the main developments of the post-war colonial period. The 
rise of African trade unions was the dominant development of this 
period. It is, therefore, the main focus of the Chapter. We also 
examine other issues connected with the development of African 
trade unions, among others, European labour on the copperbelt, the 
evolution of industrial relations policy and legislation, and 
various demands for change.
3.A. The Changing Role of the Colonial State
The development of post-war labour policy in colonial Zambia is 
best appreciated by looking at the changing role of the government
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of the territory as an autonomous entity, separate from the 
metropolitan imperial state. Two scholars of political economy who 
have attempted to construct an analytical framework for Kenya
suggest that the essential role of the colonial state was to
2articulate two modes of production. The two modes of production 
were the pre-capitalist (subsistence) and the capitalist (money) 
economies. The state protected capitalist social relations, as 
distinguished from mere capital, and imposed social control in the 
political sphere. Unlike the role of the metropolitan state from 
whose imperial authority its role stemmed, the role of the colonial 
state overseas was not without its complications and 
contradictions. The major complication arose out of its "dual 
mandate". The colonial state was the agent of the metropolitan 
power and subject, from time to time, to the direction of the 
Colonial Office in London. In addition it was also responsible for 
local cohesion over heterogeneous and contending local forces.
The Zambian situation was similar to that of Kenya depicted by 
Lonsdale and Berman in their work. Its essential characteristics 
are useful in understanding the development of post-war colonial 
labour policy in Zambia. As early as the late 1930's the colonial 
state in Zambia had abandoned the practice of 'unrestricted 
state violence' which had been characteristic of the British South 
Africa Company Chartered rule when it resorted to unmitigated 
taxation and forced labour of the indigenous population. The 
territorial government's exercise of its role was coming 
increasingly under close scrutiny by the Colonial Office.
Increased Colonial Office scrutiny over labour matters was 
demonstrated by its frequently resorting to commissions of inquiry 
and expert assessors to solve labour problems and formulate new 
policy, (see Appendix II P 266).
A number of factors were responsible for the Colonial Office's 
increased surveillance of labour policy. The emergence of the 
Labour Party as a contending party of government (Labour joined
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Churchill's war-time coalition) was one such factor that added a 
new dimension to the better appreciation of the imperial mission in 
London. Labour professed a universal sensitivity to the problems 
of wage earners, including those of the colonies. The war effort 
and the need to maximise colonies' contribution created an impetus 
for the examination of colonial conditions which survived the war 
itself. As a result, an increasing number of politicians including 
some within the Conservative ranks like Arthur Creech Jones were 
increasingly keen to scrutinise colonial labour policy more 
closely. Labour policy also profited from the increased 
participation of the British trade union movement, in particular 
the Trades Union Congress (the TUC), in government-sponsored 
bodies.3
In the territory itself the government was confronted with the need 
to create an atmosphere that would ensure a more profitable 
exploitation of minerals to make the Protectorate a paying 
proposition. To that end the government had to come to terms not 
only with the political, social and economic demands of an 
increasingly entrenched white population, but also those of the 
Africans. The urban landscape was quickly changing. With the 
increasing stabilisation of African labour in urban centres,
African workers were becoming a more permanent feature on the "line 
of rail". The previous more relaxed labour policy mainly based on 
migrant labour from the rural areas was no longer adequate. The 
government's role in labour matters had to develop beyond the mere 
collection and collation of labour data. A new framework based on 
new initiatives in legislation and administrative action was 
needed.
3 .B Development of African Trade Unions
The rise of African trade unions was undoubtedly the most important 
single development of post-war labour policy in Colonial Zambia.
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The question of what gave rise to African unions generally and 
those of Northern Rhodesia in particular has been a subject of 
debate.4 Was it entirely a result of African workers' 
consciousness and militant efforts or was it due to the 
paternalistic generosity of the Colonial State? It would seem that 
both pressure on the part of African workers and the Colonial 
State's enlightened self-interest played their part in the 
development of African trade unions on the Zambian Copperbelt. The 
formation of African unions was ultimately due to the grudging 
acceptance of the idea by the Northern Rhodesian administration 
under Colonial Office pressure, and the reaction of a new African 
urban society against economic conditions. Trade unionism was part 
of the increasing determination by Africans to seek a better deal 
for themselves and challenge racial prejudice in the process.5
The general atmosphere during the aftermath of the war encouraged a 
"fair deal" for the colonies and was, therefore, conducive to 
progress in a number of areas of colonial policy. As we have 
mentioned above (P 67) , for example, the British trade union 
movement began to take an official interest in colonial labour 
matters indicated by the TUC's participation in 
government-sponsored committees and other bodies. It was 
significant that the TUC was represented on the Colonial Labour 
Advisory Committee and assisted in the choice of labour officers 
for the colonies. Equally important, as we have also indicated, 
was the rise of the Labour Party as a part of government.
Increasing labour problems in the colonies also helped the drive 
for trade unions as part of official 'colonial development' 
policy.
By 1947 a decision had been taken by the Colonial Office to send a 
trade union officer to help organise African trade unions. The 
sending of one William Comrie, a Scottish member of the Transport 
and General Workers' Union, was instrumental in the development of
69
African unions on the Copperbelt. In his evidence to the Dalgleish 
Commission Comrie described his job as follows:
".... My job amounts to this - where there is a demand on the 
part of Africans for some form of organisation along trade 
union lines, we have to guide that demand and help it and 
give all possible assistance to the Africans in building a 
proper organisation on proper lines with a reasonable chance 
of enabling it to succeed."
In his task Comrie insisted on the application of British trade 
union principles without discrimination and quickly won the trust 
of African workers.
African trade unionism was, however, inevitably preceded by various 
forms of institutions that sought to foster African representation 
in urban society. Of these. Tribal Representatives and Boss Boys' 
Committees were probably the most prominent. A brief examination 
of their role is, therefore, in order.
3.B.1 Tribal Representatives
The outbreak of industrial unrest among African workers in the 
mines in 1935 and 1940 were important landmarks in the progressive 
development of African consciousness on the Copperbelt.8 The 
labour disturbances, among other factors, prompted a review of the 
territory's labour policy which was spearheaded by the Labour 
Department which had been formed in 1940.
Policy review started with an attempt to overhaul the tribal elders 
system instituted in 1931 and aimed at developing an urban-based 
social representation for various ethnic groups among African 
9workers. The system of tribal representatives was instituted in 
place of that of elders. Whereas tribal elders were an informal 
system based on compounds where African workers lived, that of 
tribal representatives was more official in its status. It was the
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first time that the administration in collaboration with the mine 
owners sought to prepare Africans for self-organisation and 
representation that was later to develop to full trade unionism. 
Under a 1942 agreement between the Chamber of Mines and the 
government, African representation was further expanded. The 
functions of the tribal representatives were ".... to keep in close 
touch with all native workers in the mines, and to present to 
management, on behalf of the workers, any grievances there may be 
in regard to working conditions".10
Tribal representatives were, however, not entirely successful as a 
measure of independent African workers' representation. Although 
originally conceived as independent of both the government and the 
mines, in practice the position of tribal representatives turned 
out to be almost as subservient to management control as their 
predecessors, the tribal elders. The tribal representatives were 
also subsequently alienated from the mass of workers as they were 
perceived as a privileged elite. The mining companies' emphasis on 
the separation of semi-skilled African workers from the mass of 
unskilled groups further undermined the representatives' position. 
Consequently, although tribal representatives at times performed 
useful functions as de facto shop stewards, and also as 
adjudicators of low level grievances (thereby localising disputes 
for "cooling off" purposes), their effectiveness in aid of good 
industrial relations declined with the progressive 
proletarianisation of African workers.11
3.B.2 Boss Boys' Committees and Other Groups
African workers' consciousness, cutting across ethnic distinctions, 
developed rapidly during and after the War. The process was aided 
by, among other factors, labour "stabilisation", a policy which in 
contrast to the reliance on periodical rural to urban migration of 
labour accepted a settled African industrialised community.
71
African labour stabilisation had in fact already been entrenched on 
the Copperbelt by 1944 although official government policy resisted 
it until 1956.
The lack of effectiveness on the part of tribal representatives 
inevitably created a vacuum. Between 1940 and 1949 various African 
organisations came into being, all seeking to fill the vacuum of 
African representation in industry. The government for its part 
cautiously watched developments hoping that a central organisation 
liable to easy official regulation would emerge in time. Of the 
latent organisations following the institution of tribal 
representatives, three made considerable impact on the Copperbelt: 
the Boss Boys' Committees (representing underground African 
Supervisors), the Works Committees, and the African Clerks 
Association (representing African clerical staff). All three were 
work-based.
The Boss Boys' Committees had been formed as early as 1942 to 
handle grievances of African supervisors underground. Unlike 
tribal representatives, the Boss Boys’ Committees’ selection was 
professional in character although ethnic representation was 
broadly reflected. The Mining Companies did not object to the Boss 
Boys' Committees. They realised the benefit of their isolation 
from the underground African work force. The Boss Boys' Committees 
were also afflicted with the same structural ambiguity as tribal 
representatives to a large extent. Much as they were work-based, 
the distinction between social and work place grievances was not as 
clearly drawn.13
The formation in 1946 of the Works Committee and in 1947 that of 
the Clerks Association indicated a more progressive development in 
the representation of African workers. There were improvements on 
the Boss Boys' Committees which were more embracing and truly 
representative of various groups. The Works Committees, unlike the
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Boss Boys which were an interest group within the African labour 
force, were more integrated agents of the workers. Similarly, the 
Clerks Association which sought to represent administrative and 
clerical groups did so regardless of rank or department of the 
mining industry. The Clerks Association although relatively 
short-lived, has been considered to have paved the way for the 
African Mineworkers Union.
All three organisations co-existed for a while and their prestige 
varied among different groups of African workers in the mining 
industry. Given the increasing militancy within the ranks of the 
African workforce, one concern was probably most prevalent. The 
organisations tended to be at the mercy of mining companies' 
managements and were, therefore, at best regarded as "house 
unions". In contrast to the African Mineworkers Union, which was 
to emerge later, the organisations were less populist and 
broadly-based. Besides this, they were also psychologically linked 
to tribally-based prestige structures.
In spite of their short-comings however, the three organisations 
were a marked improvement on the tribal representatives. Conflict 
with the latter system was, therefore, inevitable. The mining 
companies, however, continued to give paternalistic support to 
tribal representatives in spite of their loss of credibility. It 
was not until 1953 that they were finally abolished.
The Boss Boys' Committees, the Works Committees and the Clerks 
Association in turn steadily declined, unable to achieve any 
credible participation of African workers in industrial relations. 
By 1947, with the organisational assistance of William Comrie, 
trade unionism entered the scene. It first came not from the 
African labour force in the mines, but from the even more 
politically conscious shop assistants. The Shop Assistants Union 
was formed in 1947. The focus of attention soon inevitably shifted 
to the mining industry where the African Mineworkers Union was 
formed in 1949.
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3.B.3 The African Mine Workers Union and Other Unions
The founding of the Northern Rhodesian African Mine Workers Union 
(the NRAMU) came at a time when the demands and needs of the 
African work force in the mining industry were being brought to 
public attention. The new organisation was able to respond to 
those needs and demands better than any of the organisations in 
existence at the time.
Several factors were responsible for the ascendency of the new 
creed of organised labour over the old one mainly based on tribal 
representation. One of them, as we have seen above, was the 
increased stabilisation of African labour on the Copperbelt.
African labour stabilisation led to the decline of those roles 
performed by tribal representatives and other similar institutions 
which tended to be relevant only at times of relatively high labour 
instability due to the rural - urban migration. The new 
leadership's orientation was more proletarian than tribal.
The new organisation's success was, however, not easy. One of the 
major obstacles in its path was the mining companies' initial 
opposition to it. The companies were at first unco-operative with 
regards to bargaining issues and tended to use their managerial 
power excessively, encouraging dissension and divisions within 
African labour ranks when it suited them. The mining companies' 
attitude of course reflected their commitment to the 
officially-sponsored tribal representatives. The NRAMU had also to 
cope with initial apathy and distrust which were widespread among 
most African workers except among the more politically conscious 
and articulate ones.
In spite of the obstacles however, trade union activity on the 
Copperbelt was consolidated and spread to other urban centres in 
time. By 1954, 16 African trade unions were registered. The 
major aims of the unions were universal. They sought to increase
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wages, to improve working conditions and African advancement in 
employment and to bring an end to racial discrimination at work, 
the so called practice of colour bar that allocated jobs on the 
basis of race. The first decade of African trade unionism in which 
the NRAMU was the undisputed leader was heavily tainted by 
militancy as the record successive strikes readily testify.18 Most 
unions faced organisation and financial difficulties. They drew 
their leadership from the new African elite comprising clerks, or 
as on the railways, messenger-interpreters. Internal divisions 
were frequent and a constant source of weakness. Membership was 
generally small before the adoption of "check-off" arrangements 
later in the 1950's and early 1960's. Seven of the fourteen 
functioning unions at the end of 1954, for instance, had fewer than 
one thousand members.18
Trade union activity during the period, however, laid down the 
foundation for four key unions dominant to this day (See Table 3, 
P129). The Shop Assistants' Union, the first African union to be 
formed in 1947, was the basis for the current National Union of 
Commercial and Industrial Workers (NUCIW). Out of the Artisans' 
Association grew the General Workers' Union, which after 
re-organisation and amalgamation emerged as today's National Union 
of Building, Engineering and General Workers, (NUBEGW). The 
present Zambia Railways' Union grew out of the Northern Rhodesian 
African Railway Workers' Trade Union formed in 1950. The NRARWTU 
amalgamated with the Southern Rhodesian African Railways Union to 
form the Rhodesia Railways African Union (the RRAU) in 1955. The 
Zambian component of the RRAU reverted to its original form after 
the break-up of the Federation in 1963. In 1967 it became the 
Zambia Railways Union after the dissolution of the common railways 
system.
The most important union by virtue of its size, resources, strength 
and influence in the African trade union movement was the NRAMU, 
the present Mine Workers' Union of Zambia (MUZ). By the end of 
1949 the union already had 19,000 members which peaked to 55,000
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after independence. By 1956 the union had managed to sign a dues 
agreement with the mining companies and appointed a full-time 
general secretary.20
By virtue of its prominent role the NRAMU along with its European 
counterpart whose role we shall presently examine, was the key 
target of government labour policy. A brief review of major 
developments in industrial relations indicates the extent of the 
administration's concern with the union's affairs.
The NRAMU was equally prone to the multitude of internal problems 
which were usually a result of financial mismanagement and 
leadership shortcomings among African unions during the period. 
Partly as a result of such problems, the Mining Companies withdrew 
the "check-off" arrangements and did not restore them until 1957. 
The Branigan Commission of 1956 was in particular highly critical 
of the union's financial mismanagement and the over-centralisation 
of its leadership. Such problems coupled with the mining 
companies' hostility and readiness to take advantage, constantly 
resulted in weaknesses of which other groups took advantage. In 
1953, for instance, the mines recognised the Mines African Staff 
Association (MASA). The emergence of MASA led to a serious 
jurisdictional conflict that further impaired the NRAMU's capacity 
to represent its membership and carry on effective collective 
bargaining.
In spite of the difficulties that faced the union however, it was 
generally successful in its campaigns. Its strikes of 1952, 1955 
and 1956, in particular its capacity to encourage African workers 
to take major industrial action in a peaceful and orderly manner, 
are examples of this. The 1952 strike over a wages claim lasted 
three weeks; in 1955 it managed to take out 33,000 out of 37,000 
African workers on strike for ten weeks, even though only about 30 
per cent were fully-paid up members of the union. In 1956 the 
union organised a series of "rolling strikes" which seriously
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disrupted the mining industry and led to the declaration of a state 
of emergency, the arrest and detention of 40 of its leaders, and as 
we shall presently see, the amendment of labour legislation to 
introduce greater control over the unions.
It was the growth and relative success of the NRAMU which shaped 
the character of the labour movement. It benefited from the policy 
makers' desire to see unions maintain their autonomy from political 
influence, particularly that of the nationalist movement. The 
miners' objectives generally coincided with the policy of 
industrial autonomy for most of the period under review.22 They 
saw the primary function of unionism as one of raising wages and 
improving working conditions through collective bargaining and 
industrial action where necessary. This perception was most 
evident in one significant incident concerning attempts by African 
nationalists to stop the imposition of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland in 1953. The miners' refusal to recommend to their 
members that they support protests by the African National 
Congress, the leading nationalist political party at the time, was 
critical in the campaign's failure.
In later years the struggle for union autonomy shifted to attempts 
by the nationalist movement to create a central labour organisation 
sympathetic to its tactics.24 With the later emergence of the 
United National Independence Party (UNIP) as the dominant 
nationalist party in 1959, the struggle for union autonomy centred 
on attempts to define a working relationship between the labour 
movement and the nationalist movement which could express mutual 
sympathy without encroaching on the two movements' respective 
domains. In spite of attempts to reach a mutually satisfactory 
understanding however, suspicion continued. It resulted in a 
serious split within the labour movement with the miners on the 
side of the faction that insisted on unions' autonomy. It was not 
until 1965 when the government imposed one central labour body by 
legislation that a semblance of unity was
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restored.25 The problem of autonomy however, was to continue 
unabated. As we shall see in the following chapters, it is union 
autonomy with which government labour policy is mainly concerned.
In contrast to the situation emerging in some other African 
countries where unions were more ready to sacrifice their autonomy 
for the greater cause of African nationalism, relative success 
tended to reinforce the NRAMU's desire for operational autonomy.26 
The NRAMU leadership was more responsive to the rank and file's 
main concerns which apparently measured success in terms of 
successful bargains secured by the Union. These concerns further 
helped to instill a parochial sense of interest.27
The "rolling strikes" of 1956 marked a significant change in the 
emphasis of labour policy by the administration. Although broadly 
maintaining the non-interventionist model, the government sought 
legislative changes that tended to be restrictive, as we shall 
presently see below. Nevertheless, the years 1957 to 1964 
continued to witness increased union activity in most industries. 
Increased union activity in part benefited from better government 
efforts to develop a more stable industrial relations system based 
on improved work-place procedures in which unions were encouraged, 
government action in that respect was in response to successive 
Commissions of Inquiry, in particular the Branigan and Honeyman
Commissions, which repeatedly emphasised the need for such 
28efforts.
The role of the NRAMU in the development of other unions cannot 
however be over-emphasised. The miners set an example that was 
invariably followed by other less successful groups. The formation 
of the Teachers' Union in 1962, for instance, was widely believed 
to be largely due to the miners' influence on Copperbelt teachers 
who were instrumental in its conception. The formation of the 
Teachers' Union was shortly followed by countrywide industrial 
action in demand of better conditions. The miners' influence was
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similarly evident in other groups. The formation of the Building 
Workers' Union in 1958 and the Agricultural Workers' Union in 1962 
whose leaders had Copperbelt experience also benefited from the 
NRAMU example.
The miners' influence set a trend towards union multiplicity which 
continued throughout the early 1960's. In 1962 there were over 18
29unions commanding a meagre 50,000 membership. Of these unions 
only a few eventually survived due to considerable re-organisation 
and amalgamation which took place just before and soon after 
independence. The major beneficiaries, as is apparent from the 
current situation from Table 3, were the big unions who attracted 
smaller groups and thus consolidated themselves. As a result there 
were in 1964 five unions with over 5,000 members each, whereas in 
1960 the NRAMU was the only African union with members over that 
figure. Major amalgamations included those of the NUCIW, the 
Factory Workers Union, the NUBEG (which absorbed construction 
workers), the National Union of Local Government Workers, and the 
National Union of Public Service Workers. By the end of 1964, 
with further expansion and consolidation, there were 29 unions with 
an overall membership of 101,654. Union expansion and 
consolidations created a more favourable atmosphere for recognition 
by employers. As a result, unions progressively gained invaluable 
experience in collective bargaining, oustanding in Africa.30
3.C. European Labour
Although the role of European and expatriate labour is not a major 
theme of this study, it would not be complete without mentioning 
it. The presence of European workers especially in the mining 
industry was one of the most significant factors in the development 
of labour policy in colonial Zambia. The development of African 
unionism was in part due to the example set by Europew unionism. 
The success of European unionism provided valuable experience on
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which Africans could draw. Probably even more significant was the 
fact that the advancement of Africans in industry and both 
government policy and the mining companies’ attitudes were 
dependent on the position of the European labour force. Besides 
this, the significance of European labour was not restricted to the 
colonial period. It affected post-colonial policy in a profound 
way. The reliance on expatriate European manpower long after 
independence gave rise to the Government's localisation 
(Zambianisation) policy which sought to train local manpower 
through extensive education programmes.31 A brief examination of 
European labour's position is, therefore, useful to the 
understanding of the background to post-war policy in Northern 
Rhodesia.
The development and expansion of mining operations on the 
Copperbelt during the late 1920's led to a steady increase of 
European workers and settlers.32 Mining increasingly required 
skilled labour. In order to attract such labour from South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand, the mining companies progressively 
offered the newcomers inducements in the form of high wages, fringe 
benefits and job security. The importance of European skilled 
workers increased with the further development of mining activity 
and led to further privileges. Privileges for European workers 
consequently resulted in disparities between white and black 
labour. In 1956, for instance, the African miner's highest pay was 
about E30 per month compared with the average European wage of £170 
and extra fringe benefits of free accommodation, free children's 
education, free holiday passage and annual bonus. At the time it 
was considered that the Copperbelt European workers' "living 
standard was higher than any other group of workmen .... anywhere 
in the World." The progressive entrenchment of European labour's 
privileges led to a dual labour policy subsequently reinforced by 
the development of
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separate unions for Africans in spite of the absence of any 
official policy of discrimination.
It was probably inevitable that trade unionism in Colonial Zambia 
would start among European workers. Their privileged position led 
to entrenchment out of fears of eventual African encroachment.
South Africa, where job discrimination along racial lines, 
colour-bar, had been officially recognised under Statute in 1926, 
provided the impetus.34 In 1936 a branch of the South Africa Mine 
Workers' Union was established on the Copperbelt. The branch was 
subsequently transformed into an autonomous union, the Northern 
Rhodesia Mine Workers Union (NRMWU).35 In 1937 the mining 
companies recognised the NRMWU.
The outbreak of the war provided the NRMWU with further opportunity 
to entrench itself. Under the British Government's direction the 
mining company undertook to supply all copper production for the 
Allied war effort. In 1940 the NRMWU took advantage of British 
fears of disruption of copper supplies and insisted on the 
legitimisation of job reservations for European workers. Under 
British Government pressure, the demand was acceded to. Thus de 
facto colour-bar was born. In 1942 another concession in the form 
of the closed shop was granted.
The entrenchment of European labour's privileges and the NRMWU's 
conduct in industrial affairs continued to be significant factors 
both in the development of African unionism and labour policy until 
independence. As we shall presently see, European labour activity 
was a key factor in the impact of labour policy on industrial 
relations and influenced subsequent changes in that policy. It is, 
therefore, useful to bear in mind the background role of European 
labour for a better appreciation of wider developments during the 
period.
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3.D. The Regulation of Trade Unions and Industrial Relations
As we have seen, the first trade union in the country was not 
established until 1936 when the European NRMWU was formed. Prior 
to the formation of the first trade union, British trade union and 
trade disputes laws of 1871, 1875, 1876, 1896 and 1906 had been 
made applicable by a general statute of application in anticipation 
of future developments.37 By the time of the NRMWU's inception it 
was felt that new legislation was necessary. Thus followed the 
passing of the Imperial Acts Extension Ordinance, 1937 which 
extended a number of British Acts then in force to the territory. 
The 1937 Ordinance made applicable to Northern Rhodesia, British 
Trade Union Acts of 1913, 1927 and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. 
As we have seen, the Colonial Office was, towards the outbreak of 
the Second World War, inclined to put pressure on colonial 
administrations to review their labour policies. Part of that 
pressure was in the form of directives for the introduction of 
local legislation to pave the way for increased trade union 
activity. In response to such pressure, the administration 
reluctantly attempted to pass a local trade union statute in 1938. 
Although the Bill introduced in the Legislative Council (the LEGCO) 
was for the most part a consolidating one, provisions which would 
have brought compulsory legislation of trade unions, and also 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration made it controversial. In 
fact, compulsory registration would have simply brought the 
position in Northern Rhodesia in line with that of most colonies. 
Compulsory arbitration on the other hand would have followed the 
experience of Southern Rhodesia where it was in force.38 Both 
sides of industry, neither of which had been consulted in depth, 
objected to the Bill. The Miners lobbied the generally sympathetic 
unofficial members of the LEGCO. In spite of further government 
efforts which lasted well into 1943, the Bill had to be withdrawn 
39owing to insurmountable opposition.
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Post-war conditions, however, which among other developments gave 
rise to African trade unions, made the postponement of local labour 
legislation increasingly untenable. It was felt that the British 
law applicable needed to be given a local orientation to suit 
labour conditions in the territory. The LEGCO subsequently set up 
a Select Committee in March 1949 to formulate proposals for local 
labour legislation.40 The Select Committee toured major industrial 
centres to gather evidence. It produced two reports which were 
used as a basis for two Bills to regulate trade unions and 
industrial disputes, the Trade Unions and Disputes Bill and the 
Industrial Conciliation Bill, 1949.41 The Select Committee had been 
urged by the Chamber of Mines to recommend separate legislation for 
African and European trade unions. The Chamber argued that the 
"general effect of the proposed legislation would be to apply to 
Africans the most advanced form of trade unionism many years before 
the vast majority of Africans (were) capable of understanding its 
implications or of carrying out the provisions of the 
legislation".42 The Chamber also suggested two stages of 
registration and recognition in both the proposed separate 
legislations. According to those proposals every trade union would 
first have been compelled to register to ensure close 
administrative control. The second stage, that of recognition, 
would come after proof of progress in the conduct of a given 
union's affairs. The Registrar in his discretion would have to 
determine whether the union was fully representative of the workers 
in the industry and area concerned before according recognition. 
Only after such recognition would the union have its jurisdiction 
and capacity to engage in collective bargaining.
The proposals were rejected. In rejecting the proposal to 
legislate for separate unions, the government was mindful of the 
Colonial Office's directions against the introduction of official 
colour bar in contrast to de facto colour bar which already existed
in all industries in the country. Separate legislation would have
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amounted to the de jure recognition of discrimination along racial 
lines. The rejection of a two-tier registration and recognition 
procedure was, on the other hand, apparently based on the desire to 
maintain the principle of voluntarism. It was generally felt that 
recognition in particular was an extra-legal problem, a matter to 
be left to a given trade union and employer.
Two alternative proposals by the Chamber of Mines were also 
rejected, the introduction of compulsory registration and corporate 
personality for trade unions. On the question of compulsory 
registration the Chamber was initially supported by the NRMWU who 
were keen to avoid trade union multiplicity and competition that 
might undermine its position. The union therefore, supported a 
system of compulsory registration which would require the consent 
of the existing trade union in a given industry.43
It argued in favour of maintaining a voluntary system of 
registration, the benefits of which when given to registered unions 
would prove a compelling bait to most unions. Under the proposed 
law, as under the position then obtaining, registered unions were 
automatically accorded legal capacity which included the protection 
against liability in pursuance of certain acts that would otherwise 
be tortious. The granting of Corporate personality was, therefore, 
deemed superfluous.44
3.D.1 Legislation 1949
The legislation which eventually emerged in the form of two 
Ordinances, the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance and the 
Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949, were within the current 
colonial mould of most other territories. The legislation's 
essential features reflected British voluntarism at the time. In 
the following pages we briefly examine some of the key provisions 
concerning the regulation of trade unions, collective bargaining
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and trade disputes. It should be noted that although the two 
statutes were intended to deal with different areas, one with the 
organisation of trade unions and their involvement in trade 
disputes and the other with the settlement of disputes under 
conciliation, in practice the two instruments overlapped and were 
complementary to each other.
3.D.2 Administrative Control of Unions
The administrative control of trade unions was a key feature of the 
Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949. One major 
innovation of the Ordinance was the introduction of the Office of 
the Registrar of Trade Unions which was responsible for overseeing 
the administrative regulation of trade unions.45 Unlike the 
Solicitor General who had acted as registrar of trade unions prior 
to the enactment of the Ordinance, the Registrar of Trade Unions 
was an official of the Labour Department directly involved in the 
formulation and implementation of labour policy.
As the official responsible for ensuring that trade unions complied 
with statutory requirements, the Registrar had a wide range of 
powers. For instance, the legislation required trade union 
constitutions to comply with mandatory statutory objects set out in 
Section 6. Before registration could be granted, the Registrar had 
to satisfy himself that a given constitution conformed to the 
statutory objects.47 In certain circumstances the law gave the 
Registrar the power to cancel union registration where, for 
instance, the constitution had been altered in a way that made it 
incompatible with statutory objects. Appeals in such cases could 
be lodged directly with the High Court.48
The Registrar was also given extensive powers to regulate the 
financial management of trade unions. Unions were required to give 
an account of their revenues, expenditure and various assets to the
85
Registrar annually. The use of finances was also more restricted 
than that obtaining in the United Kingdom. In spite of the fact 
that the English Trade Union Act, 1927, earlier applied to the 
territory, had been repealed when the 1949 Ordinances were enacted, 
restrictions on the use of union finances were still based on the 
Act. During the stages of the Ordinances' enactment, there had been 
a lot of controversial debate concerning the use of funds for 
political purposes. Many members of the LEGCO saw the existence of 
the political fund as contrary to the principle of union autonomy 
from political influence which had become cherished as a 
fundamental guideline in the development of colonial trade unions.
Arguments were thus made for the exclusion of the political fund 
50altogether. In the end, however, the British precedent partially 
prevailed. It was instead decided to control the use of the 
political fund more closely. Not only was the use of union funds 
for political purposes restricted to activities which were less of 
a risk to union autonomy, but strict rules of operation were also 
to be drawn up and approved by the Registrar in advance. Among 
other things, the rules had to stipulate that the political fund 
would be separate from other union funds and members were free to 
seek exemption without incurring any penalties for opting out. 
Above all, the question of contribution to the political fund could 
not be made a condition of admission to union membership.52
The use of union funds for other purposes had also to comply with 
prescribed objects. Thus union funds could only be spent on the 
following:
(a) the payment of salaries and allowances to trade union 
officers;
(b) the payment of expenses for union administration, including 
the auditing of accounts;
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(c) the prosecution or defence of any legal proceedings to which 
the union or any member (was) a party, when such prosecution 
or defence (was) undertaken for the purpose of securing or 
protecting any rights of the union as such or any rights 
arising out of the relations of any members with his 
employer}
(d) the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the trade union or 
any member;
(e) the compensation of members for loss arising out of trade 
disputes;
(f) allowances to members or their dependants on account of 
death, old age, sickness, accidents, or unemployment of such 
members; and
(g) any other object which by notification in the Government 
Gazette the Governor, on the application of the union, 
declared to be an object for which such funds might be 
expended.
In addition, as we have seen, the law required the furnishing of 
annual returns of accounts to the Registrar. The requirements in 
that respect followed closely on Sections 11 and 16 of the Trade 
Union Act, 1871. The union treasurer was required to tender to the 
trustees or members a true account of monies received and paid out, 
including the balance of securities held according to union rules. 
The trustees were required to appoint a person fit to audit the 
accounts, and where necessary, the auditor could take control of 
the books, papers and other financial documents. The annual return 
and accounts had to be in prescribed form. The law further 
stipulated that the returns had to be accompanied by new rules and
changes of union officers which had taken place during the year 
. 53concerned.
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The Ordinance also laid down elaborate duties of trade union 
officers and their qualifications. Persons who had been convicted 
of any crime involving fraud or dishonesty were not eligible to 
hold office, for instance. Holders of union office also had to be 
engaged or employed in a given industry for a prescribed period to 
qualify. In the latter case, however, the Registrar could give 
exemption from the requirement at his discretion. Union office was 
also barred to persons who had been on the executive or held office 
in a union whose registration had been cancelled or withdrawn under 
the provisions of the law. In such cases permission to hold office 
could only be given if the person concerned could prove to the 
satisfaction of the Registrar that he had not been at fault in the 
circumstances leading to the suspension or cancellation of union 
registration. Similarly, when a candiate seeking office had 
previously been suspended by the Registrar under Section 25, he 
could not hold office if the suspension had not been revoked or the 
period for which suspension was effective had not expired.54
3.D.3 The Closed Shop
The legislation also set out guidelines on the operation of the 
closed shop and secured members' rights in the running of union 
affairs.
To be legally valid a closed shop55 had to receive a certain amount 
of support from the trade union membership in a secret ballot. At 
least 75 per cent of paid-up members had to participate in the 
ballot. Of those voting, two-thirds had to be in favour of the 
agreement for it to have effect. Where the above requirements were 
not met or where the ballot was not held within one calendar month 
of concluding the closed shop agreement, it would be null and void. 
In addition, it was required of the union holding the ballot to 
submit, within 48 hours before holding the ballot, a list of
paid-up members for the preceding month to the Labour Department. 
The Department was responsible for the ballot's supervision and was 
also empowered to make rules for its conduct.
The Ordinance conferred upon union members certain rights to ensure 
democratic participation and avoid victimisation. One such right 
was the right to information. Members were entitled not only to 
receive copies of the constitution and union rules, but also the 
union'8 annual report and accounts.56 Union members were also 
given protection against unreasonable suspension and expulsion. 
Appeals to independent persons or ordinary courts were mandatory in 
such cases. The outcome of such appeals was binding unless 
overturned by higher courts, including the High Court.57
Trade union rules were also required to provide for the "right of 
every member to a reasonable opportunity to vote and state his case 
against any disqualification, including disqualification from 
receiving benefits if subscription was in arrears."
Freedom of association was also protected under the legislation. 
Section 54 provided that no employee could be prevented from being 
or becoming a member of a trade union. The provision prohibited 
employers making it "a condition of employment of any employee that 
that employee (should) neither be nor become a member of a trade 
union or other organisation representing employees in any 
industry...." Any such condition in any contract of employment 
entered into before or after the commencement of the Ordinance was 
void. A penalty was also imposed against any employer contravening 
the prohibition.
3.D.4 Picketing and Essential Services
The right to picket in the course of industrial action and 
restrictions in essential services received considerable attention
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during the enactment of the Ordinances. The Chambers of Mines and 
Commerce had particularly opposed the inclusion of the right to 
picket in the legislation.59 It was argued that in the climate 
then pertaining, picketing would simply result in widespread 
intimidation. On the other hand, picketing was regarded as a 
well-institutionalised weapon of persuasion, essential to 
industrial action. In the end the right to picket was included, 
but prohibited in or near private dwelling premises.60
At the time of the enactment of Ordinances, and ever since, the 
question of essential services had been central in attempts to 
control the trade unions' capacity to act effectively in industrial 
action in many tropical countries of the Commonwealth. At the 
time the law in Northern Rhodesia was based on that of metropolitan 
United Kingdom. It is useful to recall that at that time the right 
to strike and lockout in Britain had been limited in three ways.
Firstly, there were the permanent restrictions on industrial action 
called in breach of certain contracts. Under the 1875 Conspiracy 
and Protection of Property Act, a breach of contract was a criminal 
offence when it was likely to endanger human life, cause serious 
bodily injury or endanger valuable property; or in the case of 
employees in gas, water and electricity industries, likely to 
deprive the community of their supply of any of those services.
The second kind of restriction was in force between 1927 and 1946. 
The 1927 Trade Unions and Trades Disputes Act defined illegal 
strikes and lockouts. Penalties were laid down for declaring, 
instigating, inciting or taking part in such illegal activities.
The 1875 Act was also modified in 1927 by restricting the right of 
public employees to strike. The third restriction was imposed 
under war time legislation. It was contained in the Conditions of 
Employment and National Arbitration Order No 1305 of 1940 which was 
in force until 1951. Compulsory arbitration was provided as a 
safeguard to each side of industry in return for the withdrawal of 
the right to strike or lockout.
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Provisions dealing with essential services in Northern Rhodesia 
were based on the principles of the above British law. The scope 
of essential services, however, aroused much controversy. In spite 
of the general agreement to exclude services regarded as essential 
to the life of the community from industrial action, the scope of 
such services was not universally agreed. The original Bill had 
contained restrictions on water and electricity only. Later the 
case for the inclusion of sanitary services was made. In spite of 
demands to extend the scope further from the Chambers of Mines and 
Commerce and some LEGCO members, the Ordinance only dealt with the 
above three services.62 From then onwards the scope of essential 
services was progressively extended. The current legislation gives 
the President the power to add to an extensive list of services 
already covered by resorting to the Preservation of Public Security 
Regulations.63
In spite of the need, recognised at the time, for an adequate 
machinery for the prompt settlement of disputes involving essential 
services, no special machinery was provided under the 1949 
Ordinances.
3.D.5 Immunities and Penal Sanctions
Two other features of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes 
Ordinance, 1949, should be mentioned here. One was the extension 
of traditional immunities to trade unions similar to those existing 
in the United Kingdom. The other was the resort to penal 
sanctions.
Sections 3 and 4 conferred protection on trade unions and their 
contracts. Unions could not, "by reason merely that they (were) in 
restraint of trade, be deemed unlawful so as to render any member 
of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for conspiracy
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or otherwise. Further, the objects of a trade union could not be 
deemed to be unlawful so as to render void or voidable any 
agreement or trust, merely because they were in restraint of 
trade".
Similarly, trade union contracts were protected. No legal 
proceedings could be instituted to enforce certain union agreements 
or recover damages for breach of contract. Such agreements 
included those concerning conditions of membership, subscriptions 
and certain contributions.
The resort to penal sanctions, including imprisonment, to enforce 
many provisions of the legislation was a distinctive feature. 
Penalties were prescribed for a whole range of contraventions.
Some of them, as we have seen, were within the administrative 
control of the Registrar. Others, were however, subject to the due 
process of the courts. Penalties in both categories were not 
restricted to cases of misappropriation or dishonesty, but extended 
to other contraventions as well. Although not a general feature of 
the United Kingdom's legislation at the time, the use of penalties
in trade union legislation was a common feature of colonial 
64practice.
3.D.6 Dispute Settlement Procedures
As in the case of trade unions, the lav? concerning the settlement 
of trade disputes broadly followed the British example save for a 
number of significant exceptions. In response to rising industrial 
relations problems in the 1950's, the law regulating the settlement 
of collective disputes became progressively more restrictive. 
Nevertheless, the legislation in Northern Rhodesia continued to be 
less restrictive than that of many other colonial territories in 
that respect. One of the factors responsible for the relatively
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liberal position was of course the relative strength of the mining 
unions on the Copperbelt, both black and European unions.65
The position in Britain concerning the prevention and settlement of 
trade disputes at the time is instructive in appreciating the 
regime of the Northern Rhodesian Ordinances in that respect.
British legislation at the time provided few positive procedures in
the area of dispute settlement, as indeed in collective 
66bargaining. The only notable exception was in the case of 
industries covered by wages councils and boards. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act, 1896, did however, provide for the possibility of 
official intervention to help in the settlement of disputes arising 
in the course of negotiations between employers and trade unions. 
The Industrial Courts Act, 1919, set up regular channels for the 
voluntary submission of disputes to arbitration. Awards resulting 
from such settlements were generally accepted by the parties in 
spite of their non-binding nature in law. The Industrial Disputes 
Order, in force from 1951 to 1955, made provision for the 
compulsory referral of disputes to arbitration in certain 
instances. Awards in that respect were enforceable in Courts as 
implied terms of the contract of employment.67
The Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, 1949 was in certain respects 
a simplified consolidation of the 1896 and 1919 British Acts, with 
68more emphasis on the former. Unlike the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Ordinance whose provisions were in many instances 
mandatory, the Industrial Conciliation Ordinance's approach was 
apparently to facilitate dispute settlement by negotiation between 
the parties. It provided the framework for settlement and did not 
affect sectors where conciliation machinery had already been agreed 
upon by the parties. This position was emphasised by a member of 
the Executive Council who introduced the Bill in LEGCO. Pointing 
to the fact that conciliation machinery already existed in the 
mines he went on to say:
93
On the other hand there are many undertakings in the 
country with no negotiating and conciliation machinery in 
existence between themselves and employees. For instance, 
there are many large firms of contractors here now. So far 
as we are aware they have no established machinery for the 
prevention and settlement of trade disputes. If a dispute 
arose .... the provision of this Bill could imnediately be 
brought into effect."
The regime of the Ordinance was mainly based on conciliation 
boards. The boards could be set up by agreement between employees 
and labour representatives on an industry basis. Each board had to 
register its Constitution with the Registrar and furnish annual 
returns of proceedings in a manner similar to that required of 
trade unions. Once registered a board's procedure merely had to 
conform to its Constitution. The conciliation procedure was, 
therefore, a matter for the parties in each industry. There were, 
however, instances where the government could intervene to set the 
machinery in motion.
Under Section 4, the Governor could, where it was felt there were 
no adequate arrangements in a particular industry for submitting 
disputes to conciliation, order an inquiry into conditions to 
determine the desirability of establishing a conciliation board.71 
Where a dispute was apprehended or came into effect in the absence 
of any conciliation machinery, the government could either take 
steps to enable the parties to meet under an independent chairman 
or on the application of one of the parties, appoint a conciliator 
or board of conciliation. Alternatively, a board of enquiry with a 
more general mandate could be appointed.72 The government could 
also appoint an arbitral tribunal with the consent of the parties. 
In 1958, the Ordinance was amended to give the government the power 
to provide arbitration in addition to, as well as in place of, 
conciliation.73
The conciliation boards were intended to facilitate the speedy 
settlement of disputes. They were exempted from applying normal
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rules of evidence as applied in criminal and civil proceedings. 
Counsel could, however, appear for the parties under conditions 
designed to ensure as much informality as possible.74
It cannot be overemphasised that in comparison to the current 
framework of dispute settlement which we shall examine later in the 
study, the framework for the settlement of disputes under the 1949 
legislation was in the main voluntary despite later government 
attempts to shape its role.
3.E. Initial Impact of Policy
The above discussion of some of the main elements of post-war 
colonial labour policy would not be complete without an examination 
of its impact on industrial relations, particularly on the 
Copperbelt, which it was designed to shape. The impact of the 
policy is best appreciated by outlining some of the major 
developments in industrial relations and demands for changes in 
policy during the period beginning in the mid-1950's to the eve of 
the Country’s self-government in 1963.
As we have seen earlier, the Labour Department was finally 
established in 1940. The objectives of labour policy and the 
Department's role were clearly spelt out as to "include the 
establishment of fair working conditions for those in employment, 
the maintenance of good industrial relations between employers and 
employees, and the peaceful settlement of disputes."75 While the 
1949 legislation which we have outlined above would confirm it as 
providing the framework for carrying out the above policy, the 
extent to which its objectives were attained was not always clear. 
Events appertaining to industrial relations on the Copperbelt do 
however, provide some insight into how the policy fared in practice 
and how the government responded to demands for a more restrictive 
policy.
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3.F. Industrial Relations on the Copperbelt
Industrial strife had generally been on the increase in all 
industries, especially the mining industry, since 1950. In 1956 
the government felt compelled to intervene by declaring a state of 
emergency following the so-called rolling strikes by African 
miners. A number of prominent African trade union leaders were 
detained in the emergency. Searching questions were increasingly 
raised about the circumstances which allowed the deterioration of 
industrial relations to such an extent.76 How adequate and 
suitable was labour legislation as formulated in the 1949 
Ordinances? Was the government right to allow trade disputes to 
continue being settled within a voluntary framework? What action 
could be taken to stem the rising level of violence and loss of 
revenue which were consequences of industrial action? These are 
some of the pertinent questions asked by the European electorate, 
managements and by members of the government itself.
Apart from the European NRMWU with a history of militancy going 
back to 1936, most of the industrial disputes involved African 
miners who felt cause for dissatisfaction with their conditions of 
employment in comparison to their white counterparts. African 
workers with an increasingly strong union to articulate their 
demands felt they were entitled to better wages, housing and food 
rations than they were getting. Bad relations with their European 
counterparts and difficult communications with management served to 
compound the situation. There was also a growing group of 
semi-skilled African workers who longed for the recognition of 
their increasing skills, but were denied advancement due to job 
reservation for white workers strictly enforced through the de 
facto colour-bar. These factors, coupled with a worsening 
political atmosphere, especially after the creation of the Central 
African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, contributed 
to bad industrial relations on the Copperbelt.
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Industrial strife presented a grave situation to the government not 
only because it posed a serious danger to social control, but also 
because strikes in the mining industry resulted in the loss of 
revenue in royalties and taxation. The increasing loss of revenue 
on account of strikes coincided with a down-turn in the fortunes of 
copper. Copper prices declined between 1956-59. The value of 
copper sales at the London Metal Exchange dropped from a peak of 
£400 sterling per ton in 1956 to £158 sterling per ton in 1958, for 
instance. Both territorial and federal revenues in the form of 
taxation from the mines fell from 66.2 per cent in 1956-57 to 40.2 
per cent in 1958-59. The African strikes in 1955 alone, for 
instance, resulted in losses of £2j million and £3} million to the 
territorial and federal treasuries respectively. In a situation 
where the country’s financial and economic well-being was 
interlocked with that of the mining industry, pressures for more 
government intervention in the way industrial relations were 
conducted naturally increased.
3.F.1 Labour Policy in Neighbouring Territories
Demands for change increasingly focused on the role of the law as 
embodied in the 1949 Ordinances in comparison to the situation in 
the neighbouring territories of Southern Rhodesia and Katanga, and 
also South Africa.
The 1949 legislation permitted, as we have seen, parties to make 
their own arrangements for conducting industrial relations. The 
law merely set out the minimum standards especially in the conduct 
of union affairs. By convention, and not by government policy, 
trade unions were organised on racial lines. Similarly, in respect 
to the settlement of disputes the law merely provided a framework 
for conciliation where there were no internal arrangements or where 
a total breakdown in such arrangements ensued. Other than the
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requirement to notify disputes, there was no direct government 
involvement unless requested. Even where there was a deadlock, 
government intervention was by way of arranging voluntary 
arbitration or an enquiry to clarify issues and make 
recommendations. The occasional intervention through the 
declaration of a state of emergency as that of 1956 was an 
extraordinary measure of urgency. In ordinary circumstances, 
therefore, government intervention was both indirect and informal 
following upon the proven approach of the British experience.
Similarly, the approach to collective bargaining, although not an 
exact reproduction, was based on the British system. Like most
colonial institutions it was an imported system developed in
79different circumstances. The result was, as in the British 
system itself, that the law was simply "a gloss or footnote to 
80collective bargaining." In spite of the fact that the framework 
had been applied in other colonial possessions with small 
variations, it had no parallel in the more immediate neighbouring 
territories.
Attempts had been made in the LEGCO to base some provisions of the 
Ordinance more closely on the Southern Rhodesian Industrial 
Conciliation Act, 1945.81 The Southern Rhodesian Act followed 
South African precedents in excluding Africans from the definition 
of employees in connection with registered trade unions and 
Industrial Councils. Industrial Councils formed by employers and 
European workers could, however, make decisions binding on all 
workers in a given industry, including Africans. What made the 
Southern approach unattractive to liberal LEGCO members and 
government officials, apart from the colour bar built into it, was 
the need for a closer regulation by government of industrial 
relations which was cardinal to the 1945 Act in Southern Rhodesia. 
That law required that existing machinery for the settlement of 
trade disputes be fully utilised. Where there was no voluntary 
agreement or arbitration, compulsory arbitration would take its
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place. Once arbitration was in process no strikes were allowed 
until a month after the consideration of the award by the parties.
The South African and Katanga experiences which had long been 
regarded as pace setters in labour policy, particularly that 
concerning the mining industry, were also cited in support of 
demands for changes in the industrial relations system in Northern 
Rhodesia. In South Africa, African trade unions could not be 
recognised under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1926. The 1937 
Amendment merely extended European and "coloured" (mixed race) 
collective agreements to all workers, including Africans, of the 
industry concerned. The 1953 Native Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act simply provided for government-appointed Europeans to 
negotiate on behalf of African workers. The agreements reached by 
such proxy negotiations were, however, legally binding on the 
African workers concerned. There was, therefore, no statutory role 
for the African worker in collective bargaining. Strikes were 
punishable by a heavy fine and three years imprisonment. Racial 
divisions were further strengthened by the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, 1946, which compelled mixed unions to segregate their 
membership. The Act also authorised the Ministry of Labour to 
reserve jobs on a racial basis. Even where the white worker was
concerned, the South African system of industrial relations was 
82more closely regulated.
In contrast to the South African system which was clearly designed 
to protect the white industrial worker, the Katanga mines took the
lead in Central and Southern Africa in the training and advancement 
83of the African worker. But in spite of the more liberal policy 
in these fields, wages did not dramatically improve with better 
training opportunities. Moreover, African trade unions were firmly 
discouraged. Whereas the first European trade union had received 
recognition as early as 1921, African trade unions were not allowed 
until 1946. Even then they were confined to the local level and
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certain crafts only. Membership was also limited to those with at 
least three years of employment in the trade concerned and the 
Congolese administration was given wide powers to regulate union 
affairs. As a result, therefore, only 7,500 African workers out of 
a labour force of 1,146,000 were union members in 1954. The 
deliberate discouragement of trade unionism coupled with a severely 
restricted collective bargaining system was in clear contrast to 
the position in Northern Rhodesia.84
3.G. Demands for Change
Given the different orientation in labour policy in the immediate 
neighbourhood, it was almost inevitable that the prevailing bad 
industrial relations would be readily explained in terms of the 
inadequacies in the existing law and policy. A close examination 
of the alleged inadequacies, however, reveals that they were not 
exclusively due to shortcomings of policy - if at all. Many 
factors, including peculiar developments in the mining industry, 
were responsible for the bad industrial relations.85
The administration faithfully followed the Colonial Office 
directives in many respects. One of those directives was that 
against discriminatory legislation. As we have seen, Comrie, the 
Scottish trade union officer sent out to advise African trade 
unions was opposed to any 'watering down' of the principles of 
trade unionism to cater for African labour. Comrie's position, as 
numerous communications testify, was very similar to that of the 
Colonial Office.86
In contrast, mine managements and other employers feared from the 
beginning that African trade unions could not comply with 
legislation rooted in the voluntary approach. They had demanded 
compulsory conciliation to cater for what they saw as bad
87leadership in both the European and African unions.
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The fact that the mining companies' arguments were rejected was due 
more to determined Colonial Office pressure in the background than 
consensus in the administration.
Although the establishment of African trade unions on a 'separate, 
but equal basis' in part reflected government policy against 
discrimination, it was not possible to prevent racial discrepancies 
in practice, particularly in the private industry. In the mining 
industry, for example, the granting of the closed shop to the 
European NRMWU and not the African Union (the NRAMU) was one such 
instance of racially-based differences in union bargaining power.88 
Although the mining companies had granted the closed shop 
reluctantly, the African miners were to seize upon it as an 
instance of de facto colour bar extending to job reservation. The 
mining companies also approached negotiations with the two unions 
differently. European trade unions negotiated with heads of 
departments while the African union met with the African Personnel 
departments. Justified as the two approaches were on the grounds 
of the need for better communications and the different economic 
considerations involved, the approach symbolised the double 
standards employed in the way industrial relations were conducted 
in other respects as well.
Other trends suggested genuinely different orientation between the 
two unions. Demands in the European union tended to move upwards 
from members to the Executive. Those of the African union on the 
other hand (probably because of the unusual monopoly of literacy 
and appreciation of the intricacies of unionism by the few in 
leadership) filtered downward from the Supreme Council.90
The difference in the bargaining strength of the two mining 
unions was built into collective agreements as well. In the 1949 
recognition agreement between the mining companies and the African 
union, the consent of 50 per cent of the
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membership had to be obtained in a secret ballot where strike 
action was contemplated. The European union on the other hand was 
strong enough to resist the clause until it was forced upon it when 
labour legislation was amended in 1958.
Differences in the treatment of the two unions apart, the way in 
which industrial relations were generally conducted in the industry 
is equally revealing. Both African and European recognition 
agreements provided for the lpcal discussion of grievances, but the 
strong centralisation of mining managements in the form of the 
Chamber of Mines affected unions as well. From 1941 the mining 
companies co-ordinated their policies through the Chamber under the 
direction of an executive committee composed of general managers of 
the biggest mines. Wage demands and other issues like African 
advancement were dealt with within the framework of the Chamber of 
Mines. Despite the fact that agreements were later individually 
signed with each mine management, centralisation and co-ordination 
by the Chamber excluded any creative, let alone any viable 
variation in the practice of industrial relations. Although 
employers in other industries were not as co-ordinated as the 
mining companies, the tendency was to follow standard procedures in 
dealings with unions.
As a result of the tendency towards centralisation grievances which 
could be settled at the local mine level usually involved union 
headquarters as well. Three Commissions from which this assessment 
is taken (Branigan, 1956; Honeyman, 1957; and Leggett, 1959) all 
pointed to the need to decentralise the grievance settlement 
machinery to the workplace not only in the mining industry, but in 
other industries as well. In the face of a renewed wave of 
industrial unrest the Morison Commission of 1962 also considered 
91the issue of decentralisation.
Industrial relations were also prone to poor communications between 
the parties, leading to distrust and lack of confidence. The 1955
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African strikes over wages and discussions over African advancement 
thereafter revealed ample evidence of this state of affairs. On 
the basis of available evidence one has to go along with Berger's 
assertion that the mining companies tended to manipulate fine 
points of procedure to their advantage. Such a tendency was hardly 
reassuring. The unions in response usually resorted to strike 
action to embarrass the employers. Thus in the summer of 1956, 
for instance, no less than fifteen African strikes broke out 
without recourse to notification procedures as laid down in the 
recognition agreement. Similarly, about fourteen stoppages by 
European workers took place between January 1956 and July 1957.
These problems were widely attributed to weak union leadership and 
organisation in employers and government circles. Available 
evidence at least partially justifies this assertion. Although the 
NRMWU's financial position was more stable than that of its African 
counterpart, changes in leadership were too frequent. There was 
also a feeling that the closed shop gave union leaders too much 
power. The 'pioneer spirit' among European workers made them less
amenable to being led, hence the demands of leaders by union
93members to adopt uncompromising positions.
These problems led to a partial breakdown in industrial relations 
generally and on the Copperbelt in particular. Demands for changes 
across the board in union organisation, collective agreements and 
legislation followed. They also forced the administration to take 
a more active role in labour disputes.
The government had from the beginning endorsed the voluntary 
settlement of trade disputes for several reasons. As we have seen, 
it was orthodox British industrial relations policy and was 
agreeable to an increasingly TUC-influenced Colonial Office.
Minimum intervention was made attractive by the ever present 
problem of the shortage of administrative staff. Any effective
103
intervention would have required a manifold increase in the number 
of administrative and supervisory staff. That was not possible. 
The principle of non-intervention allowed the administration to 
stand aloof from the politically embarrassing problem of African 
advancement in industry, particularly on the Copperbelt. Above 
all, non-intervention was encouraged by the establishment of 
African trade unions and was interpreted as releasing the
administration from the responsibility of representing African 
94interests in industry.
However, as industrial strife increased, the administration found 
it difficult to maintain a detached attitude. Even so it ventured 
into industrial relations with caution. The government knew from 
experience that unions, particularly the NRMWU would strongly 
resist changes in the law. The European Miners Union was 
particularly opposed to amendments that would weaken unions, 
including African unions. It feared that whatever pressures were 
brought to bear upon African unions as a result of any change in 
policy, the same were capable of being applied to itself if the 
situation so demanded. It, therefore, led a vigorous lobbying of 
elected unofficial members of the LEGCO, although they were not as 
sympathetic to its demands as a decade earlier. Elected LEGCO 
members' perception of the European interest had realistically 
narrowed down from demands for total autonomy of the past decade to 
the desire to attain responsibility within the Federal framework. 
The Federal experiment needed whatever changes that would ensure 
maximum production in industry and, therefore, high revenues. 
Undeterred and with African union support, the NRMWU also lobbied 
the British TUC, the Miners' International Federation and the 
British National Union of Mineworkers.
In contrast to the determined front presented by the trade union 
movement led by the miners, the proponents of restrictive changes 
were not so united. The mining companies for once were against the 
introduction of compulsory arbitration seen as crucial by some
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critics. They were suspicious that compulsory arbitration would 
impose solutions by outsiders. They felt compulsory arbitration 
was only suitable for wage disputes and not matters which raised 
other issues of policy. Elected LEGCO members were torn between 
the need to stop the draining of the territory's revenues by 
strikes and the need to support European railwaymen and miners who 
formed the bulk of their constituents. Although they were the most 
affected, the Federal Government could not intervene directly. 
Federal intervention was restricted to diplomatic and other 
indirect pressures. Labour policy was constitutionally not a 
94federal matter. The Federal Government's ability to intervene 
indirectly was moreover restricted by its failure to intervene in 
Southern Rhodesia where the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1945 was 
clearly a threat to the federal ideals of racial partnership 
whatever their worth. In the circumstances, federal intervention 
would be difficult to justify in the north.
Demands for government intervention were, however, reinforced by 
other centres of pressure. After the African general workers and 
government strikes of 1954, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry led in pressing for changes in the law concerning trade 
unions. Although the mining companies were ¿unbivalent about the 
need to alter the law drastically at that point, believing instead 
that it was more a question of union leadership, they did not 
object to changes in the law. Lack of active opposition from the 
mines in the matter emphasised demands for change. In the end the 
government felt overwhelmed and had to respond.
3.G.I. Response
Government response came in two stages. During the African Strikes 
of 1955 and 1956, the issue of paramount importance was that of the 
maintenance of law and order. This concern resulted in the
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declaration of a state of emergency and detention of persons
95identified as ring leaders bent on causing trouble. The 
assumption clearly seems to have been that the strikes had 
political overtones.
The second stage of government intervention coincided with the 
decline in copper prices which increased the effects of the loss of 
revenue brought about by industrial unrest. The rationale for 
intervention then changed to the need to protect the national 
interest by steimning the loss of revenue. The national interest 
argument heightened the debate about the wisdom of adopting 
principles of trade unionism and industrial relations said to be 
more suitable for application in a more developed and diversified 
economy than in an economy that is overwhelmingly dependent on a 
single commodity, copper, for its gross domestic product and export 
earnings. (See Appendix II). It was further argued by the 
proponents for changes in policy that the minimum standards 
enunciated by labour legislation needed to be supplemented by some 
administrative regulation of negotiating procedures.
The first specific response in legal terms came with the
publication of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (Amendment)
97Bill, 1955. The Bill proposed a tighter control of union 
affairs. To achieve this aim the Bill set out specific purposes 
for which union funds could be legitimately used. It further 
proposed to give the Registrar the power to inspect union books and 
accounts "at all reasonable times" in addition to annual return 
requirements already catered for. It also widened 
disqualifications from leadership. Prohibition of those convicted 
of fraud was extended to the previous ten years. Similarly, to be 
eligible for union office persons had to work in a particular 
industry for at least eighteen months. Most important, the Bill 
intended to make trade union registration compulsory in keeping 
with the practice in most British Colonial possessions. The 
overall effect of the proposed changes would have been to increase 
government supervision of trade union administration.
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The trade union movement's response was as vigorous as anticipated. 
Both mining unions strongly objected to the Bill. The NRMWU 
exerted strong pressure on elected LEGCO members and the Colonial 
Office, through the trade union movement in Britain. The pressure 
proved effective for a while resulting in a delay of one year of 
the draft legislation. However, another Bill with identical 
proposals was published in 1956. This was also met with strong 
opposition from the unions, but with countrywide industrial unrest, 
government had little trouble in securing its passage through the 
LEGCO. Encouraged by this progress the mining companies even asked 
the administration to pass extra measures similar to the Southern 
Rhodesian Industrial Conciliation Act, 1945, which would prohibit 
strikes during negotiations. The mining companies were supported 
in their call by Roy Welensky, by then Acting Federal Prime 
Minister, who went further and called for compulsory arbitration.98 910
3.H Further Demands and Changes
The 1956 Amendment did not succeed in checking the rising tide of 
labour unrest. On the contrary, there was a fresh outbreak towards 
the end of the year. Under Colonial Office pressure the 
administration appointed a Commission of Inquiry, the Branigan
99Commission, which began sitting in September 1956. Among the 
most significant evidence given to the Commission was that by the 
mining companies. They were still opposed to compulsory 
arbitration, favouring instead, as before, the compulsory use of 
procedural arrangements made in collective agreements to be 
followed by conciliation and voluntary arbitration where
100necessary. The Labour Department was strongly opposed to the
approach proposed by the mines. In its opinion the introduction of 
".... legislation creating new offences, the enforcement of which 
would be extremely difficult would tend to bring legislation itself 
into disrepute". It cited the recent strikes in which many people
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were involved and argued that "if (those strikes had been) illegal 
in terms of the proposed legislation, it would be impossible to 
invoke the law".101
The government at large was also at this point not in favour of new 
legislation, but not necessarily for the same reasons as its field 
personnel in the Labour Department. Most policy makers in 
government believed the wave of industrial unrest sweeping the 
country, particularly the strikes of 1956, were due to the 
political effects of African nationalism and the inexperience of 
African union leadership. Instead, as we have mentioned above, 
it chose to detain union leaders in 1956 and followed its action 
three years later with a new wave of arrests of nationalist 
leaders. But if African labour unrest could be explained in terms 
of political influence and inexperience in labour relations, that 
of white workers who joined in later could not. As industrial 
unrest continued unabated it led to a temporary shut down of the 
mines resulting in the laying off of 26,000 African workers.103
The widening labour unrest, particularly the involvement of the 
European miners, produced ¿mother Commission of Inquiry.104 The 
Honeyman Commission received demands for stronger labour 
legislation from the mining companies. The companies made a plea 
for the prohibition of unofficial strikes coupled with the 
requirement that even official strikes not called according to laid 
down procedures be made illegal as well. They also asked for 
compulsory strike ballots and the abolition of the closed shop 
alleging that it gave the NRMWU leaders excessive power.105 
Although sympathetic to the position of the mines, the Commission 
felt the abolition of the closed shop would lead to further 
industrial unrest. They recommended instead that it should be 
illegal for union members party to a closed shop, to strike before 
exhausting negotiation procedures. Honeyman also accepted the need 
for strike ballots and recommended accordingly. The Commission 
further recommended that the NRMWU executive (on whose shoulders
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they placed the blame for the union's irregular conduct), and the 
mining companies be given six months within which to work out a 
voluntary arbitration clause as part of their collective agreement 
to deal with unsuccessful conciliation. If the parties could not 
agree on the terms of voluntary arbitration within the time 
suggested, the Commission urged the administration to consider
adopting the Southern Rhodesian system of statutory coinpulsory 
106arbitration. The last alternative recommendation was clearly 
meant to be a measure of last resort. The Southern Rhodesian 
experience proved that compulsory arbitration had been used to 
strengthen colour bar. As we have seen, attempts to legitimise 
discrimination in employment in Northern Rhodesia had been rejected 
during the Second World War with Colonial Office support. The fact 
that it was once again under consideration at all was an indication 
of the extent of the deterioration in industrial relations in the 
territory.
As with the last time round the administration anticipated union 
opposition to any new proposals based on the Honeyman 
recommendations. Given the compulsory arbitration alternative in 
the recommendations, the mines were not enthusiastic either. As 
before, they felt such measures could undermine their managerial 
prerogatives and give way to unnecessary outside influence in 
determining industrial relations practice. Only the LEGCO proved 
enthusiastic, even advocating the outright abolition of the closed 
shop. The unions as before managed to rally support in London. 
Concerted TUC pressure contributed to the later withdrawal of the 
proposals contained in the 1958 Bill which were based on the 
Honeyman recommendations.108 In withdrawing the Bill, the 
government asserted that the Commission's proposals lacked clarity 
and the government would seek clarification from the chairman in 
109due course.
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Once again the administration was forced to review its position 
resulting in the publication of a new bill later in the year. The 
new Bill simplified the procedure for notifying trade disputes to 
the government. It also removed penal sanctions for strikes called 
in defiance of secret ballot requirements except for unions with 
closed shop arrangements. The vote needed to approve closed shop 
was also reduced from two-thirds to a half of the total union 
membership. By far the most significant innovation was the 
introduction of penal sanctions for strikes called in defiance of 
strike ballots where the closed shop was in operation. It was also 
an offence to strike during the course of conciliation proceedings. 
Members penalised for defying official union line could appeal to 
an independent arbiter. In spite of the NRMWU's strong plea to 
delay implementation to enable unions to work out voluntary 
arrangements, the Bill became law on the 14 May 1958.110
Attempts to pacify the industrial relations scene however, met with 
new difficulties. The slump in copper prices deepened. Given the 
bonus system for European miners which was based on the price of 
copper, a further deterioration in industrial relations on the 
Copperbelt was inevitable. Another wave of labour unrest 
resulted from the 1958 European workers' wage claim of 15 per cent 
and negotiations with the mining companies to reduce NRMWU's 
restrictive practices.
The administration intervened to press for a settlement and 
compelled the parties to include, as a condition in their 
agreement, the consideration of Honeyman's recommendations on 
compulsory arbitration. Unfortunately for the government, the case 
for compulsory arbitration had weakened since Honeyman made the 
recommendations. War time arbitration in Britain which acted as 
the impetus came to an end in the same year, 1959. The new British 
Labour Minister, Ian Macleod, had heeded employers' pleas that 
compulsory arbitration gave
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unfair advantage to the unions as they were not bound by 
unfavourable awards, unlike the employer.112
The administration resorted to what by that time had become the 
usual course to deal with any major deadlock in industrial 
relations. It called in British expertise to advise the parties on 
alternatives in dispute clauses for their new recognition 
agreement. Sir Frederick Leggett, called in to bring the parties 
in line, was not in favour of Southern Rhodesia's compulsory 
arbitration approach and differed sharply with Honeyman's 
emphatic recommendations in 1957 on the matter. He recommended 
instead changes in existing voluntary procedures to shift emphasis 
from the top level to the shop floor dealings in dispute 
settlement. Such changes would bring with them an increased role 
for shop stewards in resolving grievances. He also suggested a 
three day 'cooling-off' period before the NRMWU executive could 
intervene in local disputes to be written into the grievance 
procedures. He also drew attention to the long neglected problem 
of normal communications between management and the union 
executive. He, therefore, recommended the establishment of a joint 
industrial council as a forum of top level consultation. Each 
party would be represented by six people and the council would meet 
at least once a month.113
Leggett's advice was particularly welcomed by the union. Not only 
was it negotiated within the industry (which approach both sides 
favoured), but it was also a 'face saver' in a situation where the 
general tide of opinion was against union action. The union, 
therefore, welcomed the recommendations as 'revolutionary changes' 
whereas in fact they were a mere revision of the old system.
The Leggett guidelines produced some success in the Government's 
attempts to apply restrictive legislation in industrial relations. 
Their effect was, however, mainly restricted to the European work 
force. The government saw the problems of the African miners, and
Ill
indeed African employees in other industries, rather differently. 
Government officials saw two different problems within the African 
Miners Union particularly. The first, which was seen as extending 
to non-mining African unions as well, was political influence from 
the nationalist movement. The second, peculiar to the mines and 
railways, was the influence of irregular European industrial 
action. On many occasions African workers went on strike following 
European example.114
African workers increasingly resented the double standard treatment 
by managements. They made strong comparisons, for instance, 
between the harsh treatment given to their leaders in 1956 and the 
lenient treatment of the NRMWU executive in 1957. The African 
union resented its inability to prevent restrictive conditions 
being written into its 1958 check-off agreement. The restrictions 
were obviously intended by mine managements to bypass union rights 
to maintain political funds as guaranteed under labour legislation. 
The application of the Leggett proposals themselves were a further 
basis of alienation. Leggett had intended the guidelines to apply 
to both black and white unions. The companies maintained they were 
too advanced for the African union. The appointment of stewards, a 
major step in the strengthening of shop floor industrial relations, 
was not introduced for African workers. As in the case of the 
introduction of the joint industrial council to deal with the 
African Union, shop stewards were not introduced until 1963. By 
that time reforms in industrial relations policy were heavily 
dominated by and subject to political developments. The era of 
Colonial labour policy was effectively at an end.
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3.1 Conclusion
The above review of post-war colonial policy is significant to this 
study in several respects. Firstly, it reveals that law played a 
key role in the shaping of labour policy in response to 
socio-political and economic developments. Secondly, it also 
indicates the State's tendency in later years to intervene in 
industrial relations, taking account of what were perceived as the 
effects of industrial relations on the wider interests of society, 
in particular. As we shall see from the following chapters dealing 
with post-colonial labour policy, there has been a certain 
continuity in respect of the above two factors. Both law and the 
State have continued to play significant roles, indeed increasingly 
important roles in labour relations, and economic imperatives have 
been paramount.
The third observation to be drawn from the above review is rather 
different from the first two. In spite of the role of law and 
increased state intervention in the later period of the colonial 
administration, the system of industrial relations in the country 
was still essentially based on the British voluntary model. By and 
large the State merely provided a framework for industrial 
relations activity, leaving it to collective bargaining to shape 
the actual practice. As we shall see in later Chapters, the 
approach is in sharp contrast to current attempts to determine the 
actual content of industrial relations on the part of the State.
Colonial labour policy thus provides an indispensable background 
for the better appreciation of current policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TRADE UNION ACTIVITY
4.A. Introduction
It has been a significant feature of Zambian labour policy that 
major sectors of the trade union movement, notably the miners and 
railwaymen, had largely achieved organisational autonomy by 
independence. Nevertheless the majority of unions at independence 
were weak, seriously disturbed by leadership conflicts and unable 
to assert themselves in the generally unsettled industrial 
relations situation. Initial government policy towards trade 
unions was, therefore, at least as much a response to that 
unsettled situation as it was a desire to devise means of 
incorporating them into its development strategy.
As with other areas of the policy of incorporation, attempts at 
closer regulation and control of trade unions consisted of two 
phases of institutional re-organisation and legislative reform.
The first phase, which largely amounted to transitional policy, was 
an attempt to eradicate the most visibly unacceptable elements of 
colonial labour policy in the light of post-independence 
expectations. It also consisted of efforts to check what the 
government viewed as the adverse effects of high expectations 
within the trade union movement brought about by the attainment of 
independence. The second phase was a much more deliberate and 
considered form of response on the part of policy makers. It went 
further than the transitional political and administrative changes 
of the first phase. It was part of the overall package of radical
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legislative reforms brought about by the enactment of the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971.
In this Chapter we shall examine each of the two phases and make an 
assessment of the trade union response, and therefore, to that 
extent the impact of that element of government policy. Before 
examining the changes made during the two institutional and 
legislative phases, however, it is useful to place things in 
perspective by examining some pertinent factors that have 
influenced the relationships between the unions and the ruling 
party and administration. Of the four areas that we have identified 
as the main focus of the Government's incorporation efforts, that 
is to say, trade union activity, collective bargaining (including 
incomes policy), industrial conflict and workers' participation, 
the attempt to incorporate trade unions has been the element most 
closely related to political developments. It, therefore, needs to 
be examined within the context of the wider political process 
during the period under study. Our intention is not to provide an 
exhaustive account of trade unionism and the political process, 
this task is left to other capable writers1 who are specialists in 
the field, but rather to give a brief background of the factors 
that guided government policy.2 It will also be useful to describe 
the changes that have taken place in the trade unions' 
organisational structure during the post-independence period.
4.B Trade Unions in the Political Process
The trade unions' place in the post-independence political process 
was to a large extent shaped by events which took place during the 
colonial period. Some of the developments we have highlighted in 
Chapter Three above. The factors that shaped the place that the 
labour movement came to occupy in the political process after 
independence are important in appreciating the strategy of 
incorporation as part of the wider political process in Zambia 
after independence.
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By independence the Trade Union Congress (TUC), formed in 1950, was 
torn apart by conflict between militant unionists, mainly leaders 
of unions other than the Miners' and Railwaymens' unions and the 
latter. The major source of conflict was the political involvement 
of trade unions and the subordination of labour to the ruling 
party, the UNIP. Militant unionists continued to urge the labour 
movement to embrace political action even after independence by 
accepting affiliation as an integral wing of the UNIP. Miners and 
railwaymen rejected this principle. Although some accommodation 
was eventually made that generally preserved the movement's 
autonomy, important differences concerning the labour movement's 
place in the political process remained. The differences were 
exacerbated by a further ideological split within the militant 
faction resulting from different conceptions of the future of the 
labour movement and the role of labour in the state.^
Against this background of conflict the ruling party sought, 
through government action, to establish a degree of unity within 
the trade union movement. That was accomplished to a large extent 
by persuading the principal protagonists to leave the labour 
movement for more lucrative jobs in the public sector and 
institutional reforms through legislation which we shall outline 
later in this Chapter. The political intervention had consequences 
for the labour movement in later years, in particular the political 
control of individual unions. The unions that were more successful 
at resisting political control were the miners' and railwaymen's, 
both relatively more viable and more effectively organised, 
superior in that respect to the ruling party itself.4 The two 
unions were able to maintain autonomy at the levels attained during 
the colonial period. As for most other unions, political 
intervention resulted in disarray and serious weakness affecting 
the labour movement as a whole. Most unions were further weakened 
by internal struggles for power that other writers have chronicled 
at some length. It is the situation of conflict and weakness 
within the labour movement that partly prompted initial government 
attempts to incorporate unions.
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4.C The First Phase: Transitional Policy
As we saw when we examined the development of colonial policy, in 
Chapter Three, trade union legislation by the time of independence 
was based on some fundamental principles derived from the British 
experience. In spite of increased State intervention that led to 
such modifications in the law as the introduction of compulsory 
registration and greater administrative and financial 
accountability, the system was essentially a voluntary one.
Immediate post-independence policy and legislation, that is to say, 
between 1964 and the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act in 
1971, was a response to two factors: the expectations engendered 
by independence and the desire by the government to achieve a 
closer regulation of trade unions and their leaders.
4.C.1 Protective Legislation
The first objective of transitional legislation, a response to the 
basic expectations of independence, was the desire to remove racial 
restrictions and to improve conditions for working people.
Equality after all, had been the raison d'etre of the nationalist 
cause and the struggle for independence. In keeping with this 
goal, therefore, legislation was amended to remove racial and 
discriminatory provisions in employment and to provide a framework 
for minimum conditions of service and better wages. Thus the 
notorious Employment of Natives Ordinance, 1929 that only catered 
for Africans to the exclusion of other races was repealed. It was 
replaced by the Employment Act, 1965, based on English legislation 
of a previous period.6 The Act provided for minimum conditions of 
Employment and abolished contracts on the ticket system. It also 
abolished recruitment and its attendant abuses.7 Similarly, a new 
Apprenticeship Ordinance enacted in 1964 ended racial 
restrictions.8
123
Other instruments of protective legislation were enacted or 
suitably amended during the period. They included a new Factories
Act, also modelled on similar English legislation of a previous 
g
period, which was passed in 1966. Among those amended and 
retained were the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children 
Ordinance; the Minimum Wages, Wages Council and Conditions of 
Employment Act; and the Workmen's Compensation Act. During this 
period the first legislation concerned with basic social security, 
the Zambian National Provident Fund Act was enacted in 1966.11
It is apparent from the above that most of the legislation was 
protective, mostly concerned with individual employment issues and 
not, strictly speaking, trade union legislation. The legislation 
did, however, possess a high 'perception value' among trade unions. 
Moreover, some of the subject matter covered by the legislation was 
of concern to trade union members. In a situation where many trade 
union members had no pension arrangements, for instance, the 
introduction of a social security scheme was a mark of progress and 
accordingly appreciated. Similarly, the training of workers for 
skilled positions as part of the Zambianization (localisation) 
Programme, that is to say the progressive replacement of 
expatriates by local personnel in all sectors of the economy, was 
viewed to be of critical importance by the unions. The removal of 
racial restrictions by the amendment of the Apprenticeship Act in 
1964 was, therefore, relevant to the unions. Above all, the 
overall relevance of the changes for the unions lay in the fact 
that they represented many of the things the African unions had 
been campaigning for ever since their inception in the late 1940's.
4.C.2 Trade Union Legislation
The second objective of transitional policy and legislation clearly 
was a desire for the closer regulation of trade unions and trade 
union leaders. It was a response to an unsettled industrial
relations situation that led to increased industrial unrest and 
internal union conflicts. It was also marked by increasingly 
explosive political relations between the ruling party, the United 
National Independence Party, (UNIP) and the trade union movement in 
general and the Mineworkers' Union in particular.12
Political acts of incorporation apart, the legislative basis of 
government policy was the amendment of the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Act passed in December 1964 and effective in 1965.13 The 
major objective of the Act was to check the escalating industrial 
unrest by creating a more stable framework for industrial relations 
and the management of trade union affairs. It sought to achieve 
this objective by increasing government powers of supervision of 
union affairs, especially in financial matters and also by the 
centralisation of the trade union movement through the creation of 
a new Congress, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (the ZCTU) .
Notable among the new restrictive provisions was the one requiring 
new union officials to have three years' employment within the 
industry concerned and officials of unions with fewer than 500 
members were required to be employed within the industry.14 As one 
commentator has observed, this change seriously affected trade 
union leadership. Many unions lost a number of able and 
experienced organisers. It was no coincidence that many such 
leaders were among the most politically conscious tending to 
emphasise union autonomy in preference to political control by the 
UNIP.15
Among increased powers of supervision and control, the Registrar 
was entitled to refuse to give consent to the election of a trade 
union officer. He could also suspend from office any union 
officer who failed in his duty under the Act, while the Minister 
could appoint another person to perform the duties of the suspended 
official.17 The Registrar could also summon witnesses "to give 
information as to the existence or as to the operation of any trade
125
union, or federation of trade unions."18 Finally, the Registrar or 
a person appointed by him was given the power of supervising every 
secret ballot required to be taken under the provisions of the 
Act.19
The government also sought to take advantage of one of the most 
intractable problems facing trade unions, the collection of dues.20 
The Minister was given far-reaching powers concerning union dues.
He could make an order for the deduction of union dues by the 
employer for payment to the union (check-off facility). If he was 
satisfied that a trade union was sufficiently representative of the 
employees concerned; and if the membership exceeded 60 per cent of 
the total employees, he could make an order to deduct subscriptions 
for all employees unless exempted in the order (dues shop 
facility).21 Such an order, however, could only be made if the 
union in question was affiliated to the ZCTU, and later provision 
was made for part of the dues to be credited to the Congress 
directly.22 The Act also restricted unions' right to accept aid 
from foreign agencies and the right to affiliate to organisations 
outside Zambia. Ministerial approval was required in both cases.23
That the provision relating to union dues was intended to be a 
mechanism of control by the State has become apparent with recent 
developments. As a response to a wave of strikes in early 1985, 
the Minister issued the Trade Union (Deduction of Subscription) 
Regulation, 1985 empowering him to revoke existing check-off orders 
in favour of any trade union whose members strike illegally, 
whether the action is official or unofficial.24 Statutory 
check-off arrangements made by the Minister under the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971 (the provision is identical to that under the 
1965 Act) in favour of qualifying unions have become the basis of 
financial security of most unions' operations. While some unions 
have chosen to respond to the Minister's actions as a challenge to 
develop direct arrangements with their members, many have been 
adversely affected by the withdrawal of the right.
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The most fundamental change under the legislation was the 
government attempt to centralise the trade union movement by 
creating the ZCTU. Until the Congress was created central union 
organisations had been troubled by splits and financial 
difficulties.26 The Congress was clearly conceived as a powerful 
agency for the regulation of trade union affairs. Although 
affiliation to the Congress under the Act was to remain voluntary 
at that stage, the government hoped all trade unions would 
affiliate to it. Introducing the Bill in 1964, the then Minister 
of Labour, Justin Chimba, was candid about government intentions. 
He said: "membership of the Congress will confer considerable 
benefits upon the affiliated unions and will have the effect of 
strengthening their position and making it extremely difficult for 
any rival organisation to set up in opposition."27 The Minister 
symbolically appointed the Congress' first executive until the 
first elections were held.28
The ZCTU was given considerable powers over member unions. Not 
only were member unions required to remit part of their 
subscriptions as we have seen above, but the Congress' approval was 
needed for certain "prescribed decisions" by the unions such as 
those concerning strike ballots, strikes, dissolutions and 
, 29amalgamations.
The ZCTU's jurisdiction was, however, limited in one important 
respect: it could not intervene directly in disputes between 
employers and workers. This limitation was more than symbolic, it 
was representative of the Congress' other structural and 
constitutional limitations. The then ZCTU General Secretary,
Wilson Chakulya, reportedly complained: "the present constitution 
keeps the unions autonomous and the national centre (ie the ZCTU) 
is there mainly to provide advice and guidance without 
30authority."
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It was, therefore, not surprising that with the Government's 
encouragement, the ZCTU Executive in 1972 set up a working party 
under the auspices of the Congress' General Council to look into 
the matter of further increasing the organisation's powers over 
member unions.
The working party recommended giving the Congress far-reaching 
powers over member unions' finances and other decisions. Led by 
the miners, member unions unanimously rejected the recommendations. 
In spite of that rejection, the Minister unilaterally used his 
powers under the 1965 Act to impose some of the changes sought by 
the ZCTU Executive.32 As a result subscriptions to the Congress 
were raised from 20 to 30 per cent of member unions' receipts and 
employers were obliged to remit that portion directly to the 
Congress. In addition, the ZCTU General Council was given powers 
to reverse some policy decisions reached by member unions' annual 
general conferences. The ZCTU was also given the right to appoint 
an observer to wage negotiations involving member unions. As the 
Ministry itself pointed out, the changes represented a considerable 
increase in the centralisation of the trade union movement.33
In making the changes briefly outlined above, the government 
claimed from the start that its aim was not only to stabilise 
industrial relations in the national interest, but that the trade 
union movement would be strengthened in the process.34 Certain 
provisions of the legislation apparently did help strengthen the 
labour movement. The raising of the minimum number of members 
required for a trade union to qualify for registration from seven 
to 100 was one such measure. It prevented the mushrooming of 
smaller unions and as we have observed elsewhere, both employers 
and unions seem to approve. The requirement of secret ballots 
over a wide range of decisions such as the election of delegates to 
a general meeting, election of officers, calling a strike, 
dissolution and amalgamation and so on has had a marked democratic 
effect on the conduct of union officers.36 Equally beneficial were
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the check-off arrangements introduced by the legislation. Many 
unions, especially smaller and financially insolvent unions, 
willingly affiliated to take advantage of ministerial check-off 
, 37orders.
In spite of apparent benefits in favour of unions, government 
policy was aimed at closer regulation and control using the ZCTU as 
the principal channel for the communication of its objectives. The 
ZCTU was encouraged from the start to involve member unions in the 
promotion of industrial peace, wage restraint and in the 
dissemination of State objectives for national development.38 As 
we shall see when we examine the second phase of post-independence 
trade union policy presently, the government has maintained these 
objectives while increasing the ZCTU's powers and role. The 
transitional legislation also attempted to reform the structures of 
the member unions themselves.
4.C.3 Post-independence Union Structure, and Organisation
Seriously unsettled by internal conflict and political 
intervention, unions were largely unable to assert themselves in 
spite of the fact that they still retained a large measure of 
operational autonomy. The transitional legislation of 1965 was 
prompted in part by the Government's concern to improve labour 
organisation while seeking to extend state control. One of the 
results of this legislation was that the structure of unions was 
greatly influenced by the Government's policy of one union in each 
industry. This, while strengthening existing unions, also helped
39the State's designs for closer control. As a result of this 
policy considerable re-organisation and amalgamation of unions took 
place between 1966 and 1971. The current state of unions largely 
reflects developments during the period (Table 3 below).
129
TABLE 3
TRADE UNIONS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1983
Year of*
Name of Union Registration Membership
1. National Union of Public Service 
Workers
1960 72,964
2. Mineworkers' Union of Zambia 1966 51,000
3. National Union of Building,
Engineering and General Workers
1960 29,000
4. National Union of Commercial and 
Industrial Workers
1960 27,000
5. Zambia National Union of Teachers 1962 28,608
6. Civil Servants' Union of Zambia 1969 30,000
7. Zambia United Local Authorities 
Workers' Union
1971 24,000
8. National Union of Plantation and 
Agricultural Workers
1962 16,000
9. National Union of Transport 
and Allied Workers
1967 11,000
10. Guards Union of Zambia 1972 12,305
11. Railway Workers Union of Zambia 1967 10,038
12. Zambia Union of Financial
Institutions and Allied Workers
1970 9,000
13. Zambia Typographical Union 1971 4,800
14. Zambia Electricity Workers' Union 1971 4,200
15. National Union of Postal and 
Telecommunications Workers
1964 4,300
16. Hotel Catering Workers' Union 1966 6,700
17, University of Zambia and Allied 1976 2,400
18. Airways and Allied Workers' 1968 2,169
* Subsequent years of Registration in accordance with periodical 
amendments to the law governing registration and various trade 
union re-organisation and amalgamation.
Sources Ministry of Labour and Social Services, Annual Report 
1983 (Government Printer, Lusaka 1984)
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As a consequence of that process of re-organisation and 
amalgamation the present Mineworkers' Union of Zambia, (MUZ) 
emerged out of three unions in the mining industry in 1966. The 
Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers Unions (ZRAWU) came into being 
on the railways; the National Union of Transport and Allied 
Workers was formed out of two long distance and heavy haulage 
unions. By 1969 several Civil Service unions merged to form the 
present Civil Servants Union of Zambia. Similar amalgamations 
resulted into larger unions in other sectors including the National 
Union of Public Service Workers, currently the largest union. 
Consequently the number of unions was reduced from twenty-four in 
1964 with a membership of about 100,000, to eighteen in 1973 with a 
membership of 184,000 or about half the total wage-earning force.
By 1983 (latest figures available), union membership had risen to 
341,614 while the number of unions remained at eighteen.
One other consequence of the policy of one union in each industry 
has been the disappearance of the Craft Union. Only two categories 
of unions now remain, the industrial unions on the one hand (the 
most important of which is still the Miners' Union in spite of the 
decline in membership from a peak of 60,000 after independence to 
the present 51,000, reflecting the decline in mining activity), and 
on the other hand, the general unions embracing a wide range of 
sectors, especially building, commercial and transport unions. 
Whereas in 1973 four unions had a membership of less than 1,000, by 
1983 none had less than 2,000; five are now between 3,000 and 
10,000, while the rest are all above 10,000, two of them with 
memberships of over 50,000. (See Table 3, P 129).
Unions draw most of their strength from the "line of rail", 
particularly the Copperbelt. They follow a similar organisational 
pattern based on the branch, although some have a measure of 
regional organisation as an intermediate level between the branch 
and the headquarters. The structure of each respective industry 
affects union organisation. The MUZ, for instance, follows the
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organisation of the miners with shop stewards in each department. 
The ZRAWU is similarly based on branches at the main railway 
centres. The general unions on the other hand, cover diverse 
interests and that is reflected in their organisation. The 
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers' organisation 
in the public sectors (parastatal companies) varies from its 
organisation in the private sector, for instance. For the most 
part the union that covers the rural areas is the National Union of 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers (NUAPW). It suffers from the 
problems of the great majority of agricultural unions in the Third 
World. Employment is largely dispersed. This phenomenon coupled 
with generally difficult employers makes union organisation an 
equally difficult task. Although wages in the rural and 
agricultural sectors have improved in line with minimum wage 
requirements, they are still lower than in other sectors and other 
conditions of employment are correspondingly less attractive.
As we shall later see in Chapter Five, unions have achieved a good 
deal in terms of collective bargaining, not least as a result of 
new arrangements under the 1971 legislation. Although union 
membership is now thought to be falling in line with increasing job 
losses resulting from the continuing economic decline, it is still 
well in excess of 50 per cent. This strength in membership is 
significant. It has enabled most unions and the labour movement as 
a whole to maintain their operational autonomy and checked 
government incorporation efforts. However, few union leaderships 
are firmly in control of their membership. As will be apparent 
from our discussion in Chapter Five, for instance, union leaders 
are usually unable to prevent industrial action in many cases even 
where they think such action is ill-advised.
Financially, the majority of unions have benefited from the 
check-off arrangements now part of labour legislation. However, 
many unions still suffer from financial short-comings that 
adversely affect their activity. In spite of reforms in union
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financial management effected by the government over the years, 
leaders are constantly accused of not sufficiently observing 
elementary principles of financial control. Unions' dependency on 
members' dues has also meant that unions are increasingly 
vulnerable as a result of continuing job losses through 
redundancies.
4.D The Second Phase:Legislation for Incorporation
The enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 marked the 
second phase of the Government's strategy of trade union 
incorporation. The Act made substantial reforms concerning various 
industrial relations institutions including those concerning 
collective bargaining, dispute settlement and industrial action and 
workers' participation as we shall see in the following chapters. 
However, in the sphere of trade union regulation the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 regime was in fact much less of a radical 
departure than had earlier been claimed by both its proponents and 
detractors.41 In fact it was more of a consolidating Act than a 
radical departure. Many of the provisions of the Trade Unions and 
Trade Disputes Act, 1965 concerning trade unions were incorporated 
in the 1971 Act without substantial changes. Some of its 
provisions, however, amounted to a further extension of trade union 
control and regulation. These we shall presently examine.
The significance of the 1971 regime mainly lies in the fact that in 
comparison to earlier post-independence changes, it was a much more 
deliberate part of the incorporation strategy. The Act was a legal 
response to strategic political action by the government aimed at 
incorporating trade unions and employers alike to its objectives of 
development. It was a culmination of efforts that had started with 
the first tripartite national planning meeting, the Livingstone 
Labour Conference, 1967, aimed at forging a consensus on labour's 
role in national development. The Livingstone Conference was
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followed by two national conventions in Kitwe, later in 1967 and in 
1969 at which issues were more extensively discussed and 
resolutions concerning subsequent changes in labour policy made.42 
These meetings took place against a background of escalating 
industrial unrest and deteriorating state-labour relations with 
occasional confrontations between unions and activists of the 
ruling party. Government anxieties about the deteriorating state 
of industrial relations were reinforced by expert findings made in 
the Turner report, 1969. Turner raised alarm about wage inflation 
and its devastating effects (we further consider the report in 
Chapter Seven) and alleged that there had been a drastic fall in 
labour efficiency and productivity. He attributed the developments 
to the fact that, "the colonial system of labour discipline (had) 
broken down and nothing yet (had) developed to take its place."44 
The worsening industrial relations situation strengthened 
government resolve to curb industrial unrest and incorporate trade 
unions into its strategy for national development. By the end of 
1969 the government had managed to secure both employers' and 
unions' agreement in principle, through resolutions, for 
substantial changes in labour policy across the board.
The 1971 Act was the legal aspect of a strategy that included 
efforts to incorporate individual trade union leaders and 
politicise the rank and file.45 The Act further strengthened the
role of the ZCTU by making affiliation compulsory for all trade 
46unions. It also gave the Congress additional powers over member 
unions including the power to decide in jurisdiction conflicts 
between unions.47
One other significant change was that concerning the educational 
role of the ZCTU and member unions. Implicit in the government 
strategy of incorporation, "persuasion rather than force", had been 
the notion that education was an important part of the efforts to 
persuade unions and their members to accept national development 
objectives. Both the constitutions of the ZCTU and member unions
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were, therefore, required to provide that one of the purposes to 
which funds "shall be applied shall be the advancement of workers' 
education and their participation in national development 
programmes in Zambia."48 It is notable that workers' education has 
emerged as one of the most important objectives of both the 
Congress and unions at large. It is also probably one of the areas 
where unions have been most responsive to government incorporation 
attempts. This is apparent from the emphasis all unions give to 
workers' education.49 The ZCTU policy document on workers' 
education and training embodies objectives similar to those of the 
State with emphasis of workers' role in national development.50
The Act also strengthened the Government's policy of 'one industry, 
one union' by providing that unions "purporting to represent a 
class or classes of employees already represented by or eligible 
for membership of another union" could not be registered and, 
therefore, could not legally exist. As we have observed above, 
this policy has now been implicitly accepted by both unions and 
employers.
The general effect of the changes considered above coupled with new 
powers for the Minister and the Registrar of trade unions, 
especially over financial matters, has been the further extension 
49of regulation and control.
4.E. Trade Union Response
As in other areas which have been the targets of government 
strategy, the trade union response has not followed a uniform 
pattern. Rather it has varied in terms of leadership levels and 
different measures. The trade union response has also been 
affected by periodical developments in state-union relations and 
above all, by the performance of the economy.
135
Two broad observations can be made of the trade unions' general 
response to policy innovations between the period 1964 to date. 
There have been indications that the trade union movement has 
accepted overall government authority.50 This can be deduced from 
the willingness to co-operate with official agencies like the ZCTU. 
It will be recalled that when the Congress was created in 1965 and 
affiliation of unions was still voluntary, most unions, including 
the miners in spite of their initial reservations, affiliated and 
accepted the Congress' authority. The centralisation of power 
through the ZCTU has also been accepted in the field of workers' 
education. As we have mentioned, the focus of educational 
objectives has followed State defined goals. We should not, 
however, read too much into union response in these areas. For 
many unions, especially smaller and financially insolvent ones, 
affiliation to the ZCTU and the assurance of check-off facilities 
was a life-line they could hardly reject. Similarly, co-operation 
in other areas was, at least in part, due to government 
reciprocity. After 1973 for instance, the government greatly 
expanded union representation on various policy-making 
organisations of the State, including the National Council of the 
ruling Party.
In contrast to the acceptance of the government overall political 
authority in the formulation of national goals, the trade union 
leadership has continued to defend and has largely preserved its 
organisational autonomy. In spite of increased financial 
supervision by the State which has led to increased dependence of 
some unions, continuing incorporation of some union leaders and 
periodic detentions of union leaders, the trade union movement in 
general continues to assert its independence.
The approach of the ZCTU in its role as the main agency of state - 
unions relations, has been predictably ambivalent. There is little 
doubt that both the 1965 and the 1971 legislation envisaged a key 
role for the Congress, which, through frequent trade union 
leadership incorporation, the government could direct. Up to about
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1981, it was apparent that the State had succeeded reasonably well 
in utilising the ZCTU as the main channel for the communication of 
its policy to the unions. A subsequent change in the Congress' 
leadership and a renewal by the ruling party of its efforts to 
control unions more directly seems to have changed the situation.51 
Moreover, the continuing deterioration of the economy in recent 
years has meant that government policies, particularly in relation 
to wages and prices have become increasingly difficult to defend. 
The ZCTU leadership, therefore, has increasingly become the focus 
of resistance to government policies, including provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971. One notable development has been 
the ZCTU's leadership reluctance to participate in the work of some 
organisations which formulate policy. Instead, they seem to be 
demanding fuller and more realistic participation, including the 
right to influence decisions. Announcing the withdrawal of the 
ZCTO from the Board of ZIMCO, the holding corporation of State 
companies, in 1986, Chairman Chiluba said he did not wish the trade 
union movement to be associated with "escalating redundancies and 
prices." The miners' leader has similarly warned the government 
that his union will stop co-operating unless rising prices and 
redundancies can be stopped.53
In so far as the trade unions have resisted efforts to make them 
cede authority over their own organisational policies - there has 
been a failure of the policy of incorporation by stealth.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
5.A. Introduction
As we have noted in Chapter Two, the system of collective 
bargaining that was inherited at independence was a voluntary one. 
Its essential characteristics were those derived from the British 
system, where the law was, to use Kahn-Freund*s famous words again, 
simply "a gloss or footnote to collective bargaining."1 At the 
time certain characteristic features were thought to be central to 
the British industrial relations system. The most important for 
our purposes here being, first, that collective bargaining at 
industry or lower levels was a matter for employer and trade unions 
with little political input or government intervention; secondly, 
that collective bargaining was neither circumscribed nor supported 
by law.2
Derived from the above perception of the British industrial 
relations system, the function of the law in colonial Zambia and 
prior to 1971 was, therefore, not to set standards against which 
collective bargaining could be judged. Nor was it, in general, to 
control the parties. In fact the main purpose of the major 
legislation, the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes and the Industrial 
Conciliation Ordinances, 1949,3 was first, to impose limits on the 
kinds of work place sanctions that could be used by one party 
against the other. Secondly, to the extent that it laid
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down any standards at all, it laid down minimum standards intended 
to encourage the growth of and strengthen voluntary collective 
bargaining.
In spite of early tendencies towards increased state intervention, 
the position as inherited at independence continued until the 
enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The 1971 
legislation sought to restructure the whole system of collective 
bargaining introducing, as it did, mandatory and legally binding 
agreements and institutions to support the process of collective 
bargaining. Henceforth under the Act, collective agreements were 
to be approved by the Industrial Relations Court, a new watchdog 
institution. Later, in 1983, the power to approve collective 
agreements was transferred to a more specialised body, the Incomes 
and Prices Commission.4 The legislation also prescribed collective 
bargaining procedures and required joint industrial councils in 
each major sector. The Act also, by implication, introduced the 
first statutory incomes policy. The Industrial Relations Court, 
which as we have seen initially had the power to approve collective 
agreements, was obliged to take into account the "Government's 
declared policy on prices and incomes."5
The policy to restructure collective bargaining has a firm economic 
basis. It is the central element to a fabric of policy that also 
comprises attempts to reduce industrial conflict and introduce an 
effective incomes policy which we discuss below in Chapters Six and 
Seven respectively. The major aims are to boost productivity, keep 
wage rises in check and control strikes. The introduction of 
legally binding collective bargaining procedures and agreements was 
in support of these aims. In this Chapter we examine the relevant 
aspects of the procedures and institutions and assess their impact 
to date.
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5.B. The Nature of Agreement«
One of the major changes in collective bargaining brought about by 
the 1971 legislation was that in the nature of collective 
agreements. Two types of agreements that can be concluded between 
the parties were introduced for the first time in Zambian labour 
relations. The first of these is the "recognition agreement."^ 
Although the term is not specifically defined in the Act, its 
nature is apparent from Section 112 which provides for the 
"essentials" of the recognition agreement. Firstly, it requires 
the employer and association representing an employer or a number 
of employers to duly recognise the trade union involved "as the 
sole representative of and exclusive bargaining agent for employees 
employed by such employer, or by the members of such association" 
for the purpose of regulating the collective relationship of the 
parties. Secondly, it obliges parties to set forth in their 
written agreement such methods, remedies relating to procedure or 
otherwise and for settling disputes or remedying grievances through 
collective bargaining. Thirdly, the agreement has to specify the 
manner and circumstances in which an agreement can be reviewed, 
altered, varied, replaced or terminated.
Once the agreement has been concluded, the parties are obliged to 
submit it to the Industrial Relations Court which is vested with 
the power to approve or vary it. It should be noted that unlike in 
the case of the substantive collective agreement which we presently 
discuss below, the Court still retains the power of approval over 
recognition agreements which for the most part are merely 
procedural. Under Section 8 of the 1983 amendment, the Incomes and 
Prices Commission must also be notified of the recognition 
agreement once approved or varied by the Court. Where the parties 
fail or neglect to enter into a recognition agreement, it is 
decreed to be a collective dispute within the provisions of the
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The second type of agreement envisaged by the Act is the collective 
agreement. Unlike the recognition agreement which is apparently 
procedural in character, a collective agreement deals with 
substantive issues. It is defined in Section 3 as "an agreement 
negotiated by an appropriate bargaining unit in which the terms and 
conditions of or affecting the employment and remuneration of 
employees are laid down." Every collective agreement is required 
to contain statutory clauses stipulating* (i) the period for 
which the agreement is to remain in force; and (ii) the method and 
procedure of amendment, termination or replacement. Under the 1983 
amendment, the parties have to submit a collective agreement to the 
Incomes and Prices Commission (see example Appendix IV) for 
approval within fourteen days of conclusion. The agreement then 
has to be gazetted under the auspices of the Commission, inviting 
comments from any person affected if it is of the opinion that it 
g
would be in the public interest. The Commission also receives 
comments from the Ministry of Labour and Social Services through 
the Labour Commissioner.10 Where the Commission is satisfied that 
a collective agreement contains the statutory clauses as required, 
is not contrary to any written law and to the Government's declared 
policy on prices and incomes, and is not prejudicial to the public 
interest (a term not specifically defined), it approves the 
agreement.11 The Commission also has the power to vary or amend 
the agreement as it deems fit. It may also summon parties to give 
clarification.12 Once approved it becomes legally binding upon the 
parties for such a period as the Commission shall approve.13
The requirement under the 1971 Act that collective agreements be 
legally binding was a major departure from the system of industrial 
relations as derived from that of Britain.14 Similarly, the 
introduction of the distinction between recognition and substantive 
agreements was also new. The changes were in keeping with the 
restructuring of other institutions which we shall presently 
examine. They were intended to clarify obligations and rights in a 
system which had essentially changed from a voluntary to a
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compulsory one. The change was profound, at least in theory. It 
introduced the notion of the written agreement in an otherwise 
'oral tradition' where many experienced trade union negotiators' 
educational background was inadequate to understand intricate 
written agreements. The complexity of written agreements was a 
recurring comment during our field work.15
In practice, however, the changes have meant little. The 
enforceability of agreements has not attained any practical 
importance. There has hardly been any case before the Industrial 
Relations Court directly concerned with agreements as binding 
contracts. More important to the fate of government strategy, the 
legal nature of collective agreements has not curbed economically 
damaging industrial conflict as we shall see in Chapter Six. In 
spite of the requirement of the law, therefore, what the Donovan 
Report said of Britain16 in its analysis is essentially true of 
Zambia. In spite of the legal requirement parties have shown
little propensity of intention to be legally bound by collective 
„ 17agreements.
5.C. The Collective Bargaining Process
Collective bargaining under Part VIII of the Act is envisaged 
within a given set of procedures and institutions. The nature of 
collective bargaining is apparent from the definition of the term 
in Section 3. It is defined as "the carrying on of negotiations by 
an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of concluding a 
collective agreement". It would appear from the definition that 
although the conclusion of a recognition agreement may be regarded 
as falling within the wider framework of collective bargaining, it 
is not, strictly speaking, part of the substantive process under 
the Act.
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Although collective bargaining is clearly conceived within certain 
procedures and institutions, no specific guidelines are given as to 
the subject matter and the manner of negotiation, for instance.
The question of the subject matter is partly resolved by looking at 
the definition of a collective agreement and collective bargaining 
practice as it has emerged.
As mentioned earlier, a collective agreement is concerned with the 
laying down of terms and conditions of employment and remuneration. 
Thus the scope of bargaining issues is potentially very wide 
indeed. It is of course subject to interpretation by the 
Industrial Relations Court, which as in other matters, gives 
binding decisions (see Chapter Six, below) . No such pronouncement 
has been made to date. In practice experience has been varied.
Many collective agreements have followed the traditional format 
with the very minimum in the subject matter covered. On the other 
hand, a few agreements we examined have covered a wide variety of
subjects well beyond any restrictive definition of remuneration and 
18employment conditions. It has been suggested by one observer 
that agreements and subjects for negotiations will in time become 
more comprehensive as parties gain more experience, a development
which it is said, would be similar to the experience of some 
19sectors in the United States.
The Act is also silent on the actual manner in which collective 
bargaining is to be conducted. It seems to assume that parties 
either reach agreement on their collective agreement or reach a 
deadlock which amounts to a collective dispute. Section 87 does, 
however, require that the bargaining unit inform the Minister at 
least one month (but not earlier than two months) from the 
expiration of the existing agreement, if the unit has been unable 
to conclude a new agreement.
The legislation also lacks any guidelines on the nature of the duty 
20to bargain. There is no requirement that bargaining be conducted
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In "good faith", for instance. It has, however, been suggested 
that the definition of collective bargaining the carrying on
of negotiations by an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose 
of concluding a collective agreement", charges the parties to 
negotiate in good faith.21
5.C.1 Institutional Framework
The institutional framework of collective bargaining under the Act 
was conceived at two levels, at the undertaking (plant or firm) and 
the industry level. Several institutions are also involved both in 
the actual process of bargaining, if need be, and the approval of 
the agreement concluded.
Bargaining representatives at each level form a bargaining unit 
which in terms of Section 3 means (a) "in relation to collective 
bargaining at the level of an undertaking other than an industry, 
the representatives of the management of the undertaking together 
with the representatives of employees in such undertaking; (b) in 
relation to collective bargaining at the level of an industry, a 
joint council."
As we have mentioned, the duty of each bargaining unit is to 
commence negotiations for the purpose of concluding a new 
collective agreement within the time specified before the expiry of 
the existing agreement, that is to say three months. The unit is 
also required to inform the Labour Commissioner and the Secretary 
to the Incomes and Prices Commission within fifteen days after the 
commencement of negotiations. Where a unit neglects to commence 
negotiations, the onus of proof is on it to show reasonable 
22cause.
For the purpose of collective bargaining at the industry level, so 
far the more predominant feature of collective bargaining.
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the law requires the formation of joint councils for every 
industry. By the end of 1985 (See Table 4, P 148, below) joint 
councils had been formed and industry-wide agreements concluded in 
most of the major sectors.23 Every joint council must have a 
constitution which has to provide for, inter alia, the composition 
of its membership, rules and the holding of meetings at intervals 
not exceeding three months.24
Besides the bargaining units at the undertaking and industry level, 
three outside institutions are involved at various stages of 
collective bargaining. These are the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Services (in particular the Labour Coiranissioner and his officials), 
the Industrial Relations Court and the Commission on Prices and 
Incomes.
Taking the Court first, as we have seen above, its role in 
collective bargaining is now limited to agreements concluded before 
1 May 1983, and still in force. Its current role in the collective 
bargaining process is, therefore, marginal. As we have noted, 
however, it retains the power to approve recognition agreements 
which are part of the wider process of collective bargaining, 
laying down, as they do, the procedural requirements. It also 
retains the function of interpreting the collective agreement, or 
indeed adjudicating in the event of negotiations reaching a 
deadlock.
The Court’s past role in the approval of collective agreements was 
self-restricted. It viewed the approval of collective agreements 
as a formality, leaving the detailed work of checking the legal 
requirements to the Labour Commissioner's Office and, occasionally, 
the Attorney-General's Office. One case, that of Chanda versus The 
Zambia National Milling Company25, was indicative of the Court's
attitude in that respect. The brief facts of the case
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JOINT COUNCILS AND INDUSTRY-WIDE AGREEMENTS, 
31 DECEMBER 1985
SECTOR TYPE OF AGREEMENT YEAR OF 
INITIAL 
AGREEMENT*
Agriculture Recognition and Collective
Banking « „
Building and Civil » h
Engineering Contractors
Copper Mining « «
Clothing Manufacturing " ■
Engineering and Steel " »
Hotel and Catering ■ «
Local Government " »
Milling
Motor Trade « «
Printing and Newspapers " »
Railways « .
Road Transport « »
Security " «
1975
1974
1974
1974
1975 
1974
1976 
1980
1974
1975
1974
1975 
1975
Sources Labour Department Annual Reports, 1974-83, 
Government Gazette Notices, 1985.
Initial agreements concluded under the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971.
149
were that the applicant, a former employee of the Zambia National 
Milling Company was claiming for wages retrospectively awarded 
under a new collective agreement in the firm. The employee had 
left the Company'8 employ in the interim period before the 
agreement was approved by the Court. The Court denied 
jurisdiction. Instead the Ministry of Labour had to obtain an 
advisory opinion from the Attorney-General's Office which was later 
distributed as guidance to all labour officers involved in similar 
claims.
The matter was apparently within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
particularly as the agreement in question was later affirmed by it. 
One would have thought that the Court could have dealt with the 
matter then. It has been speculated that the Court's reluctance to 
involve itself in such cases is in part an indication of its lack 
of independence, in particular, vis-a-vis the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Services which has tended to regard the Court as one of 
its administrative departments. The Ministry furnishes the Court 
with its administrative staff and annually reports on its 
activities.26
In contrast, the Labour Commissioner's Office has not only kept its 
previously pervasive role as 'on the spot arbiter' of collective 
bargaining (through labour officers) , but has shown a tendency to 
encroach on the functions of both the Court and the Commission. 
Labour officers tend to be the first to be involved informally by 
offering advice to the parties. In many cases they have been 
instrumental in the breaking of deadlocks during collective
bargaining even without resorting to their formal powers of 
27mediation under the Act. Although once concluded collective 
agreements have to be sent to the Commission (previously to the 
Court) , in practice they are sent through the Ministry who check 
them mostly to ensure that they contain statutory clauses required 
by the Act and also that they do not conflict with any written law. 
Similarly, the Ministry attempts to correct typographical mistakes 
and errors in format and ambiguous language. Although the Ministry 
officials do not generally try to interject
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their own views as to what the content of any agreement should be, 
there are many instances when they informally advise parties as to 
prevailing conditions in comparable sectors and as to the 
requirement of other laws. The latter function is not 
insignificant in a situation where few parties retain legal 
counsel. We found, for instance, that in one year about 30 per 
cent of collective agreements examined by the Ministry were 
returned to the parties before submission to the Court to make them 
compatible with the requirements of the Employment Act which 
regulates individual rights and obligations frequently incorporated 
into collective agreements.28
It is a matter of credit to the Ministry's role prior to the 
submission of agreements for approval that to date there are only 
two known cases where substantial objections have been raised 
against gazetted agreements. In both the cases concerned, the 
Court accepted the Ministry's recommendations and changed the 
29agreements accordingly.
The role of the Prices and Incomes Commission in the collective 
bargaining process is dealt with below in Chapter Seven. Suffice 
it to say that it has not only taken over the power to approve 
collective agreements, but has the responsibility of formulating 
incomes policy which is central to collective bargaining.
Three other institutions should be borne in mind in appraising the 
experience of collective bargaining under the legislation. These 
are the works councils, the works committees, and the party 
committees of the ruling Party, the UNIP. We deal with works 
councils and their impact as a distinct area of the incorporation 
strategy in Chapter Eight below.
Works committees were a product of the tripartite initiative of the 
Livingstone Labour Conference, 1967.30 It will be recalled that it 
was the first tripartite response to pressing post-independence
labour relations problems. Works committees emerged as part of a 
package Intended to stimulate a post-independence approach designed 
to reduce conflict, in particular encourage better communication 
between management and labour in the quest for higher productivity 
and, therefore, enhancement of the development process. Their 
focus has mainly been shop floor work arrangements intended to 
facilitate better supervision by frontline managers and higher 
output.31
Party Committees on the other hand are a creation of the ruling 
party intended to raise political consciousness of the workers on 
the shop floor to the Government's economic objectives. They were 
also intended as watchdogs (with an open-ended brief) to safeguard 
what the party regarded as the public interest.32
In many instances all these institutions co-exist not only with 
formal collective bargaining arrangements, but among themselves as 
well. Their jurisdictions in practice often overlap as well as do 
their personnel.33 Nevertheless, their core activities are 
distinct from collective bargaining both in its traditional 
received setting and as restructured under the legislation.
One other institution, the tripartite Consultative Council for 
Labour and Productivity should also be mentioned here. Its 
introduction outside the Act's framework was intended to encourage 
collaboration in support of collective bargaining.34 It was 
initially overshadowed by joint industrial Councils. Although the 
joint Councils have largely achieved the aim of centralising the 
process of collective bargaining to the industry level (See 
Table 4, P 148, above), they have not really achieved the aim of 
tripartite consultation. As a result the government seems to have 
decided to give the Council a more formal role in the proposed 
legal reforms which we shall presently discuss in Chapter Nine.35 
Under the proposals, the Council would be one of the most important 
institutions in industrial relations with a clear role. It would
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also meet regularly unlike under current arrangements when the 
Council is only convened whenever the need arises.
5.D. Impact of Restructured Collective Bargaining
The restructuring of collective bargaining under the legislation 
was clearly more economic in its objectives than political. By 
creating compulsory procedures and new institutions to police them, 
the government hoped trade unions and their members would take a 
more positive approach towards the conduct of industrial relations. 
Changed attitudes would reduce industrial conflict and hold wages 
down, among other major aims. Two of the important yardsticks with 
which to measure the impact of restructured collective bargaining 
are, therefore, the new dispute settlement procedures and incomes 
policy, in particular their effect on industrial action, 
productivity and wages. In the following Chapters Six and Seven, 
we try to assess the progress in these respects.
For our present purpose it will suffice to observe that the 
experience of collective bargaining has to date not drastically 
altered trade union attitudes. There is no evidence to suggest 
that state regulated bargaining procedures and agreements have 
checked trade union autonomy. There have been no fundamental 
change of attitudes at the work place as such. The legislation 
has, however, had some effect, some of which has been positive both 
in terms of state and union perceptions. Other changes are not 
easy to categorise.
In general, trade unions, once they got over the initial suspicion 
of government intentions, willingly complied with statutory 
procedures.36 They particularly welcomed the introduction of 
compulsory trade union recognition procedures. As a result of the 
new provisions, unions in most sectors were accorded recognition
more easily. The agricultural industry, traditionally the most 
difficult sector in which to organise unions, is a case in point. 
Easier union recognition in turn increased most unions' credibility 
with the rank and file. The increase in union membership since 
1974 can be partly explained in terms of such credibility.37
Beyond recognition the statutory procedures in part guaranteed 
unions some success in securing better wages and conditions for 
their members. Employers for their part have generally welcomed 
legally binding procedures for their certainty, even though they 
are still reluctant to resort to adjudication where they think 
unions are in breach of their obligations.38 Although most 
employers are reluctant to enter into court proceedings where 
collective agreement infringements are in issue, the existence of 
such legally binding obligations nevertheless enables them to put 
pressure on unions during negotiations. As successive annual 
reports of the Zambia Federation of Employers (the ZFE) indicate, 
many employers are quick to remind employees and unions alike that
they have followed both the "letter and the spirit" of agreements
39entered into when collective disputes arise.
The impact of the 1971 provisions in other areas in relation to 
incorporation is less certain. Nevertheless there have been 
changes. Although the conduct of collective bargaining has not 
drastically changed, the focus has somewhat been modified from the 
received practice. Prior to the introduction of the new 
arrangements, for instance, collective agreements were not as 
detailed. Since 1974 however, agreements have progressively become 
more detailed in response to their binding nature.40 Collective 
agreements today are likely to spell out in detail such matters 
regulated under statutes as the contract of employment, redundancy, 
medical disablement entitlements and summary dismissal.41
Other than such modifications in the focus of agreements, two other 
common changes may be pointed out. The first relates to the
introduction of disciplinary codes as part of collective 
agreements. The 1985 agreement between the Hotel and Catering 
Association on the one hand, and the Catering Workers Union of 
Zambia on the other, for instance provides:
"The union acknowledges that it is the function of the 
employer to maintain order, discipline and efficiency and 
that it may be necessary to discharge, dismiss, suspend or 
otherwise penalise for proper cause, in accordance with the 
agreed statement of disciplinary rules for the industry, 
provided that disciplinary action shall be made known to the 
union and may be subject to discussion."
The clause is followed by detailed offences and penalties. A 
typical collective agreement (see Appendix IV) now focuses more on 
matters of discipline. Every agreement we examined had an 
elaborate disciplinary code. In spite of such changes, however, 
there is no evidence that the general scope of managerial 
prerogatives has been enhanced. Neither has it been curtailed.
5.E. Conclusion
To the extent that the reforms in collective bargaining have 
strengthened trade unions and increased certainty in industrial 
relations, it can be argued that a certain measure of incorporation 
has been attained. For the strategy of incorporation was not 
entirely designed to manipulate and control unions, let alone 
weaken them in every respect. In certain respects there has been a 
genuine desire to strengthen union structures, as we have seen in 
Chapter Four, so that they can really be representative of their 
members and act as effective agencies of government policy.
On three major fronts, the reduction of industrial conflict, higher 
productivity and wages control, there is no evidence that the 
restructuring of collective bargaining has yielded any clear 
results. On the contrary such evidence as is available (see
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Chapters Six, Seven and Eight below), seems to suggest that 
government policy has not been successful.
It is not without significance, as we shall see in Chapter Nine, 
that the economy, the raison d'etre of the entire incorporation 
strategy continues to decline with negative consequences for 
government aims.
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CHAPTER SIX
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
6.A. Introduction
The adoption of the trade union incorporation strategy as the basis 
of post-independence labour policy in Zambia was to a certain 
extent a response to deteriorating industrial relations 
characterised by frequent labour unrest and the breakdown of 
dispute settlement procedures. As Gilmore put it, "Strike-torn 
industrial relations .... led the country into some revolutionary 
thinking to solve its problems."1 Although the majority of 
industrial disputes during the period before the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1974, came into force, were local disputes, usually 
small and limited in their effect, (also usually settled through 
the Labour Department's intervention), there were a number of major 
disputes between 1964 and 1972, which affected key sectors of the 
economy.
While the specific nature and causes of industrial action varied a 
great deal, the underlying general cause was the existence of 
serious labour grievances and expectations after independence 
coupled with the growing power of wage labour in urban areas. As 
we have noted in Chapter Four, self-government raised workers' 
expectations of higher wages and better working conditions. Such 
expectations were summed up by one miner in the now famous 
submission to the Brown Commission of Inquiry in 1966s "We are 
underpaid. We have waited very patiently. We work harder in most 
dangerous places. We want to live a better life ...."2
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The miners were among the first to demonstrate their power, 
creating a major dispute in 1966. This dispute which led to the 
Brown Commission of Inquiry, challenged the government at a crucial 
time.3 Other sectors of the economy soon followed the miners' 
example. In 1965, 1968 and 1970 railway workers were also engaged 
in three major stoppages. Similarly, Local Government workers and 
teachers were engaged in industrial action across the country in 
1968 and 1970 respectively. In 1972, 1980 and more recently in 
1985, the government was again faced with major industrial action 
in the public sector.4
As Table 6 below (PP 179 & 180) indicates the man-days lost over 
the years were considerable. It is also notable that most of the 
disputes contravened formal grievance procedures. It was unclear 
whether the breakdown in procedures was due to "employees' 
ignorance of formal procedures or to the inadequacies of both union 
leaders and management".5 Nevertheless as in other areas of labour 
policy which we have studied, the Government's approach became 
increasingly interventionist and regulatory. The Government's 
attitude towards industrial action was particularly authoritarian. 
Although no military action to quell strikes was ever taken (a 
threat in the face of labour unrest was only made once6), the State 
resorted increasingly to emergency powers under Public Security 
legislation to control the situation. The government regularly 
used Section 27 of the Preservation of Public Security Act to 
extend the definition of essential services and so prohibit 
industrial action in an increasing range of sectors.7 In 1967, the 
haulage of goods by road transport services, in 1968 the railways, 
and in 1970 the teaching service8 were all declared to be essential 
services in the face of labour unrest. In spite of this further 
extension of essential services however, the government rarely used 
its powers to prosecute the workers involved.
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As in other areas of labour policy examined in this Study, it is 
evident that the Government's approach between 1964 and the 
enactment of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (which came into 
force in 1974) was more ad hoc than deliberate. The provisions 
concerning industrial action and dispute settlement procedures in 
the 1971 legislation, however, marked a departure from that 
approach. The Act introduced further restrictions on industrial 
action and introduced a wider definition of essential services.^ 
In Section 3 of the Act, "essential service" is defined to mean:
"(a) any service relating to the generation, supply or 
distribution of electricity;
(b) any fire brigade or fire service;
(c) any sewerage, rubbish disposal or other sanitation 
service;
(d) any health, hospital or ambulance service;
(e) any service relating to the supply or distribution of 
water;
(f) any service relating to the production, supply, 
delivery or distribution of food or fuel;
(g) mining, including any service required for the working 
of a mine;
(h) any communication service;
(i) any transport service, and any service relating to the 
repair and maintenance or to the driving, loading and 
unloading, of a vehicle for use in the transport 
service;
(j) any road, railway, bridge, ferry, pontoon, airfield, 
harbour or dock;
(k) any other service or facility, whether or not of a kind 
similar to the foregoing, declared by the President to 
be a necessary service for the purposes of and under 
the Preservation of Public Security Regulations or any 
other regulations or enactment replacing the same."
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Although the right to strike was preserved, a mandatory collective 
dispute settlement procedure was laid down which makes legal 
strikes difficult if not impossible. The most significant 
innovation was the introduction of compulsory arbitration under the 
Industrial Relations Court. The Act gives the Court powers to make 
binding decisions in both individual and collective disputes to the 
exclusion of ordinary Courts in many instances. Initially, the 
Court also had the power to approve and vary collective agreements, 
thereby giving it considerable power in economic matters. (See 
P 171 and note 44, below).
In this Chapter we shall examine the key features of the 1971 
legislative reforms concerning industrial conflict and dispute 
settlement procedures. We shall also assess the impact of 
government strategy in that respect. First , however, we shall 
briefly examine the law and policy in this area during the period 
from independence to 1974 when the Industrial Relations Act came 
into force.
6.B. Dispute Settlement Procedures in the Period
Prior to the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 coming into force, in 
April 1974, collective dispute settlement procedures and the right 
to industrial action were governed by the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act.10 Save for the 
changes made to the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act (see 
Chapter Five above), the operative provisions of the two laws 
remained intact from the colonial period. The major feature of the 
legislation was the voluntary nature of conciliation, akin to the 
British situation at the time of their enactment in 1949.
The Industrial Conciliation Act empowered the Minister of Labour to 
appoint a conciliator or a conciliation board on the application of 
interested employers or employees.11 In certain circumstances.
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depending on the gravity of the dispute, the Minister could appoint 
a board of inquiry.12 In the latter instance the board was 
entitled to investigate the dispute and make appropriate 
recommendations to the Minister and not the parties.
In addition to or in lieu of the above, and with the consent of the 
parties involved, the Minister could refer the subject of a trade 
dispute to an arbitration tribunal mutually agreed upon between the 
parties, or, failing agreement, appointed by the Minister. Such 
arbitration could consist of a sole arbitrator; an arbitrator 
assisted by one or more assessors nominated by employers and an 
equal number nominated by employees; or one or more arbitrators 
nominated by employers, an equal number nominated by employees, and 
an independent chairman appointed by the Minister.13
In the light of later procedures under the 1971 Act, it is 
important to emphasise that the powers of conciliators and 
conciliation boards were limited to argument and persuasion. They 
had no power to compel parties even to discuss the dispute in 
question. Similarly, although the decisions of the sole arbitrator 
or arbitration tribunals were binding on the parties, that was due 
to a voluntary prior undertaking. Arbitration itself was voluntary 
in the first place and no party could be compelled to submit to it 
without its consent.
6.B.1 Industrial Action
In Chapter Three we noted that one of the fundamental principles 
derived from the British experience on which immediate 
post-independence legislation was based, was the freedom to 
withdraw labour. In part the immunity given to unions to protect
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them from the consequences of the common law rules relating to the 
restraint of trade and conspiracy was in recognition of the freedom 
to strike.14. Yet the freedom to strike was subject to the 
exhaustion of dispute settlement procedures once entered into.
Moreover, there were other significant restrictions on the freedom 
to strike. As we have noted above the government tended to resort 
to public security legislation to check industrial action. 
Industrial action was also prohibited in essential services by 
virtue of Section 27 of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act 
which made it an offence to hinder or interfere with the carrying 
out of those services. The onus of proof in those instances to 
show "just cause or excuse" rested upon the accused. Similarly, by 
virtue of Section 28 of the same Act, "wilful and malicious breach 
of contract, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
probable consequence, either alone or in combination with others, 
(was) to endanger human life or cause serious bodily injury or 
expose valuable property to destruction or serious injury" was an 
offence.
Given the Government's tendency to progressively extend the range 
of essential services the restrictions on the freedom to strike 
were considerable. It is perhaps not surprising that the majority 
of strikes after independence, even before the enactment of the 
1971 legislation, were "wildcat" strikes in contravention of normal 
procedures. Despite this widespread incidence of unofficial and 
often "unconstitutional" strikes which a trade union report once 
attributed to employees' ignorance of formal grievance procedures 
and the inadequacies of both union leaders and management, among 
other reasons, legislation prior to 1974 left some scope for 
legal and constitutional industrial action.
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6.C. Post - 1974 Dispute Settlement Procedures
As we have noted above, the machinery for the prevention and 
settlement of trade disputes up to 1974 under the Trade Unions and 
Trade Disputes Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act provided for 
voluntary conciliation and arbitration. Under the arrangements the 
Department of Labour was an active participant normally intervening 
to offer to conciliate on an informal basis. Mediation services 
were also available to the parties through labour officers from the 
Department. In fact the majority of grievances and disputes were 
settled by the Department's intervention. Consequently only a 
minority went to formal conciliation and arbitration.16
The changes made by the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 in respect 
of dispute settlement were among the most radical legislative 
reforms in the Government's incorporation strategy. The effect of 
the provisions was to introduce compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration. The impact of government strategy in industrial 
conflict and dispute settlement, largely depends on the reforms 
contained in Parts IX and X of the Act. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine the provisions in some detail. We first 
proceed by looking at the various stages of collective dispute 
settlement envisaged under the Act and then the role, function and 
the powers of the Industrial Relations Court.
6.C.1 Collective Dispute Settlement Procedures
Under the Act a collective dispute as defined in Section 317 only 
arises when one party has made a demand in writing to the other 
party with a copy sent to the labour officer (termed proper officer 
under the Act) , and the second party has failed to reply within 
fourteen days, has rejected the demand or has failed to make a
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counter offer. Alternatively, a dispute will be deemed to exist if 
the parties have held at least one meeting with a view to 
negotiating a settlement of the dispute, but have failed to reach 
settlement on all or some of the matters at issue between them.18 
Once a dispute has arisen the parties are obliged to inform the
Ministry through the proper officer. The proper officer then 
19attempts to mediate. Where a settlement is reached through 
mediation, it has to be reduced to writing and a copy sent to the 
Minister who in turn forwards it, with his comments, to the 
Industrial Relations Court for approval. If the Court approves, 
subject to the requirement that the settlement should not be 
contrary to any written law in force or to public policy, the award 
becomes final and binding upon the parties for such a period as the 
Court may specify.20
Where the parties are unable to reach a settlement through 
mediation, a report has to be made to the Minister who has to 
appoint a conciliator or a board of conciliation comprising a 
chairman and not less than two, but not more than four other 
members to conciliate in the dispute.21 Alternatively, if the 
parties so request, and the Labour Commissioner so recommends, the 
Minister may refer the dispute directly to the Court thereby 
22bypassing the conciliation stage. Where a dispute is referred to 
the Court without going through the process of conciliation, the 
Court can use its discretion to either make a final and binding 
decision, as in all other matters, or to refer it back to the 
Minister with such directions to him as it may deem necessary and 
conducive to the process of conciliation between the parties.23 If 
on the other hand, the dispute at this stage goes through 
conciliation and is settled, the terms are reduced to writing and 
forwarded to the Court through the Ministry. Subject to the 
requirements of any written law or public policy the Court may vary 
or confirm the terms and inform the parties of its decision through 
the Minister.
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Where the parties fail to reach a settlement through conciliation, 
the Minister has to refer the dispute to the Court for a final and 
binding decision.25
At every stage of this procedure the Ministry through the Labour 
Department has wide supervisory powers. Failure to submit or to 
observe procedural requirements is subject to penal sanctions.26 
There is also a maximum period specified for every stage of the 
process. Moreover, the statute provides that all procedures have 
to be exhausted before industrial action can be taken.27 In 
practice, therefore, lawful strike action is hardly possible. In 
assessing the effectiveness of the procedures, we should bear in 
mind that the procedures and the court have been intended as a 
"strike-alternative."28
6.C.2 The Industrial Relations Court
An equally innovative feature of the 1971 legislative regime is the 
Industrial Relations Court set up under Part X. The Court was 
conceived with a central role both in the settlement of dispute 
procedures, as we have seen above, and the control of industrial 
conflict. The Court's role, functions and powers are best 
appreciated by examining the provisions concerning it in some 
detail.
6.C.2(a) Composition, Status and Procedure
In accordance with Section 96 (2) (3)(4) and (5), the Court consists 
of the Chairman and his Deputy appointed by the President of the 
Republic from persons who are either judges of the High Court or 
are qualified to be such. Besides the Chairman and his Deputy, the
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President also appoints two other members or such greater number as 
he may prescribe. To date the Court has consisted of four judges, 
including the Chairman and his Deputy. In addition to the 
substantive judges, the Minister has power to nominate an even
29number of assessors of up to fourteen. The Act further 
prescribes that half of the number of assessors shall be the 
representatives of employers and the other half shall consist of 
representatives of employees. In any one case, the Chairman is 
empowered to call upon two of such assessors, one from each side, 
to sit with the Court. While the Court is free to take the 
assessors' opinions into consideration in making its decision, it 
is not bound to conform to their opinions.30
Three members or any greater uneven number as the Chairman may 
direct constitute a quorum for the hearing of any matter before the 
Court.31 An interlocutory matter may, however, be heard by a
32single judge under Rule 34 of the Court's rules, 1974. The 
determination of interlocutory matters would, therefore, appear to 
be in keeping with ordinary judicial practice whereby such matters 
are usually dealt with by a single judge in Chambers. Other than 
in matters of an interlocutory nature, decisions of the Court are 
by majority opinion of the members sitting.33
The Act vested the Chairman with the power to make rules by which 
proceedings of the Court are governed.34 The current rules were 
accordingly made in 1974.35 Subject to the provisions of the Act 
and its rules, the Court has power to regulate its own procedure.
It has been said that the Court's approach in that respect has been 
greatly influenced by the attitude taken by the President of the 
defunct National Industrial Relations Court in England, Lord 
Donaldson, currently Master of the Rolls. Lord Donaldson is said to 
have been inclined to avoid unnecessary formality and encouraged
parties to meet informally to discuss the best method of 
36procedure. This approach seems to be in keeping with the spirit 
of Section 101(2) which exempts the Court from being bound by rules
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of evidence in Civil or Criminal procedures. Instead the chief 
function of the Court is "to do substantial justice between the 
parties before it" (emphasis given).36
The status and constitutional position of the Court in relation to 
ordinary Courts has not been without controversy, both among 
commentators and in labour relations circles, including the unions. 
It has been argued on the one hand that the requirement that 
members of the Court be either High Court judges or those qualified 
to be such, coupled with the nature of its powers clearly give it 
the status of the High Court. It has been emphasised in this 
respect that the Court is vested with the power to make final and 
binding decisions in matters brought before it.
On the other hand it has been argued that Parliament could never 
have intended to create a parallel system of adjudication outside 
the ultimate supervision of the Supreme Court. In that respect it 
has been suggested that the "final and binding nature" of the 
Court's decisions must be restricted to the merits of any 
individual case to the extent that it is within the authority of 
the Court. It is conceivable that a situation might arise where 
the Court could exceed its authority, mis-use its powers or there
might be a matter of fraud. In such a situation appeal would go to
38other Courts, on procedural grounds at least. As we have seen in 
Chapter One some critics have gone as far as suggesting that the 
39Court is unconstitutional.
These arguments were brought before the High Court in the case of 
The Zambia National Provident Fund Board Versus The Attorney 
General and Others. The case was an appeal against a decision of 
the Industrial Relations Court. The applicant sought a writ of 
certiorari, arguing that: (1) the Industrial Relations Court was 
an inferior court to the High Court; (2) it was not part of the 
Zambian judicature; and (3) the ouster clause contained in the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, to the effect that its decisions
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were final and binding41 could not take away from the High Court 
its Supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts» and the decision 
in question was wrong both in law and in fact.
In effect what was challenged was not only the final and binding 
nature of the Court's decisions, but its constitutionality. After 
reviewing a number of English cases, including a Privy Council 
decision on certiorari,42 Judge Sakala concluded that the 
Industrial Relations Act was intended to exclude the power of the 
High Court to issue orders of certiorari against the decisions of 
the Industrial Relations Court for the purpose of quashing them.
In the event, the consideration of the application on the merits 
was made unnecessary. The judge, however, urged the authorities to 
review the situation, in particular Section 101(3) to avoid any 
possible instances of injustice. The gov rnment has, however, not 
taken any action so far. The High Court's decision has further 
dimished the Industrial Relations Court's role in the settlement of 
industrial disputes. It has not endeared it to employers and trade 
unions who were already reluctant to resort to it to resolve 
collective disputes. Coupled with the Court's own decision to 
restrict its jurisdiction which we discuss presently, the Court's 
role in the incorporation strategy has become even more marginal.
6.C.2(b) Jurisdiction and Powers
The Court's jurisdiction and powers under the Act are relatively 
wide for a court of its kind. By virtue of Section 98 the Court 
has jurisdiction and power to inquire into and make awards and 
decisions in collective disputes and any matters relating to 
industrial relations which may be brought before it; to interpret 
the terms of awards and agreements; to commit and to punish for 
contempt any person who disobeys or unlawfully refuses to carry out 
or be bound by an order made against him by the Court under the
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Act. It can also perform such acts and carry out such duties as 
may be prescribed under the Act or any other written law. It can, 
moreover, generally inquire into and adjudicate upon any matter 
affecting the rights, obligations and privileges of employees, 
employers and representative organisations.
In addition to the above, the Court's rules give it power to direct 
that any person not already a party to proceedings be added as a 
party, to issue directions as to the future conduct of proceedings; 
to administer interrogatories; to compel the attendance of 
witnesses, and the production of documents.43 Until 1983, the 
Court also had the power to examine and approve collective 
agreements. The function was, however, transferred to the Prices 
and Incomes Commission following the enactment of the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment Act), 1983. Prior to the transfer, the 
Court approved a total of 384 collective agreements. It still 
retains the power of approval in relation to recognition 
. 45agreements.
The Act also gives the Court a role in the formation and 
establishment of trade unions and employers' organisations. It has 
appellate jurisdiction where an applicant is aggrieved by the 
refusal of the Labour Commissioner in respect of registration or 
cancellation of a trade union or an employer's organisation.46 The 
Court is also seized of original jurisdiction to grant injunctions, 
in appropriate cases, prohibiting officials of a trade union or an 
employer's organisation from holding office or dealing with the 
respective organisation's funds.47 Under Section 28, the ZCTU is 
authorised to adjudicate upon trade union jurisdiction disputes as 
to which of them have the exclusive right to represent specified 
employees. The Court has appellate jurisdiction in cases of appeal 
from a decision of the Congress in such instances. Alternatively,
where there has been no adjudication by the Congress, the Court can
48be seized of original jurisdiction in such matters.
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Another important jurisdiction of the Court concerns complaints. A 
complaint can be brought to the Court in the case of an 
irregularity in the election of any person to any office in a 
representative body. Where the Court is satisfied that an 
irregularity has taken place, it has the power to declare such an 
election null and void and order a new election.49 Similarly, the 
Court can receive applications with a view to determining who 
should hold any office in a trade union, the Congress, an 
employers' association or the Federation of Employers. The Court 
has power to make a declaration on that behalf. In that respect 
any person who acts or purports to act contrary to such a 
declaration shall be liable for an offence under Section 99(3).
Such an offence would not prejudice any contempt proceedings to 
which such a person could be additionally liable.
Probably the most important power of the Court under the Act, as 
initially perceived by workers, is that relating to dismissals. 
Where an employee has reasonable cause to believe that his services 
have been terminated or that he has suffered any other penalty or 
disadvantage on the grounds of his race, colour, sex, marital 
status, religion, political opinion or affiliation, tribal 
extraction or social status or any other ground prejudicial to his 
rights, he may lay a complaint before the Court. Where the Court 
finds in favour, it has the power to grant such remedy as it may 
deem fit, including reinstatement or compensation for loss of 
employment.
As Table 5 (P 173) shows, the Court exercised its jurisdiction from 
1974 to 1983 in varying degrees. For the first three years the 
Court's work was dominated by the approval of recognition 
agreements. Thereafter, other issues such as the approval of 
collective agreements, complaints and applications increased and 
fluctuated in their frequency. Collective disputes and appeals 
were the least frequent throughout the period, totalling 10 and 27 
respectively.
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In 1983 the Court made decisions that have led to a notable 
decrease in the number of applications (that is to say cases
52brought to the Court mainly by individuals) before it. In two cases, 
A T Ndulo Versus Indeco Ltd, and Paul Mbewe Versus Bulk Carriers of 
Zambia, the Court held that except for specified Sections of the 
Act, the Court's jurisdiction is in the main confined to group 
rights, obligations, privileges and dispute in contrast to 
individual rights. Prior to the decisions, as Table 5 indicates, 
the Court entertained and dealt with individual cases 
(applications) filed under Section 98(g) of the Act. The 
subsection gives the Court the jurisdiction to "generally inquire 
into and adjudicate upon any matter affecting the rights, 
obligations and privileges of employees, employers and 
representative organisations
What led the Court to adopt this restrictive interpretation of its 
jurisdiction after almost ten years of operation is not clear. It 
has been speculated that the Court's reaction may have been 
influenced by attitudes in the legal profession and employers' 
organisations exemplified by the challenge against its jurisdiction 
in the case of The Zambia National Provident Fund Board which we 
have mentioned above.54 On the other hand, it is widely known that 
the Court has been undermanned for a long time. It has, therefore, 
been exploring ways of reducing its workload.55 There was no 
indication of the motivation for the decision in the case record. 
Whether in fact the decrease in individual applications will lead 
to a corresponding increase in collective dispute cases, to suit 
the incorporation strategy of closer control and regulation of 
industrial relations, remains to be seen. What seems to be clear 
is that the lessening of the Court's role in dispute settlement 
lessens the state's ability to regulate industrial relations in 
keeping with the incorporation strategy.
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6.C.3 Industrial Action and Dispute Settlement Machinery
Industrial conflict in the form of labour unrest was one of the 
major concerns when the government set out to devise the current 
trade union incorporation strategy. It is clear from the 
provisions concerning dispute settlement that we have examined 
above, that the policy behind them was geared towards the control 
of industrial conflict. The immédiate way this was done was to 
make use of the establishment of the dispute settlement machinery 
as a justification for a restriction on the right to strike. Thus, 
under Section 116 of the Act industrial action is unlawful where 
the underlying dispute has been referred to conciliation or to the 
Court. A brief outline of strike policy and procedures under the 
Act is, therefore, useful in appreciating government strategy.
Under the general scheme of the Act regulating industrial conflict, 
the right to strike or lock-out is not entirely extinguished. On 
the contrary, the right to strike seems to be implied in one of the 
key provisions that define employees' rights. Whether in fact 
industrial action is lawful, however, depends on the 
interpretation of several provisions, circumstances and procedures 
under the Act. The key provision in this respect is Section 116. 
The provision prohibits industrial action in a number of respects. 
Firstly, industrial action is prohibited unless it is in 
contemplation or furtherance of a collective dispute in which the 
respective employer or employee is a party. This in effect 
prohibits any secondary action.57 Section 116 also prohibits 
industrial action where not authorised by a strike ballot taken in 
the manner provided by the Constitution of a trade union.58 These 
prohibitions are subject to penalties, including penalties for
59persons who incite the contravention of the same. Finally, 
industrial action, even when it is in contemplation of a primary 
collective dispute, or authorised by a ballot, is prohibited
if conciliation is in progress or if it has been referred to the 
Industrial Relations Court for a decision.
The only time during which a strike may be lawful under the Act, 
therefore, is at or from the point when a dispute is declared until 
the time the dispute is referred to conciliation.61 There are two 
additional constraints on industrial action under Zambian law. 
First, Zambia has been under a state of national emergency ever
since the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
621965. Although the Rhodesian problem has long been settled, the 
extraordinary powers vested in the President have not been revoked. 
Those powers enable the President to take action against «my 
activity deemed to be detrimental to the interests of national 
security, health and safety. Although such power has not been used 
against strikes per se, it has been frequently used to detain 
recalcitrant trade union leaders.
Moreover, there are two further constraints. Under Section 117 of 
the Act, industrial action in essential services is prohibited. As 
we noted above, the range of services included in the category has 
been progressively extended over the years.63 In addition, the 
list is progressively extended and may be further extended by a 
Presidential decree under the Public Security Regulations. Until 
recently the power was rarely used. It was, however, used in 1985
in response to a wave of strikes. In January 1985 a Presidential
64decree was issued banning stoppages in hospitals.
It is, therefore, clear that a combination of the legal and 
procedural requirements under the Act, including essential services 
restrictions, coupled with national emergency and public security 
legislation has greatly reduced the scope of legal and 
constitutional industrial action. Yet this has not reduced the 
incidence of industrial action. It has simply meant that the 
majority of strikes that have taken place since the Act came into 
effect have been illegal, continuing the trend that was prevalent 
in the 1960's and early 1970's before the Act came into force.65
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6.D. The Effectiveness of Policy
There are two major grounds on which the effectiveness of 
government policy in this area can be assessed. The first is the 
extent to which parties have resorted to the new procedures for the 
settlement of disputes, particularly the Industrial Relations 
Court. Secondly, the effectiveness of government policy can be 
measured by assessing the impact of the Act on industrial action. 
Both elements are of course intertwined, but they can be examined 
separately.
6.D.1 Resort to Procedures
An examination of the experience under the new dispute settlement 
procedures reveals several relevant trends. During the Court's 
first three years of operation, that is to say between 1974 - 76, 
it was mostly occupied with the examination and approval of 
recognition agreements, and later collective agreements. The 
Court's work in that respect does not provide us with an objective 
basis on which to assess the attitude of parties to its role.
The Court's jurisdiction in respect of recognition and collective 
agreements was based on a statutory duty placed upon all parties 
engaged in collective bargaining.67
Of the cases adjudicated during the period, the largest proportion 
were concerned with disputes arising out of the Working Parties 
which were charged with the responsibility of forming Works 
Councils in qualifying undertakings.68 Although such cases have to 
be considered in assessing the overall impact of the new 
provisions, they are best regarded as contributing to the success 
of workers' participation arrangements which we deal with in 
Chapter Eight.
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The next largest proportion of cases before the Court in later 
years, particularly between 1979 and 1982, was concerned with 
individual grievances, mostly concerning dismissals. While this 
group of cases provides a valid basis for assessment, one major 
factor has to be borne in mind. Individual workers' resort to the 
Court was initially fuelled by widespread optimism that the Court 
would be more sympathetic to their problems.69 The Court also 
provided a quicker resolution of such cases than ordinary courts in 
civil proceedings. As we have seen the number of such cases has 
since declined. In fact there are reports which suggest that even 
before the Court restricted its jurisdiction, some workers, 
especially in professional categories, tended to prefer to sue 
their employers before ordinary courts.
6.D.2 Extent of Industrial Action
Trends in industrial action probably provide a more definite basis 
on which to assess the impact of government policy. The available 
statistics, (see Table 6 PP 179 and 180), unfortunately, are too 
incomplete to provide an objective basis on which to provide a 
clear judgement. Between 1964 and 1972, that is to say before the 
new controls on industrial action came into effect, the pattern was 
one of great variation. For instance, the number of working days 
lost in 1964 was much higher, at 125,738 than the following year 
when it dropped to 22,493. In 1966, mainly due to a prolonged 
miners' strike that year, that figure shot up to 579,406. It then 
came down sharply in 1967 (46,088), 1968 (65,898) and then rose 
sharply again in 1970 due to prolonged strikes by teachers and 
railwaymen. In 1971 the number of man days lost came down 
drastically to 18,894 and rose again in 1972 (30,8674).
Similarly, looking at post-Act years, the figures available, do not 
indicate any definite trend. In 1979, 79,896 man days were lost, a


figure that dramatically increased to 556,408 in 1981 due to 
several prolonged strikes during that year. The figure fell again 
sharply in 1982 to 7,702. It is, however, significant that the 
figures for 1984 show a sharp rise over those of 1982 and 1983. 
There were sharp rises in the number of disputes, 507 (compared to 
54 in 1983) ; the number of workers involved, 27,750 (compared to 
9,217 in 1983); and the number of working days lost, 31,382 
(compared to 8,170 in 1983). These figures are probably a result 
of the worsening economic decline as mentioned in Chapter One and 
further discussed in Chapter Nine. They underline the economic 
imperatives of the trade union incorporation strategy. Although 
figures are not yet available for 1985, 1986 and 1987, indications 
are that a substantially higher number of man days will have been 
lost due to successive waves of strikes.
Equally variable have been the figures of disputes and the number 
of workers involved, as is apparent from the same table.
What seems to be a more definite trend, and one that has not been 
officially recorded so far, is the continuing high number of 
"wildcat" strikes.72 Such strikes tend to be both illegal (that is 
to say in contravention of the procedures and requirements of the 
Act) and unconstitutional (that is to say, in contravention of 
union constitutions) . They also tend to be unofficial, that is to 
say, not approved by the union hierarchy. In so far as the 
purpose of the dispute settlement machinery alone and other 
elements of Sections 116 and 117 of the Act was to reduce 
industrial action, it is difficult to see any hint of success.
These methods of control were notable failures. Yet, the failure 
was not only partly due to the failure of procedures to function. 
There was also a failure of the unions to control the membership. 
Thus, most of the strikes were illegal as well as unconstitutional
and unofficial,
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One observation which we made in respect of the overall nature of 
government policy in Chapter Two needs to be emphasised here.
There has been a certain continuity in government policy comparable 
to the approach before independence. The 1971 Act merely continued 
the government tendency of severely circumscribing the right to 
strike in practice by "emergency" action and the introduction of 
long lists of 'essential services' in which strikes are illegal.
As Davies has noted, this was a cardinal feature of Colonial trade 
union control.74 The post-colonial State in Zambia has made it 
part and parcel of its incorporation strategy.
The basis for the above policy, as during the colonial period, was 
economic. The closer regulation of dispute settlement procedures, 
in particular the introduction of compulsory procedures, was 
intended to reduce the frequency of strikes which tend to have 
negative economic effects. Although dispute trends have not been 
as definite during the overall period under consideration, they 
increased out of proportion for the last year (1984) for which 
figures are available. It is also significant that the upward 
trend is thought to have continued in recent years.7^ Judged 
against this background, therefore, the incorporation strategy in 
this area has not been successful.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY
7.A Introduction
The search for an effective prices and incomes policy has been a 
key element of incorporation both as a logical extension of 
collective bargaining restructuring under the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971, and also as part of the wider national development 
strategy. The underlying problems experienced in Zambia in this 
respect have been similar to those of other developing countries 
that Turner chronicled in the late 1960's which have been also 
highlighted by other writers in more recent years.1 Similarly, the 
search for solutions has been heavily influenced by the 
International Labour Organisation's approach characterised by a 
desire to place emphasis on the development of trade unions and 
collective bargaining as part of its international labour standard 
setting. As in other areas of Zambian development however, prices 
and incomes policy has been dominated by problems of the dual 
nature of the economy. The economy continues to be characterised 
by a modern sector built around the copper industry which co-exists 
with the traditional sector. One is urban and mainly based on wage 
employment while the other is rural and based on subsistence 
agriculture. The result is an acute urban - rural imbalance with 
the relative prosperity of the modern over the rural sector. The 
imbalance, however, is not restricted to the rural - urban gap, it 
also extends to other areas of Zambian social and economic life. 
Critical among such other disparities is that between the highest 
and lowest paid wage earners. Such disparities have tended to 
determine the major issues of prices and incomes policy in Zambia.
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Four major Issues of differentials have dominated wage 
determination in Zambia at various stages since independence: the 
differentials between the earnings of expatriates and local 
workers; those between rural and urban incomes; those between 
earnings in different sectors; and those between the earnings of 
skilled and unskilled workers, or clerical and manual workers.3 
The last category of differentials corresponds, to a large extent, 
to the differential between salaries and wages.4 Of these 
differentials that between expatriate and local pay scales is 
largely of historical significance now. It has ceased to exert any 
notable influence on Zambian wages bargaining. Expatriates in the 
labour force have steadily declined making it less likely that the 
issue will ever again impinge on local wage determination.
In spite of the fact that wage employment accounts for only 20 to 
25 per cent of total employment in Zambia, the disproportionate 
pre-occupation with wage issues is understandable. Wage incomes 
account for as much as 75 per cent of total labour incomes in 
Zambia and data is both more accurate and more detailed in the 
modern wage sector.
Incomes control attempts have, therefore, been concerned with the 
wage differentials in varying degrees. Indeed, the concern to 
control the trade union role in wage determination has been a major 
motivation for the Government's attempts at incorporation.
In this Chapter we discuss some of the major issues of prices and 
incomes policy as a feature of incorporation. We start with a 
summary of some historical developments and then proceed to analyse 
various stages of attempts to formulate an effective incomes 
policy. We also examine the institutional and legal frameworks of 
current policy before concluding with an assessment of this area of 
the incorporation strategy.
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7.B The Pre-Incomes Policy Era
Current attempts to formulate an effective incomes policy can be 
traced back to 1961. The year marked the acceptance by major 
employment sectors of the principle of African advancement into the 
full range of jobs occupied by European workers. In spite of the 
fact that collective bargaining, including wage bargaining had been 
a feature of African trade unionism since the late 1940's it was 
not until 1961 that some sectors, notably the Rhodesia Railways, 
opened its European categories of employment to Africans. Later in 
that year the European and African Sections of the Civil Service 
were combined into a non-racial local civil service even though 
nothing was done to bring the wages of the former European and 
African jobs into one common scale.
Further developments followed in the mining industry with the 
appointment of the Morison Commission of Enquiry appointed to 
consider the industry's pay structure beyond "job fragmentation"6 
which up to then had been the bench mark of African advancement in 
the mines. The Morison Commission sought to create a non-racial 
pay scale throughout the mining industry by recommending the 
raising of African wages by a constant proportion throughout the 
pay structure, but not entirely closing the gap between the African 
and European pay scales. It was, therefore, not until 1964, at 
independence, that a truly uniform non-racial wage and employment 
structure was created. That came with the Hadow Salaries 
Commission which reviewed Civil Service salaries. The Commission 
proposed to create a single scale out of four different ones based 
on race or the date of employment by awarding a sizeable pay 
increase to the lower-paid civil servants. It also recommended 
reducing the salaries for the former "European" jobs having taken 
account of the "requirements of the local employment market."
The rapid turnover of expatriate workers, especially after the 
dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland created
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a problem which justified a recourse to a dual wage structure with 
the introduction of a different pay scale for expatriates as an 
inducement. The idea of expatriate inducement first took root in 
the mining sector where employers were most concerned to stem the 
loss of skilled expatriate labour. However, the differentials 
resulting from the 1964 wage settlement in that industry did not 
have any recognisable rationale to explain the considerable 
variation between local and expatriate pay scales.8 Labour unrest 
among the ranks of African workers inevitably followed the 
perception of continuing inequality.
In 1966 the government responded with the appointment of ¿mother 
Commission of Enquiry under the Chairmanship of Roland Brown, then 
9Tanzania's Attorney-General. The Commission was instructed to 
examine the disparities between the expatriates' and local 
conditions of service in the mining industry. Although the 
Commission recommended formalising the Hadow formula of a single 
basic scale with allowances for expatriate workers, it found it 
difficult to decide what factors should determine the basic pay 
scale. The existing expatriate scale based on the inducement 
factor was rejected because it would be excessively inflationary 
and because it was seen to be based on an inappropriate notion of 
privilege intended to maintain a "European way of life." It was 
also felt that the effect of collective bargaining in the past had 
been to introduce wide-spread anomalies into the scale.10
The local scale on the other hand was also rejected as a basis, in 
the words of the Commission, because,
"it deliberately undervalues the skill of the African 
workers. It has been built from established points on the 
scale of African wages by a process of job evaluation, 
without reference to European rates for the same or similar 
work. The European miners were able to secure for themselves 
high wages because industrial skill in Zambia was scarce. It 
is still scarce and will remain so for many years to come.
Its value to the employer does not depend on race or colour, 
but by isolating African wages from any connection with
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European wages the mining companies appear .... to have 
devalued the skill which Africans can acquire now for the 
first time."AA
In the end the Brown Commission recommended a 22 per cent wage 
increase to be applied uniformly throughout the African scale. The 
choice of 22 per cent was arbitrary, influenced less by any 
scientific calculations than what Fry termed the "correct" 
relationship of the new to the old scales.12 It also stemmed from 
the Commission's belief that the mining industry was in,
"a situation which must be put right if there is to be any 
chance of industrial peace. Weighing in the balance the 
importance of the industry on which the development of Zambia 
ultimately depends, we have felt justified in recommending, 
as part of a new settlement, a general increase in wages 
which might otherwise be regarded as excessive in terms of 
the growth rate of the economy as a whole."
The Brown Commission was soon followed by the Whelan Civil Service 
Salaries Commission which again clearly emphasised the mining 
industry as the leader in setting the pace of policy review in the 
area of wages as in other areas of industrial relations. The 
Whelan Commission's particular task was to take into account wage 
awards in other fields and to tackle the disparity between lower 
and higher civil service salaries. The Whelan Commission followed 
the Brown Commission by awarding an average pay increase of 22 per 
cent, but weighted in favour of the lower-paid who received a 25 
per cent increase while those on higher incomes only received an 
increase of 15 per cent. Of significance was the Commission's 
proposal to end differentials between rural and urban civil 
services pay scales, thereby virtually doubling the lowest paid 
rural civil servants' pay.
The effect of the Whelan recommendations affected other sectors 
resulting in wage increases of 20 to 25 per cent. Most sectors 
also followed Whelan's example in ending rural - urban pay 
differentials.
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The major achievement of efforts at wage determination up to 1969 
which we have briefly reviewed here was the attainment of unified 
wage scales in all major employment sectors. This was true of both 
differentials between expatriate and local basic scales 
(discounting the inducement element), and those between the urban 
and rural areas. There was no apparent concerted incomes, let 
alone prices policy on the part of the government. Government 
action was more of a reaction to address some of the anomalies 
created during the colonial period and also due to the need to 
pacify industrial relations. At this period there was no design to 
use incomes policy as a tool of incorporation, that as we shall 
presently see, came later.
7.C The Era of Incomes Policy
Attempts to regulate wages especially in the private sector go back 
to 1948 with the adoption of the Minimum Wages, Wages Councils and 
Conditions of Employment Ordinance. The government at independence 
retained the principal provisions of the law which until recently 
remained the legislative basis for wage fixing and for 
determination of minimum wage rates by Wages Councils and Wages 
Boards. The major concern of the government at independence was 
to replace the racially-oriented Wages Councils and Wages Boards 
with non-racial bodies. It was also concerned with the 
establishment of minimum wages to remove gross inequalities and 
raise the wages of the lowest paid African workers, for whom no 
statutory minimum wages and conditions of employment had been set.
The next incomes policy initiative did not occur until 1965. In 
that year the first attempt was made to bridge the gap between 
urban and rural incomes under the Transitional National Development 
plan in 1965. The plan sought to reverse the current development 
trend of rural - urban migration through a policy of monetisation 
of agriculture and a reduction in the rural-urban disparities. It
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was followed by the First Development Plan, 1966-70. The latter 
added employment objectives anticipated to benefit rural areas. 
Although three wage rounds can be discerned in the first decade of 
independence, 1963-64, 1966-67 and 1970-71, built around wage 
reviews we have looked at above, no attempt was, however, made to 
introduce a comprehensive incomes and prices policy until 1969.16
7.C.1 The First Turner Report
By 1969 it was apparent that the Brown Commission of Inquiry, which 
increased miners' wages by 22 per cent for African ranks on the 
grounds of "the need to remove every vestige of racial 
discrimination" in the mining industry, had resulted in a 
widespread wages spiral. It was felt that the wage increases were 
not only fuelling inflation but widening the gap between urban and 
rural incomes and reducing the number of new jobs in the process.
In April 1969, the government, therefore, sought the assistance of 
the United Nations Development Programme and the International 
Labour Organisation in designing an incomes policy that would 
provide a basis for equitable income distribution, restrain price 
increases and stimulate productivity and employment. In its 
request the government explained.
".... although increases in real wages have been on average 
very considerable since independence, they have been unevenly 
distributed between different groups of workers, so that some 
injustices may have resulted, and there are probably a number 
of inequities and anomalies in the wage structure. In 
particular, the gains from development are not very equitably 
distributed a^ between the urban population and the rural 
population."
The government was also concerned with the inflationary effect of 
rising wages. It was, therefore.
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"anxious that future Increases in wages and other incomes 
should take place in an orderly fashion related to the 
increase in the capacity of our economy, so that any danger 
of an inflationary spiral be averted."
The Government's first incomes policy was an ad hoc one announced 
in August 1969 while the UNDP/ILO Experts Mission, led by Professor 
Turner of the University of Cambridge's Department of Applied 
Economics, was studying the issue of wages and prices as requested. 
A temporary wage freeze and a limit of 5 per cent for annual wage 
increases was imposed.18
Government fears were apparently borne out by Turner's report which 
diagnosed the problem as the failure of wage increases to be 
matched by corresponding increases in productivity. He observed, 
for instance, that
"employees (are) usually paid a fixed monthly wage or salary 
without regard to their personal performances and very many 
employees are on lengthy incremental scales by which they 
receive an aromatic annual pay increase simply for getting a 
year older."
In his view.
"any proposal for an improvement in wages or conditions 
should, therefore, be accompanied by concrete, detailed and 
effective proposals to improve efficiency - for instance, by 
adopting satisfactory output standards, eliminating 
absenteeism or exceggive overtime working, reducing waste or 
damage, and so on."
His report recommended that wherever possible simple "payment by 
results", "piece rate" or "incentive" systems should be adopted. 
Specifically, the first Turner Report related wages and wage 
increases to productivity with a maximum of 5 per cent ceiling on 
annual wage increases. Price control was to be established through 
a Prices Board. Similarly, rural incomes were to be increased 
through increased productivity.
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While some observers were critical of Turner's conclusions, 
especially those on productivity, the government was enthusiastic 
about the Report, primarily the recommendation to introduce wages 
and incomes control.21 A National Convention held in Kitwe in 
December 1969 accepted the Report as
"providing (us) with an excellent base from which to start 
when dealing with the difficult job of establishing our 
incomes, wages and prices policy."
President Kaunda was particularly captivated by Turner's contention 
that colonial labour discipline "had broken down and nothing had 
taken its place" and that falling productivity was the source of 
the relative poverty of rural areas. He told the Convention:
"i agree with this view. Almost three years ago, in fact, in 
addressing the National Convention on the Four-Year 
Development Plan .... 1 stated that, 'clearly the only 
lasting solution to this problem .... (of rural-urban 
inequality) must be to raise the level of incomes in the 
rural areas. And this itself can only come about through the 
achievement of higher productivity."
Although the Convention generally welcomed the Report and approved 
incomes guidelines which set a norm of five per cent increase in 
wages and salaries (provided they were matched by increases in 
productivity) , Turner's recommendations on the machinery for the 
implementation of the policy were rejected. His proposal that a 
central agency for wages, prices and productivity to administer 
controls be set up was rejected on "administrative and practical 
grounds." Instead the government approved the establishment of a 
Consumer Prices Board to enforce price controls. A proposed Prices 
and Incomes Commission would (along with an Industrial Relations 
Court to be established) administer wages and incomes guidelines.
There was one notable follow-up to the first Turner Report, the 
appointment of the O'Riordan Commission to report on Public Service 
salaries. The Commission had been given a number of potentially
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far-reaching terms of reference. They included the restricting of 
pay increases within the five per cent policy norm; the need to 
attract people to work in rural areas» the modification of the 
system of housing subsidies» the consideration of Zambian wages in 
relation to those of neighbouring friendly states» and the need to 
establish some relationship between the Civil Service and 
parastatal salary scales.
The report was regarded as disappointing.24 It merely recommended 
increases within the incomes policy norm. No mention was made of 
wage levels in neighbouring countries. Although it recommended 
action to bring conditions in parastatal and local government into 
line with those in central government, no action was taken to 
implement the recommendation.
As for the need to attract civil servants to rural areas, a system 
of national prices for commodities was recoimnended for 
consideration as a means of bringing rural and urban costs of 
living more into line with one another. In response, while the 
government felt,
"some sympathy for public servants serving in rural areas, 
their position is no more difficult than that of the general 
population in those areas. The Government's view is that 
public servants should be required to work at any station in 
Zambia without compensation for the situation existing at 
that station."
In 1970 the Prices Board was set up, but hardly functioned. By 
1972 with the resignation of its chairman, it had become defunct. 
Although provision for the establishment of the Industrial 
Relations Court, with power to approve wage clauses in collective 
agreements in line with government policy, was made under the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971, it was not until 1974 that the 
Court became functional. Even the Court made no attempt to 
exercise its power in that regard until the role was later assumed
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by the new Prices and Incomes Commission established in 1979. The 
major reason for the Court's failure to assume its role as the 
custodian of "the Government's declared policy on Prices and 
Incomes" was partly due to the apparent lack of such a policy.26
By 1975 it was apparent that there was no effective machinery to 
implement Turner's recommendations. No ministerial power to 
enforce the policy as announced in 1969 had been given under 
Statute.27. Although in 1972 the government felt that its wages 
and Incomes policy "continued to be partially observed...."28, by 
1975 the Manakatwe Commission, reporting on Civil Service salaries, 
concluded that Zambia ".... has no Wages and Incomes Policy."29 
The sharply rising cost of living after 1970 made it more difficult 
for employers to resist trade union demands for wage increases.
The five per cent pay norm was, therefore, invariably ignored by 
parties to collective bargaining, including those in the State 
sector.
7.C.2 The Second Turner Report
The second major attempt to devise an effective incomes and prices 
policy was made in 1978 with the Commissioning of the Second Turner 
Report.30 It came amid a rapid decline in the economic prospects 
in the face of the Zambian currency's devaluation, falling copper 
prices, rising inflation and increasing trade union demands for a 
living wage based on an objectively set poverty datum line.31
The terms of reference for Turner's second mission were similar to 
those of his first mission. Emphasis was placed on the need to 
develop an equitable distribution of income, especially the 
reduction of income differentials between urban and rural areas, 
modern and traditional, and manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
The reduction and subsequent control of the rate of price increases
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was also sought. The request for technical assistance also 
specifically referred to the need to take account of the country's 
development objectives, a factor which was merely implied in the 
first request in 1969.
Turner recommended a three-phase approach. The first phase to last 
from May 1978 to July 1979 was to consist of a flat rate increase 
in wages of six kwacha per month which in effect would represent a 
five per cent increase in the national wages bill. That was to be 
followed by the second phase from August 1979 which would allow for 
increments of up to a maximum of 131 kwacha per annum. In addition 
a cost of living component and productivity-oriented increases were 
to be allowed during the phase. During the second phase, studies 
on incomes and prices with a view to determining a national minimum 
wage would be conducted. Phase III would see the introduction of a 
national minimum wage while containing the major components of 
Phase II. Further studies would be undertaken aimed at 
establishing a national earnings structure that would reflect the 
nation's development objectives.
Legislation to establish new institutions to implement these 
measures was also recommended as a matter of urgency. A new Prices 
and Incomes Commission and a Consultative Council on Prices and 
Incomes were to be constituted on a statutory basis. The latter 
was to consist of representatives from the ruling party, the ZCTU 
and the ZFE and other interested groups under the chairmanship of 
the Prime Minister. The Commission would comprise an executive 
board with a full time chairman and two deputies. The Board would 
also have representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Labour, 
Commerce, Industry, the National Commission for Development 
Planning and the Cabinet Office. The Commission was also to 
consist of a full-time professional secretariat of economists, 
statisticians, accountants and other experts in industrial 
relations and law.
200
The comprehensive recommendations for new incomes policy 
institutions were clearly an attempt to address what was thought to 
be the major reason for the failure of the first recommendations, 
the lack of an effective implementation machinery.
The two bodies, the Council and the Commission, would be 
semi-autonomous entities under the office of the Prime Minister.
The Council would meet at least twice a year to review policy and 
receive recommendations and draft annual reports for the 
Comnission. The Commission would assume full executive powers 
which were entrusted to many Government Ministries and other 
agencies relating to wages, salaries and incomes. It would also 
absorb the department of price control. While the power of the 
government to validate collective agreements would remain 
substantially unchanged, the Commission would provide it with 
policy guidelines on incomes and prices policy.
The government accepted the Report as "providing a suitable basis 
for devising medium and long term policies" on incomes and wages. 
The trade unions while welcoming the tripartite elements (they gave 
evidence to the mission of experts and were more closely consulted 
unlike in 1969) especially in the structure of the proposed 
Consultative Council, nevertheless rejected the ceiling placed on 
wage increases as irrational in the face of the escalating cost of 
living.3^
The government went ahead and created the Commission in 1979.
Until the enabling legislation of 1981,33 the Chairman was its 
sole employee and it had no permanent office until 1980.
7.C.3 Institutional and Legal Framework of Incomes Policy
With the Prices and Incomes Commission Act, 1981, the institutional 
and legal framework of the second major attempt at formulating an
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effective incomes policy was established.
The legislation was based on the detailed recommendations of the 
Turner Report in many respects.34 The Commission has wide-ranging 
functions.35 It is charged with formulating and recommending for 
approval of the government, a comprehensive prices and incomes 
policy. Once approved it has to supervise the execution and 
implementation of the policy. It can also recommend, for approval 
of the government, minimum and maximum wage levels and conditions 
of service, and supervise and execute the same once approved. It 
can investigate and report to the government particular cases or 
general issues likely to affect current or future prices and 
incomes policy. It can also determine price levels for any 
controlled goods, services, products or commodities, including 
price levels of agricultural produce and livestock. It supervises 
the administration and implementation of price control. In 
addition to these functions the Minister may direct the Commission 
to do all such things as he deems necessary in order to give effect 
to approved policy on prices and incomes. Contrary to Turner's 
recommendations, the Commission was also given the exclusive power 
to examine and ratify collective agreements, a function earlier 
given to the Industrial Relations Court under the 1971 
legislation.36
Similarly, the provisions relating to the Consultative Council are 
broadly identical to the recommendations in the Report both in 
terms of composition and function. In addition to government 
representatives, those of the unions and employers, the Council 
also consists of nominees of ZIMCO, the nationalised sector's 
holding company, the Zambia Industrial and Commercial Association, 
the Zambia Commercial Farmers' Bureau, the Consumers' Protection 
Association and the Co-operative Federation. The Council's 
principal function is to consider and comment on matters relating 
to prices and incomes policy referred to it by the Commission.
This is apparently significant as the power of initiative is left
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to the Commission. The Council may, however, require the 
Commission to investigate particular cases or general issues likely 
to affect current or future policy. In urgent cases the Council 
can direct the Commission to formulate policy for government 
approval designed to deal with any particular situation.
It is premature to assess the potential of the Commission and the 
Council at this stage, but it is a matter of record that it has so 
far made no appreciable impact on incomes and prices policy.38 
The new regime was really put into effect only by 1986. It 
continues to be short-staffed, particularly of the professional 
staff clearly envisaged as vital to its work by Turner. Its role 
may well be in opposition to IMF requirements for less government 
and public agencies' control over the economy. In the wake of the 
foreign exchange auction system which the Zambian Government was 
compelled to adopt in 1986, the IMF spelt out its hostility to 
price control measures, a key element to the implementation
39machinery as conceived under Turner. Above all, the trade unions 
continue to insist on free collective bargaining until such a time 
as the government can control the cost of living.40 In the absence 
of any comprehensive policy to match wage increases with those of 
prices, it will be difficult to influence wage and price trends in 
the current framework.
7.D Conclusion
It is apparent from the above brief examination of government 
attempts to devise an effective incomes and prices policy that the 
search for such a policy has been part of the strategy of 
incorporation. By seeking to restrain wage increases in line with 
its development goals of closing the gap between urban and rural 
areas, traditional and m o d e m  sectors, and also between high and 
low incomes groups, the government has sought to incorporate labour 
into its economic strategy. The government strategy moreover
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becomes clearer if the restructuring of collecting bargaining and 
regulation by law is taken into account. Taken together the 
regulation of collective bargaining and attempts to impose an 
incomes policy constitute the main economic elements of trade union 
incorporation.
The available evidence, however, suggests that incomes policy as a 
weapon of incorporation, as elsewhere in Africa where it has been 
tried, has so far failed to make a positive impact.41 Government 
policy failed in part because of a discernible lack of balance 
between the desire to control wages and the ability to control 
prices. Government strategies in the 1970's were also largely 
negative due to union opposition to wage control. Take the 
following instances: in 1971 when the Teachers' Union members went 
on strike in pursuit of better wages and conditions, the government 
responded by detaining several of the leaders. Similar measures 
were taken against 15 miners' leaders when they protested against 
the O'Riordan Commission's attempts to equate them to lower paid 
sectors in 1970. Although attempts to incorporate labour have 
fallen short of complete integration attempted in Tanzania, the 
Zambian Government has nevertheless resorted to the incorporation 
of individual union leaders to influence union attitudes.42
It is significant that as early as 1971 the government itself 
acknowledged that:
"from its inception the (incomes) policy was handicapped by 
the non-existence of an effective enforcement machinery, and 
the workers', employers' as well as Government commitment to 
its successful implementation has lacked the fervour and 
enthusiasm with which it can be launched."
In spite of recent attempts culminating in the establishment of the 
Commission, the above observation continues to be largely valid.
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Of all the areas which have been targets of government 
incorporation efforts this has undoubtedly been the most 
problematic. Such attempts as we have seen designed to limit wage 
increases have not been matched by any effective machinery to 
control prices. Recent attempts to use the Commission received a 
set back with the withdrawal of aid by the Swedish International 
Development Agency. The Agency had earlier pledged assistance to 
fund the Commission in its work. That pledge was, however, 
withdrawn when it was discovered that such funding would be used 
for price control.44
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION
8. A Introduction
Among the areas we have identified in this study as being central 
to the Government's strategy of labour incorporation, the 
introduction of workers' participation in the form of works 
councils is the most radical. Whereas incorporation in other areas 
has more or less been channelled through the institutional 
framework of trade unions, the introduction of works councils at 
places of work has been aimed at the incorporation of workers more 
directly from the shop floor. The law relating to works councils 
takes account of trade unions where they exist, as will be apparent 
presently, but it is clear that institutionally organised labour 
has not been as central to incorporation. Government policy has 
been more concerned with the rank and file.
It should be noted from the outset that works councils were not the 
first forms of workers' representation at the work place, nor are 
they the only 'participative arrangements' aimed at influencing 
managerial decisions. Apart from trade union representation, well 
in excess of 50 per cent of the work force, there are several other 
major forums of worker-management consultation and communication. 
Party Committees of the ruling United National Independence Party 
have been the most prominent of the alternative and largely ad hoc 
arrangements. Party Committees mainly act as political watchdogs 
in places of work although there have been many instances of 
intervention in specific grievances in the past. In recent years.
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however, they have tended to be more concerned with "public issue 
disputes", those perceived by the party hierarchy as affecting or 
likely to affect the national interest.1
One other forum is that of works committees which goes as far back 
as the early 1950's. Works committees were the precursor to works 
councils introduced as they were as forums through which employers 
and workers could discuss issues of common interest. They are 
today mostly concerned with works rules and procedures.2
Another forum, that of boardroom representations through the ZCTU 
along the lines of the Bullock recommendations, was introduced in 
1983. President Kaunda announced that in order to "expedite the 
implementation of workers' participation through the management of 
economic crisis", the government had decided to appoint ZCTU 
representatives to the ZIMCO main board and those of its 
subsidiaries.3 This form of workers' participation was a 
relatively brief experience. By the end of 1986 the ZCTU had 
decided to withdraw from the scheme. They felt that unions' 
representation on the board placed an unacceptable burden of 
accountability on the shoulders of trade union leaders without a 
corresponding capacity to really influence decisions, particularly 
those with serious economic implications for working people.4
We are concerned in this study with works councils as part of the 
trade union incorporation strategy. Works Councils have been 
viewed as the main vehicle for putting into practice in the 
industrial sphere Zambia's political philosophy of "participatory 
democracy".5 In terms of development objectives works councils 
have provided the "productionist" element of incorporation, seeking 
to provide an effective mechanism for incorporating workers in 
undertakings and increase productivity. Works councils differ from 
the other forms of consultation in that not only have they been 
legislated for, but also because they are a relatively more 
comprehensive form of workers' representation. Except for trade 
unions, the other forms of workers' representation at places of
211
work are not statutory and where they co-exist with works councils, 
they are invariably more ad hoc in the way they operate.6
The Provisions relating to works councils are contained in Part VII 
of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. It will be recalled that 
most of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, came 
into force in 1974, Part VII was delayed for another two years, 
coming into force only in May 1976. There then followed an 
introductory phase which lasted until the end of 1977 during which 
unions, workers and management were instructed as to their duties 
and rights in workers' participation. The first works councils did 
not, therefore, come into operation until the beginning of 1978.
By the end of 1984, however, well over 200 works councils had been 
formed in as many firms in all the major sectors of the economy.
The majority are in the public sector which, following successive 
nationalisation in the 1970's, is far bigger than the private 
sector. Many large private companies however, including 
multinationals, do have active works councils.
In this Chapter we examine the nature and scope of the legal 
provisions relating to works councils and how they have operated to 
date. It is not our intention to provide an exhaustive discussion 
of workers' participation and its theoretical underpinnings. There 
is a wealth of literature analysing various approaches to
industrial democracy and various experiences, particularly those of 
8developing countries. In Zambia, workers' participation has since 
its introduction received a lot of attention from scholars and
9
commentators. In addition to our own field work , we have taken 
account of a number of reports, research and case studies in 
assessing the impact of works councils (see Appendix V).10 Our 
main concern here, however, is to analyse the practical impact of 
works councils in the light of the policy of incorporation.
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8.B Historical Perspectives
The idea of workers' participation in Zambia can be traced as far 
back as the early 1950's. At the height of the nationalist 
movement's struggle for independence vague ideas about industrial 
democracy were often mentioned as part of the anticipated platform 
of post-independence reforms. At that stage it was probably more 
of a ploy to augment African miners' support, particularly during 
the struggle against the introduction of the British Central 
African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the Colonial Office 
in 1953. The idea re-emerged after independence during a period 
characterised by both a high frequency of unofficial strikes and 
seme major nationwide stoppages. As we have noted in Chapter 
Six, the precise factors that gave rise to heightened industrial 
conflict during the immediate post-independence period have been a 
matter of considerable debate. There is little doubt, however, 
that increased industrial conflict occurred against a background of
high expectations among workers prompted by the attainment of 
. . . 12 independence.
The Government's response, mainly based on presidential initiative, 
was the start of what we have identified as the strategy of 
incorporation. This as we have seen, began with the appointment of 
a number of key trade union leaders to government posts. It was 
followed by presidential initiatives in negotiating for radical 
changes in industrial relations such as joint Industrial Councils 
outside the mining industry. Presidential initiative has been most 
apparent in the case of workers' participation. The Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971 in general and the provision on works councils 
in particular, were worked out by presidential advisers and only at 
a very advanced stage were they referred to the parliamentary 
draftsman. Neither the Cabinet nor the Ministry of Labour was 
involved in any significant way. Moreover, unlike other parts of 
the Act, the administration of provisions on works councils was 
made the responsibility of the Department of Industrial 
Participatory Democracy created in 1975, and initially within the 
President's Office.14 The power to enact subsidiary legislation
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concerning the operation of works councils was similarly given to 
the President whereas the responsibility to frame statutory 
instruments for the rest of the Act, was vested in the Minister of 
Labour in accordance with the usual practice.15 Workers' 
participation has, therefore, been regarded by the President as a 
key aspect of the incorporation strategy.
Incorporation of individual trade union leaders into government was 
later followed by a programme of seminars and conventions designed 
to pave the way for a radical labour code and an incomes policy. 
Some of the forums are now a matter of national record. They 
included the Livingstone Labour Conference of 1967, and the Kitwe 
National Conventions of 1967 and 1969. The government also 
turned to the International Labour Office to boost its case, in 
particular in support of the view that economic necessity demanded 
a programme of high productivity, of which workers* participation 
was seen as a key element, and an effective incomes and prices 
policy. As we have seen in Chapter Seven, the Turner reports and 
the two Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa (JASPA) reports of 
1975 and 1981 were clear attempts to utilise the ILO's authority in 
support of the Government's arguments.
The first concrete step towards the introduction of workers' 
participation in Zambia was taken at the 1967 Tripartite Labour 
Conference in Livingstone where it was resolved to set up works 
councils and strengthen works committees where they already 
existed. The President later outlined the guidelines for the 
establishment of works councils at the Second National Convention 
in Kitwe in December 1969. At that stage he was more concerned 
with the philosophical and moral considerations which had prompted 
the government to think of a radical change in the country's entire 
labour legislation. He characterised the Government's intention as 
an attempt to transform the social structure of Zambian industry. 
Workers' participation was to be a key feature of structural 
changes that would attack traditional management prerogatives and 
other aspects of the industrial relations system as it existed.
The President's vision was to change managerial leadership in
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economic tasks to the role similar to that played by the hallowed 
Zambian traditional institution of the village headman. It was to 
be a search for shop floor relations similar to village consensus 
and participation in the making of decisions, a form of the 
"African palaver."17
The reaction to the proposals from the business community was 
predictable. Business managers had great misgivings about any 
workers' representation outside the existing framework of 
collective bargaining, considered by some of them as disruptive 
enough already.18 In contrast, the response of workers was 
generally enthusiastic, welcoming any changes that would 
potentially increase their say and, therefore, their power on the 
shop-floor. While publicly welcoming the proposals, trade union 
leaders were privately more ambivalent and cautious. They were 
suspicious of any designs that might encroach upon and weaken the 
19unions' institutional power.
It has been suggested that employers, particularly the powerful 
Commercial Farmers' lobby, were more hostile to the proposals when 
it was discovered that the intention initially was to introduce 
works councils more on the lines of the Yugoslav type workers'
20self-management than that of Western countries. As a result, as 
Quemby has asserted, what subsequently emerged had less resemblance 
to the early designs in both form and content. The Bill's 
provisions on works councils were definitely closer to the West 
German system of Co-determination than the Yugoslav self-management 
model.21 The business community's suspicions had earlier been 
heightened by the tone of the President in outlining the proposals 
at the Second National Convention:
"The purpose of the Works Councils will be to provide 
machinery within the undertaking for the participation of the 
workers in management decisions. In certain clearly defined 
areas, which have been traditionally regarded as so-called 
'management prerogatives' decisions will„only be taken with 
the participation of the Works Councils"22 (emphasis given)
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The business community's reaction was clearly not lost on the 
government. Introducing the Bill in the National Assembly, the 
Minister of Labour gave assurances that there would be no attempt 
to sweep away the traditional structure of industrial management:
"Some people have gone to the extent of labelling the idea as 
Communist-inspired. I do not accept this line of thinking 
which is so obviously based on a misunderstanding. We are 
not establishing workers' councils, but works councils ... 
there is no intention to punish anyone, there is no intention 
to grab J^e power of management and place it in the hands of 
workers. (emphasis given)
In spite of government assurances, misgivings persisted which were 
said to be largely responsible for the delay in the implementation 
of the legislation when it was enacted.24 As we have indicated 
above, provisions relating to works councils were delayed a further 
two years and did not come into force until 1976.23 When they came 
into operation ministers gave the impression they did so on an 
experimental basis. The President's office consequently supervised 
their implementation at the beginning.
8.C Institutional and Legislative Framework of Workers' 
Participation
There are two elements that form the framework of Zambian workers' 
participation. One is institutional and the other legislative.
The main institutional framework for the implementation of workers’ 
participation is provided by the Department of Industrial 
Participatory democracy. The department, initially part of the 
President's Office, reflecting presidential initiative which was 
instrumental in the introduction of workers' participation, was 
later transferred to the Prime Minister's Office. Then in 1985, it 
was made part of the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. As we 
shall presently suggest, the latter change is not without 
significance for the department’s role in the implementation of 
workers' participation.
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The department was given a number of tasks to ensure the 
introduction and then the progressive development of works 
councils. was bo draw up a programme of work which initially
involved the selection of a few firms on an experimental basis. It 
was also charged with the task of carrying out "research on the 
economics of participatory democracy" and comparative study of 
industrial democracy schemes in other countries. The latter 
fesulted in extensive study tours of Yugoslavia and West Germany 
between 1975 and 1976.
After the initial setting up of works councils, the department was 
bo constantly review the programme and make recommendations from 
time to time on how to improve the effectiveness of works councils, 
including recommendations for appropriate changes in the law. It 
*lso has the task of monitoring the work of individual councils to 
ensure that they are run in accordance with the ruling party's 
Philosophy of Zambian Humanism. The department is also responsible 
for continuing education to inform workers and the public at large 
■bout the objectives of workers' participation.
The extent to which the department has been effective in carrying 
out these tasks is unclear. The department itself has admitted 
that there have been unusual difficulties in its work, not least 
the problem of credibility.26 one of the greatest problems has 
been the lack of understanding by the majority of workers and the 
Public of the concept of industrial democracy, a problem which the 
department has said is due to insufficient national education.27
^ e  legislative framework i8, as we have indicated above, set out 
Part VIII of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. We now proceed 
bo outline some of the main features of the regime.
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8.C.1 Formation and Composition of Works Councils
The Act requires the setting up of works councils in every 
undertaking employing more than one hundred permanent employees.28 
It was originally envisaged that this figure would be at least as 
low as twenty-five.29 It has been speculated that the modification 
was due to the intention to establish works councils on an 
experimental basis and also due to intense pressure from the 
agricultural lobby who wished to be excluded from the provisions of 
the Act.30
Although the provisions of the Act are applicable to both 
commercial and public undertakings, including local authorities, 
the President has the power to exempt any undertakings or class of 
employees from the operation of all or any part of Part VII.31 
Although the power of exemption has been used sparingly (to date 
only the Army, the Police, certain government departments and 
domestic servants, are exempt), the requirement that only the 
category of the term "eligible employees" qualify to participate in 
works councils has severely limited the scope of works councils.
As defined in Section 3 of the Act "eligible employee" excludes 
those serving a trial period, casual or seasonal employees, the 
latter is a common feature of agricultural work. Members of 
management are also excluded. The latest records available show 
that there are 360,500 people in wage employment spread across 
about nine major industries. Of these about 34,820 are employed in 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. About 25 per cent 
(8,705) of those employed in agriculture and related sectors are 
seasonal workers. Roughly 10 per cent of wage earners are domestic 
servants. Another 27,345 are in the Army, the Police, management 
and other categories excluded from the effect of the provisions on 
works councils. Taking the undertakings that employ less than one 
hundred workers into account the exclusion of certain categories of 
employees has in practice, therefore, meant that 20 per cent 
(72,100) of the country's wage labour force is outside the scope of 
the provisions on works councils.
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The formation of works councils is preceded by that of working 
parties comprising of four representatives each of both management 
and workers. The working party's first major task is to classify 
employees into management and eligible categories. They also set 
the size of the council (which must be between 3 and 15, but most 
are in fact between 12 and 15 as they tend to be formed in larger 
firms), receive nominations and conduct the first elections by 
secret ballot. The councils consist of two-thirds workers and 
one-third management. Whereas worker representatives are elected, 
those of management are appointed by senior management. Candidates 
and electors have to be eligible employees.
Councils draw up their own rules and elect their own officers.
They are required to report to a general meeting of eligible 
employees only once a year. It has been frequently observed that 
such reporting is not frequent enough to maintain effective 
communication between councils and workers they represent. In our 
research we did find, however, that union meetings and those of 
other institutions at the work place are usually taken advantage of 
to report on councils' work.
8.C.2 Objectives and Powers
The Act states that there are two main objectives of works 
councils:
" (a) to promote and maintain the effective participation of 
workers in the affairs of the undertaking;
(b) to secure the mutual co-operation of workers,
management and trade unions in the undertaking in the 
interest of industrial peace, improved working 
conditions, greater efficiency and productivity." 
(emphasis given)
The Act attempts to achieve the above objectives by giving three 
types of powers to works councils. Firstly, there are issues over 
which councils have a power of veto. Secondly, there are issues
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over which councils must be consulted by management and, thirdly, 
there are those over which councils can only be informed after 
decisions have been taken.
The veto powers set out in Section 72 require councils to approve 
management decisions on "matter(s) of policy in the field of 
personnel management and industrial relations." This category 
includes decisions concerning recruitment, assessment of salaries, 
transfers between undertakings owned by the same employer, and 
employees' safety at work.
Three observations can be briefly made concerning the veto power. 
What amounts to policy or not has not always been easy to 
determine.34 It is notable that some of the subjects in this 
category are traditionally those of collective bargaining. They 
raise the potential of conflict between councils and unions where 
they exist together. It is, therefore, significant that most of 
the works councillors interviewed in our Survey claimed there had 
been no notable conflict in this area. That could be partly 
explained by the fact that in many sectors where councils have been 
set up, trade unions tended to be already well established and most 
councillors to be "union people". In such sectors it is not 
unusual for workers to serve in several capacities as works 
councillors, shop stewards and members of works committees. Many 
councillors and unionists, therefore, tend to see their work as 
complementary.
At least one critic has asserted that the wording of the provision 
relating to the councils' veto places the initiative in the hands 
of management.36 Almost invariably, managements make decisions 
leaving councils either to approve or veto them. The danger in the 
context of workshop relations is obvious. Works councillors in 
their desire to be co-operative and win management's confidence may 
appear to be too acquiescent to the rank and file. On the other 
hand, where they wish to be assertive they may appear obstructive 
in exercising the power of veto. Management's tendency to take the 
initiative was clearly apparent in the leading case in this area
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concerning a disputed transfer which came before the Industrial 
Relations Court. Although the case was decided on different 
grounds (veto powers were not operative during the first year of 
the life of the works councils),38 the management's initiative in 
the first place gave them the upper hand.
The second category of councils' powers provides them with the 
right to be consulted about medical facilities for workers, housing 
and pension schemes and such amenities as canteens and recreational 
facilities. It is notable that decisions in this area usually 
involve financial expenditure on the part of the undertaking. At 
best councils are, therefore, in practice confined to giving 
suggestions to management concerning welfare facilities of the
employees. Management are not obliged to act on these 
39suggestions. This is also an area prone to demarcation disputes 
with unions should councils choose to be more vocal when 
. 40consulted.
The third category of the right to information for councils 
reveals the true nature of the incorporation strategy in general.
In many of his pronouncements. President Kaunda has emphasised his 
vision of a humanist "man-centred society" in which the worker 
would play a key role in participating in decision-making, 
particularly economic decisions that determine his standard of 
living. Coupled with the policy of decentralisation in economic 
planning (a matter which has received equally strong emphasis in 
recent years41) it could be thought that the area of "investment 
policy, financial control, distribution of profits, economic 
planning, job evaluation, wages policy and the appointment of 
senior management" would have been a key one vis-a-vis 
participation rights. Instead, Section 71 merely gives councils 
the right to be "informed forthwith". It can, therefore, be 
argued, that the Government's intention was not to give workers any 
real power through participation, but merely the appearance of 
involvement in decision-making.
In addition to these three powers, the Act provides councils with a 
"watchdog" function. Under Section 74 councils are required to
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inform management at once if there is any reason to believe that 
management has contravened the Act or any other written law, a 
collective agreement, works agreement or works rule in any way.
Once informed, management must investigate the alleged 
contravention and remedy any errors. Where a particular council is 
not satisfied as to the remedial action taken, it must report the 
matter to the trade union, if it exists, which has to negotiate a 
settlement with management. Where no trade union exists, or a 
settlement cannot be reached, the matter goes to the Industrial 
Relations Court, which as in other matters under the Act, gives a 
final and binding decision. On the face of it, this provision is 
intended to avoid the alienation of trade unions as during the 
formation of the council when unions have the power to approve or 
disapprove candidates for council elections. The provision further 
requires the union to give its reasons in writing where it rejects 
a candidate's nomination. The aggrieved candidate has the right of 
appeal to the Industrial Relations Court. The aim of the 
provision appears to be to involve union participation at a 
superficial level.
The councils' duty to act as watchdogs is liable to be rendered 
meaningless in practice by the secrecy provision, however.43 
Council deliberations, in particular information concerning the 
"financial affairs of any undertaking or any manufacturing or 
commercial secrets or working processes thereof" acquired by 
councillors must not be divulged to outsiders. Worker councillors 
are, therefore, prevented from consulting outside experts to assist 
in interpreting the information given by management. The 
importance of outside expertise for effective participation is of 
paramount importance in a situation where the general level of 
education of most councillors is grossly inadequate.44 Besides, 
the obligation relating to secrecy as defined under Section 76, 
seems to be too broad. As Weiss has pointed out, almost all 
information in an enterprise is more or less related to financial 
matters. The borderline between information to be disclosed and 
that to be kept secret does not seem sufficiently clear. That this 
area is prone to conflict was apparent from our survey.
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Many councillors interviewed tended to treat all aspects of 
councils' work as confidential. They, therefore, usually 
sought assurances from the outset that they would remain 
anonymous. Almost all those interviewed, including members 
of management, did not seem certain as to what constituted 
information for disclosure and that of a confidential 
nature.
8.D The Impact of Workers' Participation
Any attempt to make an assessment of how works councils have fared 
in practice and, therefore, to judge the success or failure of this 
aspect of the Government's policy of incorporation has to be a 
cautious one. In spite of the fact that this area of the 
incorporation strategy has attracted most attention, works councils 
have been in operation for less than ten years. Compared to other 
institutions under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, councils 
have had a shorter life. The brevity of the experience of workers' 
participation cannot be overemphasised. Compared to other 
countries' experience the Zambian experience is too recent to 
provide a basis of any firm conclusions. The experience is still 
at an early evolutionary stage.
In spite of the short time that works councils have existed 
however, there is enough material to enable us to make a tentative 
assessment of the experience as part of the incorporation 
strategy.47 The assessment is best made by examining the parties 
and other institutions' reaction to the arrangements. In the 
following pages we briefly examine the attitudes of workers, 
councillors, trade unions, employers and business community and 
government officials. From these we conclude what the impact of 
the experience has been to date and its significance for the 
general policy of labour incorporation. We first proceed, however, 
by looking at one major structural limitation in the form of 
another law, company law.48
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8.D.1 Company Law and Workers' Participation
Company law in Zambia has tended to place a structural limitation 
on the scope of works councils in practice. Current company law on 
which business management ultimately rests provides for the 
internal rules of the firm to be framed in a manner considered to 
be in the best interest of investors, and owners of capital. Those 
rules do not take account of workers as representatives of company 
interests except as labour contractors. As a mere factor in the 
production process, workers' interests are not necessarily 
compatible to those of investors in the present company law 
arrangements.
The restrictions imposed by capital ownership are as basically true 
for private firms as for state business organisations. In spite of 
the economic reforms of the late 1960's and early 1970's that 
extended public ownership through nationalisation, most state-owned 
enterprises are still joint-stock companies, not only with powerful 
minority share-holders, but also increasingly charged to operate on 
strict business lines. With the progressive removal of state 
subsidies due to the current economic decline and the IMF's 
economic management supervision, the 'business factor' in 
management is stronger than ever.
Private management methods apart. Company law itself is more 
outdated than is generally realised. As one learned critic rightly 
observed:
"The Companies Act, a verbatim copy of the English Companies 
Act of 1908 (the hey-day of laissez-faire capitalism) has 
not, since it was made law in Zambia by the British South 
Africa Conçany (who first ruled Zambia under a Royal ..
Charter).—  been consolidated or amended substantially."
The President himself has long been aware of the situation. In 
1969 he said steps were being taken to amend the Act in order to 
establish the legal right of workers to representation. He
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acknowledged, however, that it was a complicated process and that 
amendment would take some time.50
In spite of the earlier intention, no changes have so far been 
accomplished. A committee was set up to review the structure of a 
company, but because of strong opposition from the legal profession 
and the business community, and the absence of the necessary 
expertise in the Attorney-General's chambers, nothing came out of 
it. The only real attempt to change the status quo, mainly due to 
unions' pressure, was the announcement in January 1983, that major 
state companies would have union representatives on their boards. 
There is no evidence that union representation on the board, during 
the time it lasted, made any significant difference.51
8.D.2 Workers' Attitudes
There seems little doubt from the institutional structure of 
workers' participation as we have set it out above, that the 
intention of the government was to appeal to workers beyond formal 
union organisation and thereby incorporate them directly. Workers' 
attitudes and reactions to the works councils' experience is, 
therefore, a crucial factor in assessing the impact of government 
policy.
The workers themselves were initially enthusiastic about the 
introduction of works councils.52 This enthusiasm was largely 
based on the expectation that councils would provide a more 
effective channel (where unions were not as effective) or the only 
channel for workers collectively to express their grievances,
(where unions were not acting as formal representatives). Workers 
hoped that works councils would lead to better wages and conditions 
of work. Indications are now that they have been generally 
disappointed by what they see as the negligible achievements of the 
system. Although most are still supportive of works councils and
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generally see them as making efforts on their behalf, they complain 
of the inadequacy of communication with them.53 In some instances, 
notably among miners, workers feel their unions were generally more 
representative of their aspirations. Unions were seen as making 
genuine attempts to obtain workers' views and to keep them informed 
of developments.54
It seems clear from the studies so far conducted that workers tend 
to view councils as having the same role as that of unions and to 
measure their accomplishments by the same yardstick. They perceive 
no change in management attitudes and are apparently no more 
attached to their undertakings on account of the works council's 
role. On the contrary, a considerable number of workers tended to 
regard councils as not accountable to them and, therefore, more 
susceptible to manipulation by management.55
8.D.3 Works Councillors' Attitudes
Although most councillors felt participation had not achieved as 
much as they had hoped for, they were less critical of the 
experience. Many felt the experience was still evolving and it 
was, therefore, too early to make any conclusive judgement.56
There were marked differences in attitudes between councillors in 
the public sector and those in private firms (also between smaller 
and larger undertakings), especially over allegations of 
victimisation and managements obstruction in the course of their 
. 57 work.
Similarly, councillors' attitudes towards jurisdictional conflicts 
with other institutions such as unions and party committees also 
depended on whether the same councillors also served in the other
v. ^  58bodies.
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A limited number felt that as councillors they had become more 
appreciative of their firms' problems from discussions with 
management and the information furnished by them. Others felt 
communication with the rank and file was hindered by the veil of 
secrecy under Section 76.60 Although most councillors felt they 
had made some contribution to the welfare of their undertakings and 
fellow workers, few saw themselves as decisive factors in 
management decisions.60
Although many councillors appeared to gloss over the issue of 
whether they appreciated the more complex problems discussed in 
council meetings, it was found that the level of education of many 
councillors was such that it affected their participation. Many 
were inadequately literate in English to make any effective
contributions to councils' deliberations which are conducted in 
61English. This was in spite of the fact that most councillors 
tended to be the more educated workers and more ambitious for 
upward mobility in their work.
8.D.4 Trade Union Perceptions
Although trade unionists have always publicly welcomed workers 
participation in principle, they have nevertheless been suspicious 
of government intentions. Congress leaders in particular have 
barely disguised their hostility to what they see as attempts on 
the part of the government to alienate the rank and file from the 
labour leadership through various policies. A number of national 
union leaders now tend to take the ZCTU's position that workers' 
participation on its own is rather irrelevant unless it is 
conceived within a framework that gives the labour movement the 
right to participate effectively in the formulation of the overall 
economic and social policy of the country at large. This is the 
attitude that before 1983 persuaded the ZCTU to seek boardroom 
representation in preference to works councils.63
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Many unionists polled, including those at the branch level, were 
suspicious of councils' jurisdiction.64 Although earlier fears of 
conflicts between works councils and local union officials have not 
been justified generally, the suspicion has not disappeared.
Unions' suspicions seemed to be encouraged by ILO reservations, 
especially those of the Workers' Relations Department, that see 
current arrangements as tending to weaken tripartite structures at 
the national, industrial and shop-floor levels.66
Many branch union officials are nevertheless members of works 
councils in the firms they work for. Not surprisingly such 
unionists tended to see councils as complementary to the unions' 
traditional role as "the extended arm of trade unions", as 
Kahn-Freund once put it. Although some disputes between works 
councils and union branches have been reported,6 these tended to 
arise out of lack of information concerning their respective 
jurisdictions. In some cases successful efforts have been made to 
co-ordinate the various organisations' activities.67
8.D.5 Employers' and Business Community's Attitudes
As in the case of workers, our research and some other studies 
sought to assess the attitudes of various groups among employers 
and the business community towards workers' participation and works 
councils in particular. Some of the major groups thus investigated 
included the Zambian Federation of Employers, (the ZFE), (the main 
employers' organisation), the Zambian Industrial and Commercial 
Organisation (the main representative of the business community at 
large), the Commercial Farmers Union and individual managers both 
from the public and private sectors.
At the time the councils were introduced the majority of employers, 
especially large firms and multinationals, did accept the measure 
of participation that the Act would bring in spite of their
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misgivings.68 This attitude was in part due to the fact that they 
had been influential in watering down the proposals from the 
Yugoslav type structure earlier conceived by presidential advisers 
to that closer to the West German model of co-determination.69
Soon after the provisions on works councils came into force in May 
1976, they were followed in December 1977 with a Presidential 
Commission on Equity Participation, to consider workers' equity 
participation. Although the report of the Commission has never 
been published, it is known that it met with concerted opposition 
from all sections of the employers and business community.70 
Although it is thought that the Commission cautiously recommended 
worker equity participation as long as it gave no managerial 
rights, the attempt to extend workers participation through the 
granting of equity to employees served to rally the support of the 
business community towards what were perceived as more moderate 
works council provisions. Thus in general there has been a 
widespread acceptance of a more guarded development of works 
councils.
The farmers' lobby continues to be adamant that the time is not yet 
ripe for workers' participation in the agricultural sector. In 
their submission to the Equity Commission, the Farmers' Employers' 
Association contended:
"The majority of workers in the agricultural industry are not 
disciplined. The industry should be allowed to organise 
itself better, raise productivity to feed the nation and 
produce surplus for export before it can afford to raise 
wages and introduce bonuses and lastly participation."
The fanners' opposition to any form of workers' participation was 
more of an exception than the general rule. Most managers have 
been re-assuring to investors both as regards the security of 
capital and profits. This does not, however, indicate that works 
councils in their present form have been accepted by the employers 
and business community in every aspect. Weiss, for instance.
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reported that in some cases management in both private and public 
sectors were still less positive towards councils. In certain 
instances management did not accept councillors as legitimate 
representatives of employees.72 The private attitudes within the 
ZFE circles were particularly striking. In public the organisation 
was very supportive of councils urging their members to co-operate 
fully. In private, however, the ZFE is known to regard councils 
more as an experiment than a permanent institution of the Zambian 
industrial relations system. They have expressed serious concern 
as to the negative effect some councils are said to have on 
tripartite structures and collective bargaining.73
The employers' and business community also have significant 
reservations about this aspect of incorporation. In other aspects 
of the incorporation strategy they have been enthusiastic about 
attempts to reform the system. Although management in the public 
sector tend to have fewer reservations, (indirectly at the 
insistence of ministers), it is significant that seme, especially 
those in manufacturing are not enthusiastic.74
8.D.6 Attitudes within the Government
Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Services claims works 
councils have "contributed significantly in the maintenance of 
industrial tranquility", it also acknowledges that "for various 
reasons (some) employers continued to thwart the effectiveness of 
councils and in some incidents arbitrarily interfered with the 
smooth functioning of councils."75 Similarly, as we have seen 
above, the Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy has 
admitted that the implementation of the workers' participation 
programme has not been without difficulties.76 In spite of the 
absence of any details from the government about the exact extent 
of works councils' contribution to its industrial relations policy, 
it seems clear that not all objectives have been accomplished.
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Moreover, there seem to be doubts within the government, if not 
about the idea of workers' participation itself, about its 
structure. One of the most striking findings of our research was 
the lack of a uniform response to works councils within the 
government itself. The Ministry of Labour resented the fact that 
proposals concerning the councils were worked out by presidential 
advisers with little consultation with the Ministry. The matter 
was further aggravated by the creation of a separate department, 
firstly in the office of the President and later in the office of 
the Prime Minister to implement the programme. Ministry officials 
have always regarded the department's personnel as "political 
amateurs" who know little about industrial relations. They have 
tended to be sympathetic to ZFE and ZCTU reservations and 
suspicions, particularly the claim that councils have tended to 
meddle in issues best left to collective bargaining.
Similarly, the Attorney-General's chambers which was also excluded 
from the framing of the legislation until the last moment has also 
looked down upon works councils provisions as rather extra-legal, 
more part of the political agenda than law. It is thought, for 
instance, that the department was reluctant to defend the 
Industrial Relations Court's position as part of the legal system 
in the case we have discussed in Chapter Six.77
Some presidential advisers and the Department of Industrial 
Participatory Democracy on the other hand have long regarded the 
present form of works councils as a transition towards fuller 
workers' participation. They continue to press for more 
fundamental changes in other laws, including company law to allow 
for a more effective form of workers' participation. To this end 
the Department has drafted several bills designed to widen the 
scope of works councils.78 The Department is also known to lean 
towards Grozdanic's approach based on the Yugoslav model rather 
than Weiss' West German model. It is significant that Grozdanic
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has undertaken pilot projects on works councils in several firms
designed to serve as a springboard for a wider scope of the 
. 79system.
The fact that the Ministry managed to take over the running of the 
Department from the Prime Minister's Office in 198580 may well 
prove to be important in shaping the direction of workers' 
participation in the future.
8.E Conclusion;
Workers' participation through works councils has been a central 
feature of the state's strategy of labour incorporation 
particularly in the efforts to raise productivity and appeal to 
working people directly. Yet, in trying to assess the success or 
otherwise of government policy in this area, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that workers participation is a relatively new 
experience. In spite of that fact that this area of incorporation 
has received more attention from scholars and commentators than any 
other, its full parameters are still not completely defined. This 
latter point has been repeatedly emphasised in several official 
reviews of the system, including those of the ILO. The same view 
is further implied by the Government's desire to improve the 
effectiveness of workers' participation by looking closely at other 
experiences.
At best, therefore, any assessment at this stage can only be a 
tentative one. However, from the instances and materials examined, 
and other sources consulted, it is possible to advance a general 
view of the experience. There is little doubt that the 
introduction of works councils, particularly to non-unionised 
sectors opened up new channels of communication between management 
and the shop floor. It is the opening up and widening of the scope
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of existing channels that may well have a more positive effect on 
Zambian industrial relations in the long run.
There is, however, no evidence at this stage that there has been 
any dramatic change in the attitudes of workers. At best works 
councils have been welcome as a forum (in some firms the only 
forum) for addressing grievances collectively. The trade union 
leadership for their part, continue to be suspicious of government 
intentions in introducing works councils. Workers' participation, 
while being accepted in principle, has neither exerted any further 
control on unions nor persuaded them of the need to have a 
completely identical view of industrial relations with that of the 
state. Indeed the most significant finding of our research was 
that all the three groups of workers involved, shop floor workers, 
worker councillors and trade union officials refuse to give up 
their autonomy in favour of wholesale support of government labour 
policy or management objectives. While subscribing to a vague 
broad identity of interests between government policy and their 
aspirations, incorporation at the expense of autonomy such as 
conceived by the state has been rejected.
Similarly, there is no indication that management and the business 
community regard works councils as having improved relations with 
the shop-floor. The business community in general continues to be 
cautious and even sceptical about workers' participation. Above 
all, there is no evidence that the major objectives of increased 
productivity and the lessening of industrial conflict have been 
attained as a result of workers' participation.
In short, there has been no re-alignment of forces and attitudes in 
keeping with the state's design of labour incorporation.
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CHAPTER NINE
TRADE UNION INCORPORATION IN ZAMBIA: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.A Trade Union Incorporation Through Law
This thesis has been primarily concerned with an analysis of the 
use of law in the development of labour policy in post-colonial 
Zambia. From its inception the Zambian state perceived labour, 
particularly organised labour, as a strategic factor in its 
development policy. It, therefore, set out to devise ways and 
means of incorporating labour to enhance its development objectives 
and chose labour legislation, particularly the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971, as a key instrument in the Government's strategy.
As we noted in Chapter One, our analytical approach in this study 
has been influenced by two broad traditions of legal scholarship 
that recognise the importance of contextual non-legal factors. As 
in many other developing countries of the Third World, the policy 
of incorporation in Zambia was an attempt to use law in support of 
development objectives. Problems of development clearly influenced 
the perception of the role of legislation. There is little doubt 
the state was ready to use legislation as an instrument to 
legitimate state policy. Law was not regarded "as an institution 
apart from or above other social phenomena"1. On the contrary, as 
we suggested at the beginning of this study, it was assumed that 
the law was less autonomous in an essentially 'volatile' developing 
polity. In Zambia, as in other developing countries, the law has 
been only one factor interwoven with other factors in a wider 
social and economic fabric. In particular, the law has been used
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as part of the State's response to the economic imperatives of 
development.
As is apparent from the preceding chapters, labour legislation in
Zambia has been used both for the roles of "reform" and for that of
2"restriction". It can be said, on the one hand, that the 
enactment of protective legislation during the first phase of 
incorporation attempts (Chapter Four) and the provisions conferring 
recognition and collective bargaining rights on trade unions 
(Chapter Five) amounted to reform as they created new rights for 
workers and trade unions. Similarly, the provisions on workers' 
participation that we have examined in Chapter Eight can also be 
seen in this light. On the other hand, the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971's provisions on industrial conflict and dispute 
settlement procedures (Chapter Six), and the prices and incomes 
legislation (Chapter Seven) are essentially restrictive in 
character as they limit trade unions' and employers' freedom of 
action. These roles are essentially a continuation of labour 
policy during colonial times. As we have seen in Chapter Three, 
African trade unions were essentially a creation of the statute, 
unlike their British counterparts. In that respect the enactment 
of the 1949 trade unions and industrial conciliation legislation 
which gave African workers the right to organise trade unions and 
bargain collectively clearly amounted to reform. In contrast, the 
legislative changes of the late 1950's mainly due to bad industrial 
relations on the Copperbelt, an unfavourable economic climate and 
the subsequent demands for changes (PP 99 et seq) were restrictive. 
The development of trade unions and the attainment of the measure 
of autonomy they had at independence owed as much to the law as to 
their struggle against economic and social injustice. The 
Post-Colonial State, therefore, merely adapted past techniques to a 
different set of economic imperatives.
It is true that under the colonial regime the European experience, 
particularly British experience, was a major source of policy 
initiatives. Moreover there was further European influence on the 
Zambian decision to attempt incorporation through law. The 
underlying principles of the Zambian legislation of 1971 also
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appear to have been influenced by the Heath Government's Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971. To a certain extent, therefore, the Zambian 
experience has been an attempt to "impose the law" in similar ways 
as chronicled by leading commentators on the British experience 
between 1971 - 74.3 It is significant that the Chief Parliamentary 
draftsman of the Zambian legislation, Leo Barron, was clearly 
attracted to the principles enshrined in the English Act. He was 
very interested in modifying those principles for effective use 
suitable for a developing country.4
In spite of the obvious European origins of Zambian policy, 
however, it would be wrong to consider it merely as a crude attempt 
at institutional transfer and adaptation. The Zambian experience 
is more of an African experience, a response to the problems of an 
emergent state in search of development. It is for this reason 
that we have avoided any over-simplistic comparison with European 
developments and the European debate on Corporatism.
In this concluding Chapter we first look at the effects of the 
incorporation strategy in key areas. We then consider the 
limitations of and constraints in the use of law to attain 
incorporation objectives and the proposed abandonment of the 
strategy.
9.B The Effects of Incorporation
We can summarise the effects of the incorporation strategy under 
four headings: its impact on trade unions, the restructuring of 
collective bargaining (including incomes policy), industrial 
conflict and workers' participation. We briefly consider each in 
turn in the following pages.
9.B.1 Trade Unions and Incorporation
Ultimately the success or failure of government policy in Zambia 
depends on organised labour's response to it. Trade unionism in 
Zambia grew, in part at least, from demands for a measure of
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autonomy at places of work.6 By Independence, workers' autonomy 
had emerged as an Integral part of the country's industrial 
relations system. The pattern of work place relations was based on 
what we have referred to as British Voluntarism. That notion in 
Zambia enshrined basic British trade union principles albeit within 
certain legislative and administrative restrictions. Thus though 
there was visible state intervention in contrast to the 
metropolitan situation in Britain, minimum interference remained 
the basic philosophy of the colonial government policy and no 
radical attempts were made to restructure the system drastically. 
The metropolitan system of industrial relations was still the 
ideal, despite the fact that it was not fully realised. The 
atmosphere, especially in the period just before self-government, 
was such that African trade unions were able to attain a certain 
measure of autonomy. By Independence, a number of unions, led by 
the Mineworkers' union, had in fact attained a large measure of 
functional autonomy.
The emergence of African nationalism of course resulted in the 
development of a broad identity of interests between unions and 
nationalist political parties. There was, however, no "class 
alliance against colonialism" on the lines claimed elsewhere in 
Africa.6 Indeed there was occasional conflict between labour and 
nationalist tactics, especially in the early 1950's, with trade 
unions insisting that the industrial sphere was their domaine 
reserve. Such conflict was a quest for autonomy on the part of 
trade unions who were primarily motivated by a desire to retain 
their freedom of action in the industrial sphere in order to 
maximise their members' benefits.
The new Zambian State resisted the trade unions’ insistence on 
autonomy from the start. Indeed, attempts were progressively made 
to design a strategy which would persuade organised labour to align 
itself with the state's conception of national development and 
integration. The labour movement's continued preoccupation with 
its members' interests may, therefore, be construed as the clearest 
response by the unions to the government's strategy of 
incorporation. In that respect it has to be seen as a reassertion
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of the received traditional western-type trade union autonomy. In 
other respects, however, trade union response has not been uniform. 
Rather it has varied in terms of leadership levels and different 
measures. Trade union response has also been affected by various 
developments in state - union relations and the performance of the 
economy.
Two broad observations can be made on the trade unions' general 
response to policy innovations between the period 1964 to date. 
There have been indications that the trade union movement has 
accepted overall government authority.7 This can be deduced from 
the willingness to co-operate with officially created agencies like 
the ZCTU. It will be recalled that when the Congress was created 
in 1965 and affiliation of unions was still voluntary, most unions 
including the miners in spite of their initial reservations, 
affiliated and accepted the Congress' authority. The 
centralisation of power through the ZCTU has also been accepted in 
the field of workers' education. The focus of workers' education 
has in part followed state defined goals.
We should not, however, read too much into union response in these 
areas. For many unions, especially smaller and financially 
insolvent ones, affiliation to the ZCTU and the assurance of 
check-off facilities was a life-line they could hardly reject. 
Similarly, co-operation in other areas was, at least in part, due 
to government reciprocity. After 1973 for instance, the government 
greatly expanded union representation on various policy-making 
organisations of the state, including the National Council of the 
ruling party.
In contrast to the acceptance of the overall government political 
authority in the formulation of national goals, however, the trade 
union leadership has continued to defend and has largely preserved 
its organisational autonomy. In spite of increased financial 
supervision by the state which has led to increased dependence by 
some unions, continuing incorporation of and occasional detentions 
of some union leaders, the trade union movement in general 
continues to assert its independence.
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9.B.1(a) The ZCTU's Role
The role of the ZCTU as the main agency of state - union relations 
calls for a brief comment. There is little doubt that both the 
1965 and the 1971 legislation envisaged a key role for the 
Congress, which, through frequent trade union leadership 
incorporation, the government could direct. Up to about 1981, it 
was apparent that the state had succeeded reasonably well in 
utilising the ZCTU as the main channel for the communication of its 
policies to the unions. A subsequent change in the Congress' 
leadership and a renewal by the ruling party of its efforts to 
control unions more directly seems to have changed the situation.8 
Moreover, the deterioration of the economy in recent years has 
meant that government policies, particularly in relation to wages 
and incomes, have become increasingly indefensible. The ZCTU 
leadership, therefore, has increasingly become the focus of 
resistance to government policies, including some provisions of the 
g
Industrial Relations Act, 1971. One notable development has been 
the ZCTU leadership's reluctance to participate in the work of some 
state-sponsored organisations which formulate policy. Instead, 
they seem to be demanding fuller and more concrete participation, 
including the right to influence decisions. Announcing the 
withdrawal of the ZCTU from the board of the Zambia Industrial and 
Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) in 1987, the holding corporation of 
state companies. Chairman Chiluba said he did not wish the trade 
union movement to be associated with "escalating redundancies and 
prices." The miners' leader has similarly warned the government 
that his union will cease co-operating unless rising prices and 
redundancies can be stemmed.11 In spite of the enactment of the 
Employment (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, which prohibited 
employers from declaring employees redundant without the Ministry 
of Labour's permission, redundancies continue to grow at massive 
rates.
As for the response of the rank and file, indications are that 
whilst yielding to the government's political authority and broadly 
supporting it in line with the national trade union leadership, 
incorporation continues to be resisted in many respects.12
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To fully assess the practical impact of the incorporation strategy 
upon the trade union movement in Zambia, however, we must look at 
three other areas; all targets of the 1971 reform; the 
restructuring of collective bargaining (including the introduction 
of statutory incomes policy), industrial conflict and dispute 
settlement procedures, and workers' participation.
9.B.2 Restructuring Collective Bargaining and Incomes Policy
(a) Institutional Changes
One of the major elements of the incorporation strategy was to 
restructure the key institutions of the industrial relations 
system. Thus, the creation and progressive strengthening of the 
ZCTU was complemented by attempts to restructure collective 
bargaining and dispute settlement. Finally, works councils were 
introduced. To aid the restructuring process two new key 
institutions were created., the Industrial Relations Court and, 
later, the Prices and Incomes Commission.
The latter institution as we saw in Chapter Seven has never really 
established itself and its future role is a matter for speculation. 
The Industrial Relations Court has fared better, but not as well as 
earlier expected. It has failed to emerge as the ultimate and 
authoritative arbiter of collective disputes that the government 
expected. It has developed little meaningful jurisprudence. 
Employers have been reluctant to resort to it to resolve industrial 
relations disputes, preferring instead traditional arrangements. 
Trade unions continue to be suspicious of its role, resorting to it 
only in aid of works councils and individual members' cases. The 
bulk of the cases, therefore, have been demarcation disputes 
concerning the classification of employees into management or 
eligible employees for the purposes of works councils. The rest of 
the cases have been individual grievances, mainly dismissals.
The Court's most effective role was before the amendment of the 
Industrial Relations Act in 1983 when it had the power to
246
approve both recognition and collective agreements. In 1983 
however, its power to approve collective agreements was 
transferred to the Prices and Incomes Commission. Its powers 
concerning recognition agreements are now largely routine, 
following patterns established long before the legislation was 
passed.
It therefore appears that two of the legislation's key institutions 
have thus far failed to make any meaningful contribution to the 
incorporation strategy. In addition to the above institutional 
changes, the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 created a compulsory 
system of collective bargaining with legally binding agreements.
As we have mentioned in Chapter Five, collective bargaining has to 
be conducted according to procedures laid down by law. Similarly, 
collective agreements must contain certain statutory clauses, chief 
among them the Government's declared norm on prices and incomes. 
Although there are indications that the system has introduced 
collective bargaining to certain sectors where it was absent 
before, and stabilised procedures in many others, statutory 
regulation has not achieved its main objective. It has not stemmed 
unlawful industrial action, as we shall see presently.
One other major aim of collective bargaining restructuring under 
the incorporation strategy was to introduce an effective prices and 
incomes policy and enforcement machinery. The 1983 amendment to 
the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 which gave a revamped Prices and 
Incomes Commission the power to approve both recognition and 
substantive agreements was the latest of many efforts previously 
made before. As part of the effort, foreign aid was sought to fund 
the activities of the Commission. Such aid was secured from the 
Swedish International Development Agency in 1987. As we have seen 
in Chapter Seven, the Agency withdrew its pledge of assistance when 
it was discovered that it was intended to be used mainly to impose 
price controls. In spite of continuing efforts the lack of
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resource« has seriously hindered the Commission's work and it still 
has to formulate a comprehensive prices and incomes policy.
9.B.3 Industrial Conflict
The control of industrial conflict was one of the major concerns of 
the government when it set out to devise an effective incorporation 
strategy.13 It is clear from the provisions concerning dispute 
settlement under the 1971 Act that the aim behind them was to 
reduce industrial unrest to acceptable levels. This seems to be 
the case particularly with the establishment of the Industrial 
Relations Court and compulsory procedures. Trends in industrial 
disputes, therefore, provide a credible basis for assessing the 
impact of the law.
Although neither government nor ILO statistics on industrial 
disputes make any clear distinction between collective disputes and 
individual grievances, they nevertheless provide figures concerning 
the number of industrial disputes, the number of workers involved 
and the number of man-days lost. We may, therefore, derive from 
the figures the possible effect of the provisions designed to 
curtail industrial unrest. Of course, levels of industrial 
disputes are affected by numerous other factors, and indeed some of 
these factors might be far more decisive than the effect of the 
law.
On average, the figures show that there were many more industrial 
stoppages from Independence to 1974, when the 1971 Act came into 
force, than in the period between 1975 and 1983. Except for the 
years 1980 and 1981, industrial disputes during post-1974 years 
were consistently below 100 for each year. The high number of 
disputes recorded for 1980 (121) and 1981 (156) can be accounted 
for by several major disruptions during these years. In spite of 
the average decline in the overall number of disputes during the
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latter period, however, the yearly number of disputes is not 
definitive. Thus, although the number of stoppages steadily 
declined up until 1979, they started to rise again in 1983. The 
number of stoppages sharply rose to 507 in 1984 (Cf. 54 in 1983).
Similarly, the number of workers involved in stoppages was on 
average higher for the period prior to 1974 than for the period 
after. The figures concerning the number of workers involved in 
disputes for the period 1975 to 1983 are, however, even less 
definite than those concerning the actual number of disputes. A 
total of 17,121 workers were involved in stoppages in 1975. That 
figure declined to 5,619 in 1976, and increased to 9,166 in 1977.
In 1978 the number shot up sharply to 42,067 in spite of the fact 
that the actual number of disputes had declined from 51 in 1977 to 
50. In 1979, the number fell to 10,846. Leaving the years 1980 
and 1981 aside on account of major disputes during that period, the 
figures fell to 9,217 in 1983, but sharply rose to 27,750 in 1984. 
There was little change in terms of the numbers of wage-earners 
during the period examined. The significance of this factor is, 
therefore, negligible.
The figures of man-days lost similarly do not provide any better 
guidance. Although the man-days lost during the period 1975 - 1983 
were, as in other categories examined, on average lower than for 
the earlier period, there is no apparently conclusive trend. In 
1975, 51,003 man-days were lost. The figure fell sharply to 6,527 
in 1976 and then more than doubled to 15,990 in 1977. They rose 
more sharply still to 197,330 in 1978. The figure for 1979 at 
42,916 was relatively high if we take into account that the actual 
number of stoppages (44) had fallen from the previous year. The 
years 1980 and 1981 apart, the figures for 1982 fell drastically to 
7,702, but rose slightly again to 8,170 in 1983. In 1984 the 
figures rose sharply to 31,382. From the statistics examined, it 
is difficult to be definite about the impact of legislative 
provisions concerning industrial disputes by merely looking at the
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figures in terms of the number of disputes recorded, the number of 
workers involved and the number of man-days lost. What is more 
significant is the fact that "wildcat strikes" have continued 
unabated in spite of the restrictive procedures concerning 
industrial action under the Act.15 Most such strikes tend to be 
both illegal (that is to say in contravention of procedural 
requirements of the Act) and unconstitutional under the unions' own 
rules. They also tend to be unofficial - not reconvnended or 
approved by the union hierarchy. It is noteworthy that the law has 
had no apparent effect on this trend. The problem of illegal 
strikes means that one of the major objectives of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971, the reduction of industrial disputes, has not 
been achieved. The imposition of strict procedures concerning 
collective disputes has had no positive impact. Although the union 
hierarchy tends to take account of the legal requirements in this 
area, if only to avoid the penalties, the rank and file are hardly 
influenced by such considerations. To the extent that unions' 
advice is frequently ignored, incorporation has, therefore, not 
succeeded.
9.B.4 Workers' Participation
Equally important in the assessment of government policy is 
workers' participation. Works councils continue to be central to 
the government strategy of incorporation, as is evident from 
repeated requests for ILO technical assistance with a view to 
increasing their effectiveness.16 However, it cannot be 
over-emphasised that it is too recent an experience to yield any 
definitive conclusions. It will be recalled that Part VII of the 
Act concerning works councils did not become officially operative 
until 1976. Except for a few instances, it took several years 
after 1976 for works councils to be introduced in many sectors.
The government itself regards it more as experimental, and debate 
about the most suitable model continues within its ranks. Any 
assessment in respect of that impact of workers' participation has, 
therefore, to be regarded as even more tentative than for other 
areas discussed.
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There is little doubt that the introduction of works councils, 
including some sectors not fully unionised, opened up new channels 
of communication. In the long term, works councils may well have a 
positive effect on industrial relations. There is, however, no 
evidence at this stage that there has been any dramatic change in 
the attitudes of management and workers. At best, works councils 
have been welcomed as a forum, in some firms the only forum, for 
addressing grievances collectively. Works councils were of course 
not intended for addressing grievances per se. Whereas management 
attitudes have been mixed, the business community continues to be 
suspicious of the concept of workers' participation in spite of the 
fact that it has had no significant impact on managerial 
prerogatives.17 Whilst having accepted works councils in 
principle, trade unions continue to be suspicious of government 
intentions. Works councils have in certain cases encroached on 
traditional areas of collective bargaining, but it has not been to 
the extent that unions initially feared. Whether the transfer of 
the department responsible for workers' participation to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services, (further away from 
Presidential initiative which has been the mark of developments to 
date) , has any significance remains to be seen.
9.C. Incorporation and the Law; Limitations and Constraints
The failure of legal reform to induce change in support of 
development objectives in the Third World is common. Reasons for 
the failure vary. Some scholars of law and development have 
ascribed the law's failure to the contradiction between what are
perceived as "authoritarian legal orders and the participatory 
18imperatives of development." Myrdal explained what he termed 
•soft development' in terms of.
"A general lack of social discipline in underdeveloped 
countries, signified by many weaknesses: deficiencies in 
their legislation and, in particular, in law observance and 
enforcement; lack of obedience to rules and directives 
handed down to public officials on various levels; frequent 
collusion of these officials with powerful persons or groups
of persons whose conduct they should regulate» and, at 
bottom, a general inclination of people in all strata to 
resist public controls and their implementation. Also within 
the concept of the soft state is corruption, a phenomenon 
which seems to be generally on the increase in undeveloped 
countries."
It can be said that similar factors have been at play in the 
Zambian situation.
However, it would be too simplistic to characterise all the 
shortcomings of the incorporation policy as due purely to the 
failure of law as such to bring about the changes legislated for.
As we have indicated in the introduction and at the beginning of 
this Chapter, the role of the law was never conceived of as an 
autonomous process. Rather it was viewed largely in instrumental 
terms as an attempt to legitimise policy choices based on economic, 
political and other pertinent considerations.
Economic factors, chief among others, therefore, deserve close 
attention in assessing the overall impact of government policy, 
including the role of the law in the past, and prospects for future 
policy.
The path to labour incorporation was started upon during a decade 
of relative affluence in Zambia. Strong economic performance 
stemming from good copper prices positively affected such critical 
indicators as employment, wages and balance of trade et cetera. In 
1973 when attempts to incorporate trade unions began in earnest, 
labour was in a relatively strong bargaining position. The legal 
reforms and consequent restructuring of trade unions and labour 
relations of the immediate post-independence period put unions in a 
better position to insist on their autonomy. Favourable changes in 
the law such as the institution of due check-off facilities for 
most unions improved finances which in turn positively affected the 
organisation of union affairs. Similarly, in spite of state 
superintendence over ZCTU affairs, the strengthening of the Central 
labour organisation resulted in the better representation of union
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objectives vis-a-vis employers, including government agencies. 
Indeed the second phase of government strategy that we have 
discussed earlier in the study was in part a response to labour's 
strong position, perceived as disproportionate to its numbers in 
relation to other groups in society. Successive attempts to devise 
a more equitable incomes policy that we have seen, for instance, 
was one such manifestation of the above perception.
In relation to the policy's impact and future prospects, it can, 
therefore, be argued that the relatively better economic times 
which tended to strengthen the unions' capacity to maintain their 
autonomy were a major constraint on the government efforts of 
incorporation, including the effect of labour legislation. 
Alternatively, the relatively better economic times prior to 1981 
enabled the government to have recourse to more resources to 
implement the strategy. As we shall presently see, less reliance 
on external resources may well have given the government more 
independence and the political will to see its policies through.
The introduction of the one-party state and the subsequent 
proscription of institutional opposition in 1973 may well have 
enhanced government attempts to overcome unions' resistance. The 
1980's have seen the Mining industry, which made Zambia one of the 
richest and fastest-growing economies in black Africa, in a 
"vicious spiral of decline which has been the primary cause of the 
20country*8 economic crisis." The foreign debt had by 1985 already 
reached 2.8 billion US dollars. Debt servicing alone now takes 
about 50 per cent of export earnings. Inflation is running at over 
50 per cent as well. The ZCCM, reputed to be one of the 
highest-cost copper producers, has been closing down mines in an 
attempt to restructure the industry. The result has been massive 
redundancies and more unemployment.21
In order to try and halt the decline the government has come to 
rely more heavily on external resources. In 1985 it accepted harsh 
IMF measures in order to attract external funding. The measures
included inter alia, the introduction of a foreign exchange 
auctioning system resulting in an effective devaluation of the 
Zambian currency of about 70 per cent, the removal of subsidies on 
food essentials and cut-backs in government expenditure across the 
board. It was said to be one of the most severe economic reform 
programmes in Africa.22 However, the hardships imposed by the 
programme came to threaten the political and social order of the 
country. It resulted in widespread urban riots and loss of life.
In the face of civil unrest the government sought to defuse the 
situation by restoring subsidies and breaking with the IMF early in 
1987.23 In spite of the institution of a locally formulated 
economic recovery programme, however, the country continues to rely 
heavily on external aid to finance many of its programmes.
Moreover, there appears to be no prospect of economic recovery in 
the short-term. Unemployment and the cost of living have continued 
to rise. As the unions' bargaining position has been weakened, 
the union leadership has sought to rally the political support of 
the rest of the population. Such attempts have resulted in 
government censure. Earlier in the year, for instance, the ZCTU 
leaders' passports were confiscated and a number of unionists 
detained.24
On the face of it, a weakened labour movement might well enhance 
the prospects of the proposed "integration" policy if the 
government chooses to go ahead with it. However, there is no 
guarantee in that respect. The government now has little resources 
to fund its attempts at fresh policy initiatives. The government 
has in the past sought external aid to consolidate and expand 
existing programmes. This is true of the workers' participation 
programme for which assistance has been given by the ILO, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia, among other donors.
The dangers of relying on external resources to advance 
incorporation policies were, however, recently shown by the case of 
the Prices and Incomes Commission which we have mentioned above.
In 1987 the government had sought and secured a funding pledge from 
the Swedish
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International Development Agency. The Agency withdrew its pledge 
of assistance when it discovered that the major use of the funding 
sought was to impose prices controls. In the face of further 
opposition from other aid donors. President Kaunda announced 
towards the end of 1987 that the government would be reviewing the 
exchange rate and price controls before the next budget.
9.D. The Abandonment of Incorporation as a 
Government Strategy: Prospects
In 1984 the government announced plans to reform the current law 
and replace the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, with a more radical 
one.26 The effect of the proposed changes would be to shift the 
balance away from the current incorporation strategy towards the 
further integration of trade unions into the political process.
This is apparent from a number of major changes proposed, some of 
which we refer to presently.
Any assessment of the future prospects and developments concerning 
the present labour policy is inevitably speculative. Nevertheless, 
it is useful to describe some of the proposed reforms both as 
evidence that the government has judged incorporation by law to be 
an unsuccessful strategy and to indicate the alternative strategy 
that the government is contemplating adopting.
The most radical departure from present policy would be the 
proposals to transform trade unions into "mass movements". The 
document containing the proposed reforms states:
"The constitution of every trade union shall declare that the 
trade union shall be a mass movement of the party and as such 
shall accept the declared policies, objectives, aspirations 
and programmes of the party and that no person shall be 
qualified to be elected or appointed to any office the 
trade union unless he is a member of the party ....
(emphasis added)
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The exact significance of the concept "mass movement" is not clear. 
Its practical effect is, however, patently clear. Taken together 
with the requirement of party membership for trade union officers 
it would amount to making trade unions and the ZZCTU in particular, 
integral wings of the ruling party, the United National 
Independence Party (the UNIP) on the same lines as the Women's and 
Youth Leagues.28 Attempts to make the trade union movement an 
integral part of the ruling party's hierarchy are not new. Trade 
unions have always resisted the idea in favour of complete 
autonomy. In 1973 the matter appeared to have been resolved, with 
the ruling party accepting the nominal seating of the ZCTU on the 
National Council without affecting organised labour's autonomy. 
Another important innovation would be the further extension of 
ministerial powers over the conduct of union affairs. The proposed 
law would give the minister responsible the discretion to dissolve 
any trade union on the grounds that it has "failed to carry out its 
objects adequately, or is conducting its affairs in a manner 
inimical to the interests of the party or to the security of the 
state ...,"3° This power would be coupled with the right of the 
minister to appoint other persons in place of elected officers on 
similar grounds to those empowering him to dissolve a trade 
31union.
Similarly, the proposed Act would increase ministerial powers of 
supervision over the unions' financial affairs, including the 
appointment of outside accountants and auditors. In the case of 
misuse of union funds, the government would have the power to 
suspend and dismiss guilty officers and appoint replacements.32
Two other proposed changes which seem to have the support of both 
employers and unions must be briefly mentioned here.33 It is 
proposed that a tripartite consultative council and a workers' 
education board be established.34 The former would have all three 
social partners represented and seems to be in response to the 
International Labour Organisation's (the ILO) Convention No 144
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which Zambia had ratified, and Recommendation No 152. The Workers' 
Education Board would, in addition to the social partners, have 
representatives of "institutions and organisations interested in 
furthering workers' education as the Minister may from time to time 
determine.*
It is now more than three years since the proposed reforms were 
first announced. As we have mentioned earlier, the President 
resurrected the issue of 'total incorporation' on Labour Day in 
1986. A new Committee to study ways of integrating the ZCTU into 
the ruling party as one of its wings was appointed. By the end of 
February, 1988 the Committee had yet to report and no proposals 
have been presented to Parliament for legislative action. It seems 
that not only are trade unions and employers hostile to most of the 
proposals, (the reforms would, mutatis mutandis, apply to 
employers' organisations as well), but there are also serious 
disagreements between the government and the ruling party hierarchy 
on some of the proposals. The ILO is said to be equally dismayed 
by the reform package. They are concerned that the reforms would 
further reduce the prospects of the Country's ratification of the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No 98) which they have been pressing 
the government to ratify for a number of years.
The ILO's opposition to the proposed reforms is significant. The 
government has sometimes in the past relied on the implicit support 
of the Organisation to persuade trade unions to co-operate with 
some aspects of its policy. This was apparent, for instance, from 
the Government's attempts to devise successive Prices and Incomes 
policies which we have discussed in Chapter Seven. Limited ILO 
support has also been given to the Workers' Participation 
Programme. In both instances the ILO has been readily forthcoming 
with technical assistance. It has also been known to intervene in 
order to mediate disputes between the government and the ZCTU.
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Not only would the enactment of the proposals into law make the 
prospects of ratifying the above ILO conventions more remote, it 
would also raise the possibility of undermining Zambia's 
international treaty obligations in other areas.
It would also appear that Zambia would be in breach of its 
obligations under other international human rights treaties.
Zambia has acceded to various United National Instruments on human 
rights, including the International Covenant on Civic and Political 
Rights and its Optional Protocol. It has also ratified the Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted by the Organisation of African 
38Unity. For a country that has always claimed moral leadership in 
matters of human rights, especially in Southern Africa, such 
breaches would be a serious blow to its international standing. 
Perhaps more significantly, some of the proposed provisions would 
be open to challenge as being in contravention of fundamental 
rights under the Zambian Constitution, particularly those 
concerning discrimination and freedom of association.
The proposed reforms are, therefore, unlikely to be more effective 
than present policy, judging by the trade unions' reaction to date. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind, that were such a policy 
to come into being, trade union autonomy would be severely 
curtailed. Trade unions would be a constituent element of the 
state machinery. The effectiveness of government policy would then 
have to be judged more in terms of its impact on worker attitudes 
than institutional trade union responses.
All this is speculation. What is quite clear is that the 
Government's decision to attempt a new approach to the control of 
the trade union movement is a further open acknowledgement that 
from their point of view, their incorporation through law strategy 
has failed.
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Of course, to the extent that the new institutions that have been 
created during the period have a progressive influence in shaping 
the labour relations system, the law has played an important role 
in the formulation of policy. It is clear, however, that the 
fundamental determinants remain social and political and above all, 
economic.
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APPENDIX I
A. INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDELINE
1. Trade Union and Workers role and activity.
Nature and extent of trade union influence?
What role for trade unions?
How effective trade unions as spokesmen for labour?
How effective trade union administration?
The 'right' to strike?
Frequency of involvement in industrial action?
Attitude towards essential services?
Effects of industrial action?
Causes of industrial action?
How effective machinery for settlement of disputes?
Relationship between trade unions and other bodies, eg Works 
Councils, Ministry of Labour, employers association, etc?
Effect of law and government action on workers and trade union 
activities?
Changes in management attitudes since Independence/Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971/unionisation?
2. Collective Bargaining Procedures
How familiar with nature/contents of collective agreements?
Impact of collective agreements on management/trade union 
relations/ shop-floor relations?
How binding in practice! collective bargaining 
procedures/collective agreements?
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Attitude to changes in collective agreements made by the 
Industrial Relations Court/involvement?
Impact of Joint Industrial Councils?
Statutory system fair deal?
3. Statutory Prices and Incomes Regulations (interviews conducted 
before Prices and Incomes Commission in effect).
How familiar with current ad hoc government policy on prices 
and incomes?
How effective Minimum Wages Boards and Councils?
Wage levels/differentials/productivity/cost of living?
In favour of prospective Prices and Incomes Commission?
How fair representation of workers/unions/employers/public 
representatives on Commission?
What prospects proposed Commission?
4. Dispute Settlement Procedures
Internal arrangements: grievance and dispute settlement - how 
effective?
How often recourse to statutory procedures?
How effective union intervention?
How effective Ministry of Labour intervention?
Management attitudes to dispute settlement since 
Independence/Industrial Relations Act?
Role of Industrial Relations Court: How fair, effective, 
speedy?
Effect of Industrial Relations Court decisions?
How familiar with statutory procedures: workers/trade 
unionists/work councillors/immediate shop-floor management?
Industrial Democracy
How familiar with workers' participation arrangements?
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Worker8/management/union/Government attitudes towards Works 
Councils?
How effective/impact on industrial relations« 
shop-floor/management-union/union-Government/productivity?
Relationship of Works Councils with other bodies« 
unions/employers' associations?
How effective workers' representation and accountability?
Works Councils' administrations Industrial Participatory 
Democracy Department and other agencies - Ministry of 
Labour/Industrial Relations Court/unions/management/employers' 
association/ rank and file workers?
Any need/what changes/why?
6. General attitudes to current labour policy and possible 
changes
How familiar with current overall government policy?
What attitudes to overall/particular policy?
Compare before and after Industrial Relations Act, 1971? How 
important role of law on industrial relations?
What changes preferred?
What attitudes towards role of
government/employers/unions/rank and file workers?
What attitude towards closer relationship between unions and 
ruling party/government direction?
What likely effect proposed changes in state-union relations?
B. SAMPLE OF CATEGORIES INTERVIEWED
i Shop-floor workers - selected sectors in Lusaka.
ii Trade unionists - Officers of selected branch and national 
unions, the ZCTU. Also interviewed union representatives on 
statutory and voluntary national bodies (eg Minimum Wages 
Boards and Councils and Joint Industrial Councils).
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Employer» - this category included selected classes of 
management personnel, including shop floor supervisors, 
personnel managers, officers of employers' associations, 
officers of the Zambia Federation of Employers, and employer 
representatives on statutory bodies.
Government and related agencies - including successive 
Ministers of Labour, Ministry of Labour officials, officials 
of the Industrial Relations Court, Industrial Participatory 
Democracy Officials and Minimum Wages Boards and Councils' 
personnel.
ILO officials - both at Headquarters in Geneva and Area 
Office in Lusaka.
Works Councillors - representatives of both management and 
workers on workers councils of selected firms.
Private individuals - of recognised expertise and those 
historically involved in labour matters.
APPENDIX II
ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY PROFILE
A. Geographical Position
The Republic of Zambia occupies 752,614 square km. The country is 
part of the Central African plateau stretching from the River 
Zambezi in the South-West to the tip of Lake Tanganyika in the 
North-East. It is land-locked, bounded by Tanzania in the North, 
Malawi in the East, Mozambique in the South-East, Angola in the 
West, Namibia in the South-West and Zimbabwe in the South (see 
Map 1).
B. The Economy
Zambia has a mixed economy dominated by parastatal companies in all 
sectors except agricultural production.
Mining accounts for about 95 per cent of total foreign exchange 
earnings (copper alone accounts for up to 90 per cent), but its 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (the GDP) has fallen, 
from over 30 per cent in the early 1970's to between 10 - 20 per 
cent in the years since. This has been mainly due to the slump in 
world copper prices, coupled with declining ore grades and 
increasing input costs. To reduce costs and improve efficiency, 
two of the major state-owned mining companies were merged in 1982 
to form the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (ZCCM), which is 
now one of the largest conglomerates in the World. Other major 
minerals extracted are cobalt (World's second largest producer), 
zinc and lead.

268
Industry contributes about 18 per cent to the GDP and employs over 
10 per cent of the total labour-force. The manufacturing sector is 
primarily based on processing of imported raw materials, with over 
one-third of output consisting of processed foods and beverages. 
Other major products include textiles and rubber, chemical and 
metal products. The bulk of the sector is in the hands of the 
largely state-owned Industrtial Development Corporation (INDECO) 
group, but several private enterprises are also significant. Lack 
of available foreign exchange for imports of raw materials is the 
major constraint. Government policy has shifted towards the 
development of non-traditional exports and inport substitution, 
including increased production of inputs for the expanding 
agricultural sector.
Agriculture contributes less than 20 per cent to the GDP and 
accounts for only 1 per cent of export earnings, but it is the main 
source of employment of over 50 per cent of the population. Major 
food crops include maize, cassava, sorghum and millet. Main cash 
crops include tobacco, cotton, sunflower, sugar-cane and ground 
nuts.
Hydro-electricity and coal are the major sources of domestically 
produced energy, together they provide 80 per cent of energy 
requirements. The remainder is made up of imported petroleum , some 
of which is locally refined. Some hydro-electricity is exported to 
neighbouring countries.
The balance of payments is largely determined by world copper 
prices. The general fall in copper prices and rising oil imports 
have resulted in balance of trade deficits in recent years. The 
main imports are machinery and transport equipment (typically 35 
per cent of the total value) , crude petroleum (25 per cent) , basic 
manufactures (22 per cent), and chemicals (13 per cent) .
The main exports are copper (typically 90 per cent) , cobalt (4 per 
cent), and zinc (2 per cent).
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C.Population and Social Indicators
By the end of 1985 the population was estimated at 6,500,000. The 
country is one of the most urbanised in Africa owing to the 
intensive development of copper mining. It is now estimated that 
over 40 per cent of the population are urban dwellers. Over 60 per 
cent of the urban population live on the Copperbelt. Rural 
densities vary from fewer than two per square kilometre to fifty or 
more in a few locations. The population is denser in commercial 
and agricultural areas of the "line of rail" and far South-East and 
where fishing supplements agriculture as in the upper Zambezi plain 
and lakes and marshes of the North-East.
There are more than seventy-two officially recognised ethnic 
groups, each with its own dialect or language. None is politically 
or economically predominant. English is the official language and 
has become increasingly important. Seven official vernaculars are 
recognised, among them Bemba in the North-East and the Copperbelt, 
Nyanja (Cewa) in the East and central cities like Lusaka and Kabwe, 
Lozi in the West and Livingstone, and Tonga in the South.
Approximately half the population profess Christianity, roughly 
one-half to two-thirds of which are Roman Catholics, the rest being 
of various protestant and independent denominations. The remainder 
practice traditional African religions.
There has been a great expansion in education and the rate of 
literacy since Independence. In spite of the expansion, however, 
the aim of universal free primary education has yet to be achieved 
and relatively few go beyond lower secondary levels, let alone to 
higher institutions of learning. There is one university with two 
Campuses at Lusaka and Ndola with over 5,000 students enrolled.
The government has progressively tried to provide universal medical 
and social services in both urban and rural areas. There are urban 
hospitals, large rural hospitals and a flying doctor service for
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remote areas. In spite of such attempts, services fall far short 
of the population's needs. Major health problems include chronic 
illness, such as malaria, schistosomiasis, and dietary deficiency 
as well as acute diseases, such as measles, typhoid and dysentery.
Sources
Data for the above profile have been drawn from various sources 
including Economic Reports by the National Commission for 
Development Planning and the European Economic Commission 
Delegation in Zambia; Kaplan I (ed) Zambia: A Country Profile 
(Washington DC: American University, 3rd edition, 1983); African 
Review, (Essex: Saffron Walden, 1986 and 1987): Africa South of 
the Sahara, (London: Europa Publications, 15th edition, 1986).
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APPENDIX III
Major events concerning or connected to developments in labour 
policy between 1945 and 1963 include:
1946 - William Comrie, British trade union officer, arrives to 
assist in the "orderly formation" of African trade 
unions.
1947 - First African trade union, the Shop Assistants Union, 
formed on the Copperbelt.
1947/48 Abortive negotiations on African advancement in the 
mining industry.
1948 - Commission appointed to inquire into the advancement of 
Africans in the mining industry.
Federation of Welfare societies reconstituted as the 
African National Congress. First nationalist movement.
1949 - Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers Union formed on 
the Copperbelt.
The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance and the 
Industrial Conciliation Ordinance passed.
1952 - African miners strike over increased wage demands. Led 
to the Guillebaud Arbitration.
Commission appointed to review the salary structure of 
the Civil Service.
1953 - Guillebaud Arbitration over African miners' wage 
demands. Wage increase awarded to all African miners' 
work groups.
1953 May, ANC campaign against the introduction of the 
Federation collapses mainly for lack of union support.
1953 August, The Federation established.
1953 - Mines African Staff Association (MASA) formed to cater 
for African senior workers. Recognised as an official 
negotiating body in 1955 after African status on the 
mines.
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1954 February/July, Four party talks (mining companies, 
NRWU, MRAMU, and MASA) over African advancement. 
Unsuccessful.
1954 - Copper prices begin rising at the London Metal 
Exchange. Results in corresponding rises in European 
Workers' bonuses peaking in 1956.
1954
companies
November, Tension over African advancement. Mining
give NRMWU six months' notice of abrogation of 
collective agreement. Notice suspended six weeks over 
signs of agreement.
1954 - Board of Inquiry into African advancement in the mining 
industry. The Second Forster Inquiry.
1955 - 3 January. Nine week African miners strike begins.
NRWU ballot on African advancement into low grade 
European jobs. 60 per cent in favour. Ballot 
re-affirmed later in the year after African strike, but 
with smaller majority.
1955 - July. NRMWU agrees with Anglo-American to transfer 24 
jobs categories to Africans. Subject to NRMWU veto.
Government publishes a restrictive Trade Unions and 
Trade Disputes Bill. Later withdrawn after union 
opposition.
1956 - Summer. African miners' rolling strikes.
Commission of Inquiry, Branigan Commission, into unrest 
in the mining industry.
Trade Union Bill published with similar restrictions to 
that withdrawn in 1955.
1957 - Restrictive Amendment Bill passed.
NRMWU irregular stoppages.
Commission, Honeyman Commission, to inquire into 
stoppages in the mining industry.
Another Trade Union Amendment Bill with further 
restrictions published.
1958 -
Report of the Committee on Trade Testing and 
Apprenticeship for Africans.
Restrictive Trade Union Bill passed.
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Autumn. Stoppages by NRMWU.
Zambia African Nationalist Congress formed to challenge 
"moderate" ANC.
ZANC banned, UNIP formed in its place.
New Federal Constitution and Election.
Apprenticeship opened to Africans in some crafts.
NRAMU allow joint council representation on the mines.
Monckton Commission over African opposition to the 
Federation.
Federal Review Conference. Ends in deadlock.
Renewed industrial unrest.
Morison Commission appointed to inquire into the Mining 
Industry.
NR general elections. African majority under 
coalition.
Whelan Coemiisslon of Inquiry into the unrest on the 
Copperbelt.
31 December, Federation dissolved.
APPENDIX IV
TYPICAL INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
UNDER THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1971, ACT 
AS AMENDED IN 1983
GAZETTE NOTICE NO 180 OF 1985
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1983 (Section (4)(d))
Joint Council Collective Agreement between the Hotel and Catering 
Association of Zambia and the Hotel Catering Workers’ Union of 
Zambia.
it is HEREBY NOTIFIED for public information that a Joint Council 
Collective Agreement has been concluded by the parties named above 
and the terms of which are appended hereunder.
Any person affected by this Joint Council Collective Agreement and 
who objects to any of the terms thereof may, not later than thirty 
days from the date of publication of this notice, make 
representations in writing, to the Secretary, Prices and Incomes 
Commission, PO Box 30707, Lusaka, stating his/her objections to the 
said Joint Council Collective Agreement.
Secretary
Prices and Incomes Commission.
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT IS MADE on 4th January, 1985, between the Hotel and 
Catering Association of Zambia, whose registered office is at the 
Showgrounds, Great East Road, Lusaka (hereinafter called 'the 
Association'), of the first part and the Hotel and Catering 
Workers' Union of Zambia, whose head office is situated at Cha Cha 
Cha Road, Lusaka (hereinafter called 'the Union'), of the other 
part.
Now it is hereby agreed as follows:
1. Engagement and Probation
(a) Every candidate shall complete a Company's application 
for employment.
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(b) A probationary period of three months shall be served 
and in this case either party may terminate employment 
within twenty-four hours or pay in lieu thereof, 
without assigning any reason therefor. The Company, 
however, reserves the right to extend the probationary 
period for not more than three additional months with 
the written agreement of the Works Council, (emphasis 
given)
(c) A graded worker shall be paid the basic rate for the 
job during the probationary period. Past experience 
and training in the hotel industry shall be taken into 
account at the time of engagement.
(d) At all times the employer reserves the right to require 
an employee to submit himself/herself to a medical 
examination; such examination shall be at the expense 
of the employer. No prospective employee shall be 
engaged without first being pronounced medically fit 
for employment.
2. Contract of Service
3.
The contract of employment shall be a monthly contract unless 
otherwise specified by the Company in writing.
Redundancy
(a) Where, through force of circumstances, it is necessary 
to reduce staff, the employer will negotiate with the 
Union and the Works Council (emphasis given) taking 
into account the following factors in deciding which of 
his employees are to be declared redundant: capacity; 
efficiency; length of service; diligence; loyalty; 
and health.
(b) The employer shall follow the provisions of the 
Employment Act and the Industrial Relations Act. 
(emphasis given)
(c) Formal notice of termination of employment, or pay in 
lieu and redundancy payment shall be as follows:
Length of Service Notice Payment
From 6 months to 1 year 
1 year to 3 years 
3 years to 5 years 
Over 5 years
1 month 1 month
1 month 2 months
1 month 2$ months
1 month 1 month's
salary for 
each year of 
completed 
service.
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Retirement
The normal retirement age shall be 55 years for men and 
50 years for women. Employees wishing to retire before 
the above stated period shall do so after rendering a 
continuous service of twenty years with the same 
employer. Application for longer service may be 
considered at the discretion of the employer, and if 
approved, due retirement benefits will be paid at the 
request of the employee.
(a) Retirement Benefits.
(i) A retiring employee as defined in Clause 4 above, 
having at least 5 years' service shall be 
entitled to retirement benefits as follows, in 
addition to statutory benefits:
Length of Service Payment
5 - 9  years 
10 - 19 years
20 years and above
Fifteen days' salary for 
each completed year of 
service.
Twenty days' salary for 
each completed year of 
service.
Twenty-five days' salary 
for each completed year 
of service.
(ii) If an employee is discharged on medical grounds or 
dies, he/she or the heirs shall receive whatever 
retirement benefits the deceased would have been 
entitled to had he/she retired on that date, in 
addition to any other entitlements due to the 
late employee.
(iii) If an employee is discharged on disciplinary 
grounds, he shall receive whatever retirement 
benefits he has accumulated except in the case of 
summary dismissal.
(iv) Retirement benefits shall not be paid if the 
employee is entitled to benefits under a 
Company's Pension Scheme.
(b) If an employee resigns of his own accord after the
qualifying period of five years, and if he has not been 
involved in a serious breach of Company discipline 
calling for summary dismissal, the employer shall pay 
benefits as if the employee had retired.
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5. Medical Disablement Discharge
(a) When an employee is unable to continue employment for 
medical reasons as defined by a certified medical 
practitioner or as a result of disablement caused at 
work, he shall receive a termination payment as 
follows, in addition to any statutory benefits duex
Length of Service Payment
6 months and upwards One month's salary for
each completed year of 
service.
(b) Workers claiming benefits under Clause 4 will not be 
entitled to claim under Clause 5 and vice versa.
6. Redeployment
As a measure to raise efficiency it is hereby agreed that it 
may be necessary to redeploy employees within the 
organisation, due to change in the nature of work. Such 
workers shall be given retraining where possible to keep up 
their skills.
7. Notices
(a) Where an employer is required to serve an employee with 
a written notice relating to the terms and conditions 
of employment, or termination of employment or 
occupation by the employee of any employer's property, 
such notice shall be deemed to have been properly 
served if it has been handed to the employee or 
delivered to his last known place of abode or posted on 
any board permanently kept by the employer for the 
purpose of communication of information to employees.
(b) Where an employee is required to serve any written 
notice on the employer relating to the terms and 
conditions of his employment or termination of his 
employment, such notice shall be deemed to have been 
properly served if it has been handed to the Company's 
Personnel Officer or the employee's Supervisor.
8. Basic Salary
(a) Wage rates shall be as negotiated and agreed between
the Union and the Association and 3hall be part of this 
Agreement. Provided always that the employer shall be 
at liberty to pay wages at higher rates at his sole 
discretion, in cases of outstanding ability.
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(b) During the period of the present Collective Agreement 
the wages/salaries as set out in Schedule A attached 
shall apply and shall be payable by the last working 
day of each calendar month. These wages/salaries have 
been adjusted by increases as negotiated for and agreed 
upon by the Association and the Union as followst
(Wage figures omitted)
(c) Those employees already employed and receiving the 
minimum basic salary/wage or above as per previous 
Collective Agreement, will be awarded an increment for 
1985 and 1986 as Der grade table in sub-clause (b) 
hereof. The increases are on basic wage/salary only.
9. Promotion
Promotion from one grade to another is entirely at the 
discretion of the employer. On being promoted, the employee 
shall receive the minimum basic for the new grade plus 15 per 
cent. A policy of internal promotion will be followed where 
possible.
10. Demotion 
No change.
11. Leave
(a) No change.
(b) Special leave - special leave will be granted upon 
written application and supported evidence in the event 
of the followings
(i) Death of a spouse, father, mother and own child - 
fourteen days.
(ii) No change.
(iii) No change.
(d) Maternity Leave
(i) Every female employee who has completed at least 
six months of continuous service with the company 
from the date of first engagement shall be 
entitled to ninety working days maternity leave 
on full pay, maternity leave benefits will only 
be claimed once in every twenty four months.
(ii) No change.
(iii)
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(f) No change.
(g) Sick Leave
Subject to the provisions of Section 54(2) of 
Employment Act, an employee who according to the 
judgement of a registered physician or medical 
institution designated by the employer is unable to 
execute his work by reason of sickness or an accident, 
shall on producing a medical certificate be granted paid 
sick leave as follows:
(i) During the probationary period after completing 
one month's continuous service up to a maximum of 
twenty six working days on full pay and further 
eight weeks on half pay.
(ii) For permanent employee - a maximum of 78 working 
days on full pay and further sixteen weeks on 
half pay.
(iii) No change.
(iv)
12. No change.
13. No change.
14. No change.
15. No change.
16. No change.
17. Shift Differential
Employees required to work a full shift between the hours of 
22.00 and 08.00 hours shall be paid their basic rate plus 25 
per cent of their basic rate of pay.
18. No change.
19 No change.
20 Working Hours and Overtime
(a) A normal working week shall not exceed fifty-four hours 
spread over six days, with one hour's rest period per 
day.
Overtime shall be reduced to a minimum. However, all 
employees shall work overtime when called upon to do
(b)
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(i) Employees requested to work overtime shall do so 
and the employer shall pay two times the basic 
hourly rate for the number of hours worked by the 
employee.
(ii) The employer may grant time off in lieu of 
payment for overtime worked except in the case of 
public holidays.
(c) Overtime shall not be paid until full normal weekly 
working hours have been worked, excluding public 
holidays.
(d) The provisions of this clause shall not apply to a 
watchman, unless Clause (b) is invoked.
21. Service Charge
(a) Employees covered by this Agreement shall be paid a 
service charge where applicable twice every month as 
part of their total emoluments or whichever the 
employer and Works Council (emphasis given) shall 
decide and agree upon.
(b) Those workers on training outside the establishment 
shall be paid a service charge as provided for under 
Clause 21(a).
22. Housing Allowance and House Rent
(a) The Company accepts the responsibility to house those 
of its employees who are entitled to be housed under 
the provisions of this Agreement, but in the event that 
the Company is unable to provide suitable housing it 
shall pay to the employees concerned, housing 
allowances of K15 per month to all grades of employees 
with effect from 1st January 1985, and K20 per month 
with effect from 1st January 1986.
(b) Where an employee in receipt of a monthly salary of 
K100 is provided with housing, the employer may deduct 
an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of basic salary to 
recover the cost of rent for high-cost, 8 per cent for 
medium-cost and 6 per cent for low-cost housing.
23. Acting Allowance
(a) An employee who is temporarily required to perform a 
job with a higher grade of pay than his substantive 
post for any continuous period of fifteen days or more 
shall receive an acting allowance equivalent to two 
thirds the difference between his substantive basic 
rate of pay and the minimum basic rate of pay of the 
grade on which he is acting.
(b) In the event of acting towards substantive appointment 
in a new grade continuously for three months, the 
employee shall receive the wages of his new grade, or 
if unsuccessful in his new job, he shall revert to his 
old grade and rate of pay.
Free Rations
(a) To all employees required to do a nine hours' shift 
during the day time, the employer shall provide free 
food or other rations that may be provided at his 
discretion» provided that such food shall be taken by 
the employee during the nine hours' shift» and should 
be consumed on the premises.
(b) Where an employer does not have facilities in which to 
provide free rations, he shall (in agreement with the 
Union) pay an employee a sum of K2.50 for each working 
day completed, in lieu of rations.
Protective Clothing
(a) The employer shall from time to time provide protective 
clothing or uniform to the employee according to the 
requirement of their jobs. Employees shall be obliged 
to wear such protective clothing or uniforms as 
designated by the employer. New issues of such items 
shall be made only on producing old ones. Any such 
items lost or deunaged through the fault of the employee 
shall be paid for by the employee, on a pro rata basis 
in accordance with the assessed value of the article 
and its life expectancy.
(b) where protective clothing is provided the employer 
shall be responsible for its laundry.
Loans
It is agreed by both parties that it is in the interest of 
employees and the employer that all employees remain free 
from debt as far as possible and that in this connection the 
facility for loans and salary advances should be used 
sparingly and the loans and salary advances so obtained shall 
be used properly. The employer will continue to give 
consideration to assisting employees provided that the 
Company has the ability to meet such requests.
Annual Leave - Travel Allowance
An employee will receive a fixed amount of K20 when 
proceeding on leave and this figure will not accumulate.
Where through the interests of the employer the employee
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is allowed to commute leave days such an employee shall not 
be entitled to the above stated travel allowance.
28. Funeral Assistance
(a) In the event of the death of an employee, spouse and 
own child, the employer shall provide the followingi
(i) Funeral grant of K75;
(ii) Standard coffin;
(iii) Transport for employee's mourners to and from 
cemetery» and
(iv) 50 kg of mealie meal.
(b) On submission of a death certificate in the event of 
the death of a worker's own father or mother, the 
employer shall provide a grant of K50.
29. Change of Ownership of Business or Enterprise
In the event of change of ownership of business or enterprise 
the current employer shall pay accrued benefits in accordance 
with Clause 4(a)(i), in addition to statutory payments due.
30. Disturbance Allowance
(a) It is agreed that employees may be transferred from one 
station to another and that upon being so transferred, 
the employer shall be responsible for moving the 
worker's own household and personal effects.
(b) Employees on transfer from one station to another will 
be paid a disturbance allowance as follows:
(i) Single - K50
(ii) Married - K75.
31. Discipline
(a) Policy - The Union acknowledges that it is the function 
of the employer to maintain order, discipline and 
efficiency and that it may be necessary to discharge, 
dismiss, suspend or otherwise penalise employees for 
proper cause, in accordance with the agreed statement 
of disciplinary policy for the industry, provided that 
disciplinary action shall be made known to the Union 
and may be subject to discussion.
(b) Suspension - The employer reserves the right to suspend 
an employee from employment with or without pay for a 
maximum of thirty days, depending on the gravity of the 
offence. The employer shall have the discretion to
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extend the suspension subject to the agreement by the 
Works Council. (emphasis given) If after the 
completion of the investigations the employee is 
cleared, he or she shall be entitled to full pay for 
the period of suspension.
(c) Code of Discipline - it is hereby agreed that the code 
of discipline provides for the following penalities in 
regard to relevant breach of discipline:
Offence - Three late-comings of ten minutes and above 
within thirty days period.
Penalties:
1st Breach - written warning.
2nd Breach - written warning.
3rd Breach - Final written warning.
4th Breach - Discharge.
Offence - Absent from work without permission for a 
period of less than five consecutive days.
Penalties:
1st Breach - written warning and loss of pay.
2nd Breach - Final written warning and suspension 
without pay for up to seven days.
3rd Breach - Discharge.
Offence - Absent from work without permission for five 
or more consecutive days (deemed as desertion) .
Penalty*
1st Breach - Summary dismissal.
Offence - Lack of efficiency, leaving work station 
without permission, negligence, disturbing fellow 
workers, or failure to comply with Company instructions 
communicated to him in writing.
Penalties:
1st Breach - written warning 
2nd Breach - Final written warning 
3rd Breach - Discharge.
Offence - Insulting, threatening, violating safety 
rules, sleeping on duty, unauthorised Press statements, 
petty theft of K5 or less and soliciting assistance or 
influence outside the terms of grievance procedures*
Penalties*
1st Breach - written warning with suspension 
without pay for not more than thirty days.
2nd Breach - Discharge.
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Offence - Drunkenness on duty, fighting a co-worker on 
the work premises, without causing disruption, as 
evidenced by a Supervisor and two witnesses, one of 
whom should be a workers' representative wherever 
possible.
Penalty:
1st Breach - Discharge.
Offence - Theft, fraud, forgery at work, malicious 
damage to employer's property, drunkenness on duty and 
causing disruption as evidenced by a Supervisor and two 
witnesses one of whom should be a workers' 
representative wherever possible, riotous behaviour at 
work place, refusal to obey lawful instructions, 
starting or provoking a fight with customers or 
co-workers in a public area of work premises.
Penalty:
1st Breach - Summary dismissal.
Offence - Gross negligence.
Penalty:
1st Breach - Summary dismissal.
Offence - Using or attempting to use services provided 
by the establishment for customers or serving any 
member of the staff or providing him/her with 
facilities provided by the establishment for customers 
without authority from the management.
Penalties:
1st Breach - Final written warning and suspension
without pay for not more than thirty days.
2nd Breach - Discharge.
(d) Expiry of Warning Period - Where the employee is given 
written warning for any offence the warning shall stand 
for a period of two years unless otherwise stated. 
Should he in this period commit no offence the warning 
will lapse.
32. Effective Date and Duration of Agreement
It is hereby agreed that this Joint Collective Agreement is 
effective from 1st January 1985, and shall remain binding on 
both parties for two years up to 31st December 1986, 
inclusive, except for the clause dealing with wages which may 
be amended annually by mutual agreement on the basis of 
Government's wage policy changes (emphasis given) from time 
to time. Neither party may vary or rescind any part of this
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Agreement unless such variation, addition or deletion is 
accepted by the other party in writing and is ratified by the 
Prices and Incomes Commission (emphasis given) or such other 
body as may from time to time be responsible for ratification 
of Collective Agreements.
In the event that it becomes necessary to amend parts of the 
Agreement the party proposing such an amendment shall give 
the other party two weeks' notice in writing, detailing the 
nature of the amendment being proposed. The other party 
shall be obliged to respond to the proposals within two 
weeks; and no longer than two weeks from the date of such 
reply, parties shall meet to discuss the proposed change or 
amendment.
This Agreement replaces the one signed on 9th December 1982, 
and published as Gazette Notice No 513 of 1983.
Signed and witnessed this 4th day of January 1985.
For and on behalf of  the Hotel and Catering As s o c i a t i o n  of 
Zambia:
For and on behalf of the Hotel and Catering Workers' Union of 
Zambia:
Schedule A
Grade Classification - Category of Employees
(Omitted)
APPENDIX V
LIST OF MAJOR REPORTS, RESEARCH AND CASE STUDIES ON WORKERS' 
PARTICIPATION IN ZAMBIA CONSULTED.
Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Reports of 
National Symposium and Workshop on Industrial Participatory 
Democracy. (Held at the President's Citizenship College, Kabwe, 
1976 and 1977), (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1976, 1977).
Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Report of Special 
Commission on Workers' Participation in Equity, appointed 1977 
(unpublished circa, 1978).
Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Annual Reports, 
1976-82, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1976-82).
Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Findings of 
Departmental Survey on Workers' Participation, (unpublished, circa 
1980).
Department of Industrial Participatory Democracy, Reports of 
Workshops and Seminars on Industrial Participatory Democracy.
(Held at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka), October 1981, June 1982,
December 1982, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1981 and 1982).
Schmidt C T, "Works Councils in the Republic of Zambia: A 
Preliminary Assessment After the First Year of Implementation", 
Paper Submitted to the 5th World Congress of the International 
Industrial Relations Association, (Paris: 3 - 7  September, 1979).
Fincham R and Zulu G, "Labour and Participation in Zambia" in 
Turok B (ed), Development in Zambia, (London: Zed Press, 1979).
Fincham R and Zulu G, "Works Councils in Zambia: The 
Implementation of Industrial Participatory Democracy", (1980) Vol 
5, No 2, Labour and Society.
Mwiya M, "Workers' Participation in Management in Zambia:
Evolution, Essential Features, Constraints and Potential",
M.A. Dissertation, (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1979).
Beele E, "Towards Effective Worker Participation in Zambia", LL.M. 
Dissertation, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1983).
Kalula E, (Project Leader), "The Practical Effect of the Industrial 
Relations Act Provisions on Works Councils", Zambia Labour 
Relations Project, (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1982-83), 
(unpublished survey).
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Weiss M (Mission expert) , Technical Memorandum to the Government of 
the Republic of Zambia on a Mlaaion to advise on the functioning of 
the Works Councils System. (Geneva» ILO, 1983) - Confidential 
Report at the time consulted.
Grozdanic S (Mission expert), Technical Memorandum to the 
Government of Zambia on a Mission to Advise on the Functioning of 
the Works Councils System, (Geneva: ILO, 1983) - Confidential 
report at the time.
Grozdanic S (Mission expert), Technical Memorandum to the 
Government of Zambia on a Mission co Advise on the Preparation of 
Self-Management Experiments in Pilot Enterprises, (Genevas ILO, 
1983) - Confidential Report at the time consulted.
Kester G, Industrial Participatory Democracy and Trade Unions« 
Report of an Exploratory Study in Zambia, (The Hague: Institute 
of Social Studies, 1984).
Kalombo J F, Hambulo R, Nanyangwe P, (Consultant: Grozdanic S ) , 
"Case Study on the ROP (1975) Ltd, Ndola", Second Phase Case 
Studies, International Research Project on Workers' Self-Management 
and Participation as a Factor of Social Change and Economic 
Progress in Developing Countries. (Lusaka« Industrial 
Participatory Democracy Department, 1984).
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Congress (of South Africa)
BSA British South Africa Company
CGT General Confederation of Trade Unions
CISB Copper Industry Service Bureau
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IFCTU International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
IILS International Institute for Labour Studies
ILO International Labour Office/Organisation
ILR International Labour Review
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDECO Industrial Development Corporation
IPD Industrial Participatory Democracy Department
IRA, 1971 Industrial Relations Act, 1971
LEGCO Legislative Council
MUZ Mineworkers' Union of Zambia
NCIWU National Commercial and Industrial Workers’ Union
NUBEGW National Union of Building, Engineering and General 
Workers
NRAMU Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Union
NRMWU Northern Rhodesia Mineworkers' Union
RRAWU Rhodesia Railways African Workers' Union
TUC Trades Union Congress (British)
UN IP United National Independence Party
ZCCM Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZCTU Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZFE Zambia Federation of Employers
ZICR Zambia Industrial Case Reports
ZIMCO Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZLRP Zambia Labour Relations Project
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